WORLD DEVELOPMENTS:
Environmental Developments
World Overview
Iraq and Iran
Asia (including the Middle East)
Europe
Latin America
U.S. and Canada
UN and Other International
WORLD DEVELOPMENTS
Steve Sachs
Environmental Developments
Bill McKibben, “Civilization’s last chance: The planet is nearing a tipping point on climate change, and it gets much worse, fast,” Los Angeles Times, May 11, 2008 (http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-op-mckibben11-2008may11,0,4443965.story), reports, “A few weeks ago, NASA’s chief climatologist, James Hansen, submitted a paper to Science magazine with several coauthors. The abstract attached to it argued — and I have never read stronger language in a scientific paper — that ‘if humanity wishes to preserve a planet similar to that on which civilization developed and to which life on Earth is adapted, paleoclimate evidence and ongoing climate change suggest that CO2 will need to be reduced from its current 385 ppm to at most 350 ppm.’ Hansen cites six irreversible tipping points — massive sea level rise and huge changes in rainfall patterns, among them — that we’ll pass if we don’t get back down to 350 soon; and the first of them, judging by last summer’s insane melt of Arctic ice, may already be behind us. So it’s a tough diagnosis. It’s like the doctor telling you that your cholesterol is way too high and, if you don’t bring it down right away, you’re going to have a stroke. So you take the pill, you swear off the cheese, and, if you’re lucky, you get back into the safety zone before the coronary. It’s like watching the tachometer edge into the red zone and knowing that you need to take your foot off the gas before you hear that clunk up front. In this case, though, it’s worse than that because we’re not taking the pill and we are stomping on the gas — hard. Instead of slowing down, we’re pouring on the coal, quite literally. Two weeks ago came the news that atmospheric carbon dioxide had jumped 2.4 parts per million last year — two decades ago, it was going up barely half that fast.” The one counter finding is that the Greenland Glacier is melting more slowly than recently reported. It has now been found that the huge run off of water from glogal warming caused melting ceases during the coldest months. However, the melting of glaciers in Antarctica appears to be releasing DDT, frozen into the ice prior to the ending of widespread DDT use in the 1970s, according to a study published in Ma.y by Heid Geisz in the Journal of Environmental Science. On the hopeful side, a study by M. Debora Iglasias-Rodrigez and Paul Halloran in the Journal of Science, in early April, found that the cocolithopore algae, a cornerstone of the ocean floor food chain, unlike many speceas, grow better in more acidic waters brought on by more carbon dioxide in the air. Like many species, warmer oceans are friendly to its growth. It is higher CO2 levels, not warming oceans, that are harmful to many ocean speceas.
An internal review committee of the World Bank, found, in July, that the bank and its partners had failed to put into practice pledges of environmental sustainability in recent financing of dams, pipelines, palm plantation and other development. The journal, PLoS Medicine, reported a study, in late July, linking the International Monetary Fund to rises in tuberculosis rates in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, saying that IMF requirements for loan eligibility caused the nations involved to reduce spend9ing on health care.
The April Bangkok international conference to take first steps in drafting a post Koyoto treaty to meet climate change, for the first time found internationalk agreement on regulating emmissins from air planes and ships. In July, at its meeting in Japan, the G8 nations agreed to cut their greenhouse gas emissions in half by 2050, but set no goals for the next decade, which some critics found disappointing. Others said that the agreement set the stage for detailed plans to be drawn up at upcoming meetings. James Kanter, “The Trouble with Markets for Carbon.” The New York Times, June 20, 2008, reports that the European Union carbon trading program has not been functioning properly, initially issuing too many carbon permits, because of political pressure in the member nations, who regulate carbon emissions in their own borders, and that the over allowance has increased over time. The EU is considering moving to a union wide system of issuing carbon permits. to make the cap and trade system actually reduce carbon dioxide pollution. For a more extensive discussion of the issue, see, Stephen M. Sachs, “Developing a Legitimate Carbon Trading Program To Appropriately Abate Global Warming,” in Articles, below. France is continuing to focus on nuclear power, which currently supplies 77% of its electricity, and has plans to build two additional atomic generating stations. Meanwhile, Elizabeth Rosenthal, “Europe Turns Back to Coal, Raising Alarms on Climate Change,: The New York Times, April 23, 2008, reports that, faced with high oil prices, Italy is converting many of its oil powered electrical generating plants to coal, increasing reliance on coal in the country from 14% to 33% in five years. Similar developments are slated elsewhere in Europe, which overall has plans for some 50 new coal powered electrical generating stations in th next five years. World wide (but not in the U.S.) there is a similar trend. See Martin Fackler, “A Global Comeback for Coal,” The New York Times, May 22, 2008.
In a move criticized by environmentalists as much too little, far too late, President Bush called for the U.S. to stop its increase in greenhouse gas emissions by 2025, April 16. It was revealed in June that the White House, in December, refused to open an EPA E-mail concluding that greenhouse gasses are pollutants that must be contoled. In July, a former staff member stated that Vice President Chaney’s office blocked publication of a report on the health risks of global warming. In August, EPA refused a request to reduce the required ethanol content for automobile gasoline, holding that, at the moment, reducing U.S. dependence on foreign oil is more important than limiting the rise in the price of corn (See Mathew Wald, “EPA Declines to Reduce the Quota for Ethanol in Cars,” The New York Times, August 8, 2008,http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/washington/08ethanol.html?scp=1&sq=E.P.A%20Declines%20to%20Reduce%20the%20Quota%20for%20Ethanol&st=cse). The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), in July, under public pressure, lifted an earlier temporary moratorium on new solar power development on public lands. The U.S. National Center for Atmospheric Research, in making budget reductions, has cut a program that assists less affluent nations in developing their ability to forecast and withstand floods, droughts and other aspects of climate change. Polar Bears were added to the U.S. list of endangered species, in May. California, in June, moved to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 though requiring more energy efficient buildings and appliances, generating one-third of its energy renewably and reducing automotive emissions.
A new study finds a direct link between increases in rising temperatures and heavy rains, showing that historically the impact of higher temperatures on increasing heavy rain is about twice that predicted by currently widely accepted predictions from computer simulations. (See Andrew Revkin, “Warm Spells Are Linked, In a Study, to Heavy Rains,” The New York Times, August 8, 2008). “Sea Levels Rise Faster than Estimated,” The New York Times, June 19, 2008 stated that a recent study uncovered a small error in previous ocean research, showing that the seas are warming and rising faster than previously predicted. From 1961 to 2003, ocean rise was two inches, about 50% more than th previous projection.
Six years of drought in Australia have reduced its rice crop, that once fed 20 million people, by 98%, contributing to the world food shortage, The rising price of rice – and also of other food items – has been an increasing cause and threat of unrest in Asia, and elsewhere. Inflation in Asia is causing increases in the price of products produced on that continent, which are then passed on. The effect is being doubly felt in the U.S. whose falling dollar already makes imorts increasingly more expensive. Another cause of growing world food shortages, according to Keith Bradsher and Andrew Martin, “Crop Research Is Neglected, And Third World Pays Price” The New York Times, May 18, 2008, reports that budget reductions to various agricultural research institutions, during recent years of world food production surpluses (distribution problems causing local shortages), is currently resulting in a loss of increasingly needed agricultural capacity. An additional cause of rising food coasts is that at least 29 nations have limited food exports. As of June 20, 14 countries had banned or limited rice exports, and15 had restricted wheat sales abroad. Argentina has had farmers periodically blockading roads to try to force the government to drop a new food export tariff. Mexico announced, in June, that it would freeze prices on more than 150 products to assist families in coping with inflation.
Steven Erlanger, “UN Panel. Urges Changes to Feed Poor While Saving the Environment,” The New York Times, April 16, 2008, reports that The International Assessment of International Science and Technology for Development holds that a number of factors are increasing food prices to the point where sufficient basic foods are not affordable in developing nations. Contributing factors include climate change, rise in population, rise in fuel and transportation costs, shifting from food to biofuel production, and EU dumping of food surpluses below the price of production in developing nations. In the year leading up to the report, world wheat prices rose 130%, and soy 87%. , with over all food prices up about 83%, making food become 60%-80% of consumer spending in developing nations. The report credits food inflation in setting off violent protests in 12 countries, bringing tens of deaths and the dismissal of Haiti’s prime minister. The World Bank Intends to almost double its lending for agriculture in 2009, to $800 million. The President of the World Bank called upon developed nations to contribute an additional $500 million to the UN World Food Program. President Bush ordered $200 million in addition l emergency food aid to be made available by the U.S. In the Horn of Africa, rising food prices have compounded the nutrition crisis already serious from warfare.
Foreign Policy in Focus (http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5442) reported, August 12, “The food crisis continues, and the international community has not managed to marshal sufficient resources to tackle the problem. As FPIF contributor Sophia Murphy writes, food aid contributions have plummeted to only about one-third of 1999 levels, and the UN reports that countries have offered less than half of what is needed for just the most severely affected countries.
Record fuel prices are causing other problems aside from food and general inflation. By April, rising fuel costs were already crippling U.S airlines, leading to a new round of bankruptcies among smaller carriers. In the U.S., rising prices of gasoline and diesel have brought a reduction in automobile use over the last year. In June, Spanish truckers protested rising fuel prices by blockading the border with France with their stopped trucks, causing critical shortages of some goods. Drivers in other European countries have also protested, sometimes with slow downs. In countries using the Euro, in March, inflation had reached its highest annual rate (3.5%) since 1992. India’s fiscal gains of about 9% per annum, from economic growth, were reported, in June, to have been offset in recent months by fuel and food inflation.
The Global Invasive Species Program, the Nature Conservancy, ane the International Union of Concerned Scientists, jpoined by other organizations, presented a paper at a UN meeting in Bonn, Germany in June, warning that current moves to develop plants that are fast growing weeds and invasive species for biofuel posses serious dangers, as such plants easily spread from biofuel farms, and grow rapidly.
In response to a great increase in illegal logging in its Amazon region, late last year, Brazil has begun an intense campaign to crack down on illegal logging.
Severe weather, consistent with global warming, has continued. The worst natural disaster to hit Asia since the tsunami of December 2004, occurred in early May when Cyclone Nardis slammed into Myanmar, (Burma), killing over 100,000 people in the midst of very severe damage over a wide area. North America has continued to experience more and more severe tornadoes, over a longer severe storm season, while drought in the west has been combined with large snow and rain storms in many places, at time causing severe flooding. In Midwest there has been unusually heavy rainfall this spring bringing the worst flooding in 30 years, and in Iowa record flooding in some areas. In Cedar Rapids, which had never been flooded, much of the city was under water with the Cedar River 12 feet above its highest known previous record level. In a year farmers are trying to raise record crops, a long wet spring, delaying much planting, followed by the floods, is setting the stage for a poor corn crop and reduced soy bean yields. Another longer and more fierce tornado season has been taking place. Continued drying of the West, bringing a long and firce fire season – with more than 2000 wild fires in California, In June, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California issued a water alert, requesting communities ti improve and strengthen their water conservation rules. Drought has continued – occasionally relieved by rain – in the South East. In April, the Army Corps of Engineers proposed a new water sharing plan for the South East, involving increasing water storage in lakes and rivers. Climate Change continues to have a major impact in Europe, where considerable reductions in rainfall in Spain, combined with growing demand, are sparking conflict over shrinking water. Barcelona has begun importing water by ship to meet the growing shortages.
A report posted May 27 by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program,, The effects of climate change on agriculture, land resources, water resources, and biodiversity in the United States, http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-3/final-report/default.htm, reviewing existing studies, projected a disruption of water supplies, agriculture, forestry and ecosystems in the U.S. for decades, particularly in the next 25 to 50 years. It forecasts a major water problem in the western United States, with growing demand great reductions in supply. Rainfall in the west during the 2040-2060 period is anticipated to be 20% below 1901-1970 levels, and even lower in the rapidly growing Southwest. The Midwest and East are expected to experience an increase of rainfall during that period exceeding 20% above 1901-1970 levels. The spread of nonnative plants and insects is also predicted to impact the nation, and particularly agriculture. Soy beans and corn are seen as growing faster, but more subject to crop failures from summer temperature spikes that can prevent pollination. The report stated that reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is important to lower the long term impact of global warming, but was not seen as having a major effect in the short run.
The International Crisis Group (ICG) stated, June 9, “The fear of China ‘locking up’ energy supplies around the world is misplaced, and other countries should work with it to ensure a more cooperative international environment on both energy and wider security issues (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5478&l=1).”
Tony Phillips, “Climate Change Cause and Effect, An Americas Perspective,” Americas Program, December 20, 2007 (http://americas.irc-online.org/am/4839) in part of a much broader report finds, “South America produces much of its energy from hydroelectricity, particularly Brazil, Venezuela, and Paraguay (a net exporter of electricity). But the IPCC projects that sea level rising, melting glaciers, and extreme weather events will adversely affects these same rivers. As sea levels rise, marine salt water moves upriver endangering water supplies for large delta cities such as Buenos Aires, Argentina, which takes its drinking water supply from the River Plate, the delta of the river Paraná. Chile too derives a healthy proportion of its renewable electricity generation from hydroelectric plants from dammed rivers in the Andes, however melting glaciers in the high Andes compromises water supplies and hydroelectric supplies in all Andes nations from Colombia to Chile and Argentina. Glacial melting compromises year-round hydroelectric power production, and increases the risk of flooding in river valleys.”
Robert Alvarez, “Nuclear Recycling Fails the Test,” Foreign Policy In Focus, July 7, 2008, www.fpif.org, concludes, “Over the past few years, attention to the recycling of nuclear power spent fuel has grown. Fears of global warming due to fossil fuel burning have given nuclear energy a boost; over the next 15 years dozens of new power reactors are planned world-wide. To promote nuclear energy, the Bush administration is seeking to establish international spent nuclear fuel recycling centers that are supposed to reduce wastes, recycle uranium, and convert nuclear explosive materials, such as plutonium to less troublesome elements in advanced power reactors.” “The key to recycling is being able to reuse materials while reducing pollution, saving money and making the earth a safer place. On all accounts, nuclear recycling fails the test…. In order to recycle uranium and plutonium in power plants, spent fuel has to be treated to chemically separate these elements from other highly radioactive byproducts. As it chops and dissolves used fuel rods, a reprocessing plant releases about 15 thousand times more radioactivity into the environment than nuclear power reactors and generates several dangerous waste streams. If placed in a crowded area, a few grams of waste would deliver lethal radiation doses in a matter of seconds. They also pose enduring threats to the human environment for tens of thousands of years. In Europe reprocessing has created higher risks and has spread radioactive wastes across international borders. Radiation doses to people living near the Sellefield reprocessing facility in England were found to be 10 times higher than for the general population…. Health studies indicate that significant excess childhood cancers have occurred near French and English reprocessing plants Experts have not ruled out radiation as a possible cause, despite intense pressure from the nuclear industry to do so. Nuclear recycling in the U.S. has created in one of the largest environmental legacies in the world. Between the 1940’s and the late 1980’s, the Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessors reprocessed tens of thousands of tons of spent fuel in order to reuse uranium and make plutonium for nuclear weapons.“ “With design changes, fast reactors are, ironically, being touted in the U.S. as a means to get rid of plutonium. However, the experience with “fast reactors” over the past 50 years is laced with failure. At least 15 “fast” reactors have been closed due to costs and accidents in the U.S., France, Germany, England, and Japan. There have been two fast reactor fuel meltdowns in the United States including a mishap near Detroit in the 1960’s. Russia operates the remaining fast reactor, but it has experienced 15 serious fires in 23 years. Plutonium makes up about 1 percent of spent nuclear fuel and is a powerful nuclear explosive, requiring extraordinary safeguards and security to prevent theft and diversion…. The unsuccessful history of fast reactors has created a plutonium legacy of major proportions. Of the 370 metric tons of plutonium extracted from power reactor spent fuel over the past several decades, about one third has been used. Currently, about 200 tons of plutonium sits at reprocessing plants around the world – equivalent to the amount in some 30,000 nuclear weapons in global arsenals.” “In 2007 the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded that ‘reprocessed uranium currently plays a very minor role in satisfying world uranium requirements for power reactors….’” Uranium, which makes up about 95 percent of spent fuel, cannot be reused in the great majority of reactors without increasing the levels of a key source of energy, uranium 235, from 1 to 4 percent, through a complex and expensive enrichment process. Reprocessed uranium also contains undesirable elements that make it highly radioactive and reduces the efficiency of the fuel…. Contaminants in reprocessed uranium also foul up enrichment and processing facilities, as well as new fuel. Once it is recycled in a reactor, larger amounts of undesirable elements build up – increasing the expense of reuse, storage and disposal. Given these problems, it’s no surprise that DOE plans include disposal of future reprocessed uranium in landfills, instead of recycling.” In the end, risks aside, the author reports recycling nuclear fuel to be impractical. The National Academy of sciences concluded, “It would cost up to $500 billion in 1996 dollars and take 150 years to accomplish the transmutation of plutonium and other dangerous long-lived radioactive toxins. Ten years later the idea remains as costly and technologically unfeasible as it was in the 1990s. In 2007 the Academy once again tossed cold water on the Bush administration’s effort to jump start nuclear recycling by concluding that ‘there is no economic justification for going forward with this program at anything approaching a commercial scale.’”
Since the first report of the Emerald Ash Borer(EAB) in Michigan, in 2002, the state has lost over 20 million ash trees, and the numbers continue to rise. The entire lower peninsula of Michigan is under a “no ash movement” quarantine, and the EAB continues to spread and infect entire ash lots, eventually killing off once healthy, thriving ash trees. Climate Change is threatening the viability of the black truffle, in France, as harvests of the plant used in gourmet foods has been declining for several years. Eurasian quagga mussels have been colonizing the Colorado River in thick layers, in the western U.S., disrupting habitats and clogging water intakes, much as zebra mussles have done. Usually, mercury polluting river water remains in the river, except when its water is used, or its fish eaten. However, a study by Daniel A. Crystol and Colleagues at the College of William and Mary, reported in Science, in April, found non-aquatic, non-fish eating birds had high levels of mercury, that breed within 50 yards of the South River in Virginia, which has high mercury pollution. In Deleware Bay, the red knot, s bird which migrates as far south as the tip of South America to Delaware Bay, stopping to refuel on horseshoe crab eggs to complete the final leg of its incredible migration to the Canadian Arctic, has declined 90% in population over the past 10 years.
Another major report on the non-sustainability of industrial factory farms, and the major health, environmental, financial and quality of life threats they create, was been released, in April, by the Pew Charitable Trusts and Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in a jointly sponsored report entitled “Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm Animal Production in America.” A later report by the Union of Concerned Scientists entitled “CAFOs Uncovered: The Untold Costs of Confined Animal Feeding Operations” reached similar conclusions. Articles on the issue include: Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm Animal Production in America, A Project of The Pew Charitable Trusts and Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, April 29, 2008, http://www.ncifap.org/_images/PCIFAP%20FINAL%20REPORT.pdf’ “Farm Animal Industry Must Change, Says Pew Commission,” April 29, 2008, http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2008/04/29/8622/; “Report Targets Costs Of Factory Farming, : Washington Post, April 20, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/29/AR2008042902602_pf.html; and “Confined Animal Feeding Operations Cost Taxpayers Billions, New Report Finds – Science Group Calls for Policies that Reduce CAFO Subsidies and Encourage Modern, Sustainable Meat, Milk and Egg Production,” April 24, 2008, http://www.ucsusa.org/news/press_release/cafo-costs-report-0113.html. For more information, contact the supplier of this information, Joseph Miller, Associate Professor of Psychology, Saint Mary’s College, Box 51, Madeleva Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556, jmiller@saintmarys.edu.
Dean Suagee (dsuagee@hsdwdc.com), Hobbs, Straus, Dean & Walker, LLP, reported May 9, in the United States, “Each home’s contribution to global warming is slight, but in the aggregate, energy consumption in residential buildings accounts for about 20 percent of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. If you add the energy consumption associated with commercial and industrial buildings, buildings account for nearly half of GHG emissions in the U.S. The good news is that we know how to build homes and other buildings so that they use very little energy, including the use of passive solar design techniques such as heating, ventilation, daylighting and shading. Although we know how to do this, it is apparently going to take us some time to make it the standard practice. One organization, Architecture 2030, calls for all new buildings to be carbon-neutral by 2030. This means that not only would all new buildings not consume fossil fuels for heating and cooling, they would get their electricity from renewable sources. Bringing about the transition to zero-net energy buildings – making this the standard practice for new construction – will require regulatory measures, financial assistance programs, and government support for voluntary efforts. The basic regulatory tool is a building code. Since about 1992, the federal government has had a program to help states and local governments incorporate energy efficiency requirements into their building codes. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 added statutory authorization for ”incentive funding” to states that achieve and document a 90 percent rate of compliance with building codes that meet or exceed the 2004 edition of the accepted standards for residential and commercial buildings. The act authorizes appropriation of $25 million per year for this program, including $500,000 for training state and local government officials. This pattern of federal assistance has overlooked the fact that, for buildings on lands within their jurisdiction, it is tribal governments that have the authority to enact and implement building codes. Tribal governments have simply been left out of this federal assistance program.“
In a major speech, in July, Al Gore, stated, “Today I challenge our nation to commit to producing 100 percent of our electricity from renewable energy and truly clean carbon-free sources within 10 years.” the speech can be viewed at http://www.moveon.org/r?r=3945&id=13269-7149917-5G0yjEx&t=3>http://www.moveon.org/r?r=3945&id=13269-7149917-5G0yjEx&t=3).
A report issued by the Netherlands Environmental Association in June, confirms that China became the worlds leading producer of greenhouse gasses, last summer, as China’s carbon dioxide production grew by 8% in 2007, to exceed the previous leader in CO2 pollution, the United State, by 14%.The Alaska coastal village of Kivlina, forced to relocate because of flooding following from climate change, brought suite in federal cour, in February, against 14 electric utilities, 5 oil companies and the largest U.S. coal company, claiming the firms are responsible for the flooding and relocation of the village, Much of the world’s coral, already being killed by higher carbon dioxide levels in the air, making the seas more acid, in some tropical areas is being smothered by a tough seaweed, eucheuma Algae, that costal and island people in warmer Pacific areas have been encouraged to grow as a source of carrageenan, a binder and fat substitute used in certain foods, including some ice creams. Algae eating fish do not eat this algae, and leave reefs that become covered with it. Once coral dies, it collapses into rubble in about 20 years, leaving formerly protected coastline open to destruction from storms and large waves.
Sarah Stuteville, “Lake Victoria beset by environmental problems,” San Francisco Chronicle, June 24, 2008, available at: http://www.pulitzercenter.org/openitem.cfm?id=993, reports, “Lake Victoria, the world’s largest tropical lake at 26,560 square miles and the second-largest freshwater lake in the world, is losing water at an alarming rate – at least six feet in the past four years. As a result, the waterway may soon join the list of dying lakes, some ecologists say. The reasons are varied: rising temperatures, invasive species, hydroelectric dams, and about 30 million fishermen and dirt farmers from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda who eke out a living from the lake and use it as their primary source of water. ‘When the water goes down here, we have to follow the fish” into deeper waters, said fisherman Idi Obiero. “That’s the only way you can get enough to feed your family.’” “The once-abundant iridescent tilapia and Nile perch are slowly disappearing from the Kenyan side. The Nile perch, introduced in the 1950s to increase fish yields, became a predator of several indigenous species such as the striped haplochromis. And on top of all this, the climate is changing.” “However, a 2006 study by Berkeley’s International Rivers places much of the blame for the lake’s woes on dam projects by Uganda. The Kiira Dam, built in 1999 alongside the 1954 Owen Falls Dam, uses Lake Victoria’s waters to generate power for Ugandan residents and export energy to neighboring nations. Both dams operate at the source of the Nile River, where it flows out of Lake Victoria.” “Nevertheless, Uganda began construction on yet another hydroelectric project last year – the $860 million Bujagali Dam. Although this project is designed to re-use water flowing out through the two existing dams, International Rivers criticizes it for relying on overly optimistic projections of its impact on Lake Victoria.” “Meanwhile, receding waters have raised tensions between the lake’s three neighboring countries. ‘We see (this issue) as a time bomb,’ Muramuzi said. ‘There will be conflicts in the region, among communities and among countries if these problems are not addressed soon.”
“Clean Water for Kenya,” a report by Jessica Partnow, public radio’s Living on Earth, 8/1/08, reports that In Kibera, a slum of Nairobi, Kenya, clean water is too scarce, and too expensive, leading to much serious disease. But a new technology that takes just a plastic bottle and six hours in the sun is helping reduce sickness and diarrhea in the community, and in other developing countries around the world. For more go to: http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.htm?programID=08-P13-00031&segmentID=6.
As part of a growing awareness and expression of concern by members of the middle class in China that environmental degradation is threat to their health, in July, residents of the provincial capital of Chengdu (Sichuan Provence) took to the streets to protest the building of a petrochemical plant.. In Bangladesh and adjacent sections of India rice is being grown with high levels of arsenic, because of use of water from arsenic contaminated wells. A quarter of a century after a toxic cloud escaping from the Union Carbide Pesticide factory in Bhopal, India killed thousands of people, tons of toxic sludge remains at the plant site, leaching into ground water and contaminating wells to an extent not determined by sparse monitoring.
Solar Thermal Systems, such as a solar tower plant outside of Seville, Spain, are beginning to come on line that can store solar energy for up to several days, as they heat molten salt to very high temperatures, which can be stored in large tanks, from which heat escapes very slowly This partially solves the difficulty of conventional solar and wind power that can only produce electricity while the sun shines or the wind blows.. Honda Motors began production of its FCX Clarity, which runs on a hydrogen fuel cell, in June. Only 200 are to be produced over the next three years, but after that mass production is anticipated.
World Overview
The International Crisis Group (ICG), Crisis Watch N°59, July 1, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5528, reported five actual or potential conflict situations around the world deteriorated in June 2008 and three improved. “In Zimbabwe, state-sponsored violence further escalated ahead of the 27 June presidential run-off vote, as the Mugabe regime continued its brutal crackdown to secure victory. Opposition MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai was detained five times over the month, opposition campaigning was repressed and the polling day itself marked by widespread voter intimidation. Up to 200,000 have been displaced in rural violence. Mugabe stood as the sole candidate after Tsvangirai withdrew on 22 June over election conditions. Mugabe’s election for a sixth term in office drew strong regional and international condemnation.“ Uganda’s fragile peace process continued to decay amid reports of fresh LRA attacks and threats from neighboring states to wage an armed offensive against LRA leader Joseph Kony if the impasse continues. Kony called for a resumption of talks late in June but still has not signed the final peace deal since first refusing in April. Insecurity exploded in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta, as militant groups launched a series of large-scale attacks, including the first ever assault on a deep offshore oilfield, following army raids on militant bases in early June. Progress on the much-delayed Niger Delta peace summit faltered, as groups protested President Yar‚Adua‚s failure to meet key preconditions. The situation also deteriorated in Djibouti/Eritrea and Chad.
The situation improved in North Korea, as the government submitted a long-awaited declaration of its nuclear programs on June 26. In response, the U.S. suggested the possibility of removing the DPRK from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, as a new round of six-party talks was expected. China and Taiwan also saw improvement in cross-Strait relations, agreeing to resume key transport ties at the first bilateral talks in over a decade. The situation also improved in Serbia.
Unchanged were Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Basque Country (Spain), Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chechnya (Russia), China (internal), Colombia, Comoros Islands, Côte d‚Ivoire, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, India (non-Kashmir), Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Occupied Territories, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Macedonia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Myanmar/Burma, Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Nepal, Niger, North Caucasus (non-Chechnya), Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Western Sahara, and Yemen.
ICG CrisisWatch N°60, 1 August 2008. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5611, found, “Six actual or potential conflict situations around the world deteriorated in July 2008 and three improved. In Somalia, divisions between hardliners and moderates within the Islamist opposition Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia threatened the already fragile peace deal signed in June. Amid continuing violence and government appeals for UN troop deployment, the African Union said that the newly extended AMISOM force was incapable of stabilising the situation. Continued deadly attacks on aid workers and lack of escorts for shipments further endangered humanitarian operations. In Afghanistan, a car bomb outside the Indian embassy killed scores, and was the deadliest attack in the capital since 2001. Relations with neighboring Pakistan reached a new low after Kabul alleged involvement by Pakistani intelligence services and shut down talks with Islamabad. Pakistan’s relations with India also deteriorated, in July, after bombings in Ahmedabad and a series of gunfire exchanges across the Line of Control in Kashmir. The situation also deteriorated in the North Caucasus, where violence spread throughout the region, and in Mongolia with deadly post-election riots.
“The situation improved in Serbia, where former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic was arrested in Belgrade and extradited to the ICTY – an important step towards EU integration by the newly approved pro-EU coalition government. In Colombia the army’s rescue of former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and 14 other hostages dealt a significant blow to FARC rebels. The situation also improved in Mali, where Algeria helped kick-start talks between the government and Tuareg rebels with a ceasefire 21 July. For August 2008 CrisisWatch identifies two Conflict Resolution Opportunities. In Zimbabwe, historic face-to-face talks between President Mugabe and MDC opposition leader Tsvangirai are due to resume on 3 August, presenting an opportunity to negotiate a way out of the violent four-month election crisis with a power-sharing government. In Sudan, events in the wake of the 14 July application by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for a warrant for Sudanese President Bashir create an important opportunity for progress on the stalled Darfur peace process, CPA implementation and accountability for past abuses.”
Unchanged were Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Basque Country (Spain), Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Chechnya (Russia), China (internal), Comoros Islands, Côte d‚Ivoire, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Georgia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Occupied Territories, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Macedonia, Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, Myanmar/Burma, Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somaliland (Somalia), Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Western Sahara, Yemen, and Zimbabwe
Michael T. Klare, “Global Power shift,” Foreign Policy in Focus, May 6, 2008 (http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5199), “In this new, challenging political landscape, the possession of potent military arsenals can be upstaged by the ownership of mammoth reserves of oil, natural gas, and other sources of primary energy. Hence, Russia, which escaped from the Cold War era in a shattered, demoralized condition, has reemerged as a major actor in the international arena by virtue of its colossal energy resources. For all its military might, the United States has, in contrast, sometimes found itself reduced to cajoling its foreign oil suppliers—including long-term allies such as Saudi Arabia—to increase their petroleum output in order to slow the upward spiral in energy prices. The “sole superpower” has, in short, found itself scrambling—on the battlefield, on global trading floors, and in diplomatic back rooms—to somehow come to terms with what Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-IN has termed “petro-superpowers”—nations that wield disproportionate power in the international system by virtue of their superior energy reserves. Other major energy-consuming nations have also been forced to adjust to this changing landscape. China, which enjoys enormous economic clout because of its enviable balance-of-payments position—in late 2007 its foreign currency reserves stood at a staggering $1.4 trillion—is nonetheless becoming ever more dependent on imported petroleum and so must scour the world for available supplies. Japan, with the world’s second largest economy—yet even more dependent on imported energy supplies than China—has found itself locked in fierce competition with Beijing for access to some of the same overseas reserves. On the other side of the ledger, energy-rich states like Kazakhstan and Nigeria have come to enjoy greater leverage in world affairs, attracting a constant stream of high-level visitors from energy-consuming nations—often bearing promises of investment financing, military aid, and other forms of largess.”
Theresa Hitchens and David Chen, “Forging a Sino-US ‘grand bargain’ in space,” ScienceDirect, June 2008, posted August 1, http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4351&from_page=../index.cfm, finds that recent events have made Sino-U.S. competition, and even conflict, in space increasingly likely, so it is important that the incoming U.S. administration have a bargaining strategy aimed at achieving improved security for U.S. space systems and forestalling an anti-satellite arms race with China.
On August 6, following Georgia beginning an offensive to retake its province of South Ossetia, Russian troops escalated cross boarder fighting with Georgia, invading Georgia’s separatist province of South Ossetia. Russian attacks extended beyond Georgia’s two separatist provinces into other areas of the country. By August 18, it appeared that a truce had been achieved, and that Russian troops would withdraw, but as of August 21, Russian troops were instead hardening their position. (see background details below).
Experts on terrorism stated, in June (Eric Schmitt, “Asian Gains Seen in Terror Fight,” The New York Times, June 7, 2008), that the terror networks that have caused the most deaths in Southeast Asia have suffered significant setbacks over the last three years, as a result of aggressive policing, improved intelligence and military operations, and falling away of public support. Sabrina Taverinse, “Turkish Schools Offer Pakistan a Gentler Islam,” The New York Times, May 4, 2008, reports that moderate Turkish Islamic schools in Pakistan, and 79 other countries, offer an alternative model to Madrasses “that could reduce the sway of militants.” Human Rights Watch charged, in July, that France’s fighting terrorism through sweeping arrests that often detain people with no connection to likely suspects, and aggressive interrogations and prosecutions, preventing suspects from having a fair trial, with too many arrests and convictions based upon scanty evidence, has created human rights abuses. Many critics also find the approach more counter productive than helpful, producing more faulty than correct intelligence, while creating support for terrorists among the groups targeted by counterterrorism actions.
The U.S. United Steelworkers merged with the largest labor organization in England and Ireland, in July, to form, Workers Uniting, the first global labor union, in launching a world wide labor strategy to meet the conditions of globalization.
Iraq and Iran
Douglas Macgregor, “Outside View: Iraq realities — Part 1,” first published by UPI, June 27, 2008, available at: http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4328&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=37&from_page=index.cfm, says, “Today, Americans have a better idea of how great that cost is going to be. U.S. President George W. Bush and his generals turned a limited military intervention to remove the unpopular leadership of a weak, incapable, organized crime state into a tragically destructive war of occupation waged against Iraq’s Sunni Arab population. In a long campaign that cost the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps 3,500 battle casualties, the generals applied the al-Qaida brand name to any Arab opposed to the U.S. military occupation — killing, wounding or incarcerating hundreds of thousands of Sunni Arabs, while driving an additional 3 million Arabs, most of whom are Sunni, out of Iraq.” “Today, the strategic outcome of that policy is no longer in doubt. Americans are spending $3 billion a week for the privilege of stationing 160,000 troops and about as many contractors on Iraqi soil. Yet, it is Iran, not the United States, that is shaping Iraq’s destiny. For those Americans who are in denial as to Iran’s pervasive and powerful influence in contemporary Iraq, they should consider that whenever cease-fire agreements have been brokered between Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Shiite-dominated government and the Shiite Arab nationalist Moqtada Sadr, they have never lasted.”
Douglas Macgregor, “Outside View: Iraq realities — Part 2 – Confronting Iran’s Strategic Victory – Part II,” first published by UPI, June 30, 2008, available at: http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4329&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=37&from_page=index.cfm, sees, “The suppression of violence and the reduction in U.S. casualties in Iraq over the past year and a half was not U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker’s or U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus’ accomplishment. It was achieved by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Even worse, the much celebrated ‘cash for cooperation policy’ implemented by Petraeus in the spring of 2007, which currently pays 90,000 of Iraq’s Sunni Arab insurgents nearly $300 million a year not to shoot at U.S. forces, is simply the latest chapter in a sad history of reinforcing Iranian strategic dominance by hardening the division of Arab Iraq into Sunni and Shiite states. It takes little imagination to see that Petraeus and Crocker are presiding over the division of Iraq into a small, impoverished Sunni area, a large, potentially oil-rich Kurdistan and an equally oil-rich Shiite-dominated state encompassing nine of Iraq’s largest provinces. This is a strategic outcome that will dramatically extend Iran’s influence inside Iraq and across the Middle East. The danger, of course, is that the Bush administration might begin a new war to reverse Iranian strategic influence in Iraq — influence that our generals and political leaders unwittingly aided and supported. But this would be pointless. Nothing helps suppress the Iranian theocracy’s very real internal opposition as does the present U.S. policy of regime overthrow, isolation, demonization and confrontation. A wiser U.S. policy demands an understanding of popular dissatisfaction inside Iran with the terrible mismanagement of Iran’s energy sector and economy. This understanding should lead to constructive diplomatic engagement, with the goal of extracting concessions the United States needs. Of course, engagement must also involve prospects for economic cooperation, a carefully programmed end to sanctions, as well as technical assistance for, and joint ventures with, Iran’s ailing energy sector. Negotiating with an Iranian leadership that has one foot in the seminary and the other in the bazaar will not be easy, but it is more likely to succeed than brute force.”
At the end of April, Iran was continuing to support the government of Iraq in reducing the influence of al-Sadr’s Militia, probably, in part, because Iran favors the Iraqi government’s plan to create a semi-autonomous region in the South, which might be disrupted if al-Sadr political supporters gain a great many seats in elections, in the fall. In early May, Iran ceased participating in talks with the U.S. over Iraq security, in protest of U.S. attacks on Shiite militia, in Iraq, As of late August, the Shiia dominated government in Baghdad was arresting the leaders of Suni citizens patrols, groups of former insurgents being paid by the U.S. not to fight.
As fighting with Shiite militias continued, particularly in three neighborhoods in Baghdad, April became the deadliest month for U.S. soldiers since September 2007, with 52 U.S. military personnel killed in what is officially considered “combat.”. For details on casualties go to: http://icasualties.org/oif/. Faiz Shakir, Amanda Terkel, Satyam Khanna, Matt Corley, Ali Frick, Benjamin Armbruster, and Matt Duss. “Sadr’s Surge,” Center for American Progress Action Fund: Progress Report, April 25, (http://www.americanprogressaction.org/progressreport/), “For the past several weeks, U.S. and Iraqi forces have been battling the Jaysh al-Mehdi, the militia of Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Supported by U.S. air strikes, U.S. and Iraqi troops have steadily moved into Sadrist neighborhoods in Basra and the Sadrist stronghold of Sadr City in northeast Baghdad. The fighting has resulted in heavy casualties. Voices of Iraq reported Sadrist Member of Parliament Falah Shenshel’s claim that “at least 400 civilians were killed and 1,720 others, including women and children, were wounded in the armed confrontations and bombarding operations that took place in Sadr city over the last three weeks.’ According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the weeks of fighting in the Shi’ite neighborhood ‘have destroyed the main market and isolated civilians from supplies of food and water,’ and several hospitals in Sadr City ‘have run out of basic medical supplies, including anesthesia and dressings.” Despite President Bush hailing Iraqi efforts at the onset of hostilities in mid-March, subsequent accounts reveal that the Iraq army has performed poorly, requiring U.S. forces to play a much bigger role in the fighting than they had intended. The BBC reported that it was ‘clear that although the initial military planning was Iraqi, U.S. and British forces [were] deeply involved.’ Sadr was giving indications that he may set aside his political ambitions and restart ‘a full-scale fight against U.S.-led forces.’ Though Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Bush administration have characterized the spring offensive as a crackdown on “criminals,” many observers believe that it is an attempt by Maliki and his political allies to do by force what they can not do through elections: weaken the Sadr movement in advance of provincial elections in November, when the Sadrists are widely expected to make gains in Baghdad and in Iraq’s Shi’a south.” However, as of mid-August, political infighting has been preventing the Iraqi parliament from passing the necessary measures to bring about elections in November.
Internatioanl Crisis Group, “Iraq after the Surge,” April 30, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5415&l=1, finds, “The U.S. military surge contributed to a significant reduction in violence but has reached the limit of what it can achieve. Without fundamental political changes in Iraq, success will remain fragile and dangerously reversible.” “The Sunni insurgency has been seriously weakened. Previously marginalised Sunni tribes found in the U.S. a new patron and turned against al-Qaeda in Iraq. Increasingly divided and with several important groups co-opted by the U.S., the armed movements are a shadow of their former selves. As for al-Qaeda in Iraq, it appears in disarray, a victim of U.S. attacks but also of its own brutal excesses. Yet these trends are not necessarily permanent and hardly equate with durable Sunni Arab acceptance of the political process. Instead, U.S. policy is bolstering a set of local actors operating beyond the state’s realm or the rule of law and who impose their authority by force of arms.” “Lack of progress on the political front shows that the current piecemeal approach should be replaced with efforts to bring about a broad agreement.” Joost Hiltermann, Crisis Group‚s Middle East and North Africa Deputy Program Director, states, “The issues at the heart of the political struggle cannot be solved individually or sequentially and the current governing structure does not want, nor is able, to take advantage of the surge to produce agreement on fundamentals. A dramatic departure from the current approach is required.” “The only lasting solution lies in creating non-sectarian, impartial and functional state institutions. To this end, the U.S. government must cease unconditional military support to the Iraqi government and, instead, adjust such support by assessing the behaviour of Iraqi military bodies. Along with the United Nations, the U.S. should press for, and assist the Iraqi government in organising, free, fair, inclusive and safe provincial council elections by 1 October 2008. It should insist on a broader political process aimed at a new national compact. And it should engage in genuine regional diplomacy, including with Iran and Syria, with a view to defusing regional tensions and agreeing on red lines regarding policy toward Iraq. ‘”or years, the U.S. pursued a lofty strategy = the spread of democracy; Iraq as a regional model ˆ detached from any realistic tactics,” says Robert Malley, Crisis Group‚s Middle East and North Africa Program Director. ‘And yet, with Washington having finally adopted a set of smart, pragmatic tactics, the risk today is that the U.S. finds itself devoid of any overarching strategy.’”
In July, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated that he wanted the United States to withdraw its troops from Iraq, perhaps before the end of 2009, rejecting the Bush administration’s desire for a long term U.S. military presence. With elections in Iraq approaching, and a great majority of Iraqis opposed to a prolonged U.S. occupation, Maliki can not afford to go along with Bush on continued occupation. Gor more see: “Iraqi prime minister advocates withdrawal timetable,” Los Angeles Times, July 8, 2008, <http://www.moveon.org/r?r=3940&id=13247-1653571-A4kROxx&t=2>http://www.moveon.org/r?r=3940&id=13247-1653571-A4kROxx&t=2. In late August, a draft accord worked out between the U.S. and Iraq governments for U.S. combat troops to be out of Iraqi cities by June 2009, and to leave the country by the end of 2011.
Joost Hiltermann, “Iraq, Iran and the United States: Problems and Prospects,”, OpenDemocracy, carried by International Crisis Group, July 20, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5612&l=1, sees that, “A major political initiative is required to build the long-term foundations for stability in Iraq. But with the potential for violent confrontation ever-present, and the three countries involved facing elections in 2008-09, this outcome is far from certain. The restoration of a semblance of normalcy in key parts of Iraq, the Nouri al-Maliki government’s new assertiveness and a growing clamour for a timetable for the withdrawal of United States troops all demand a reassessment of the US’s military “surge” policy and a fresh look at Iraq’s future.” “The cautious conclusion must be that while significant progress has been made on the security front, it has not been matched by progress on the political front. Without political accommodation at the top, the gains wrought by the surge are likely to prove unsustainable.” “The basic challenge Iraq faced after April 2003 was how to fill the political, security and managerial vacuums which the US’s had created when it removed the regime, disbanded the army and other security forces, and decapitated the bureaucracy through blanket de-Ba’athification. The seed and fruit of these policies – reality-blinding triumphalism, misdirected policies, endemic administrative dysfunction and crippling corruption – conspired to thwart the aim of the US and the successive Iraqi governments it helped install in the effort to stabilize the country. Iraq spun out of control. Deep-seated ethnic and sectarian differences were allowed to come to the fore and set the tone of the political debate, prompting a descent into violence and chaos. The military surge begun in early 2007 was designed to fight the symptoms (that is, to dampen the sectarian war) and, if successful on the military front, generate a new opportunity to tackle the original challenge of recreating the Iraqi state. Thanks in large part to unanticipated salutary developments triggered by the US’s re-commitment to Iraq – evident from the insertion of extra troops at a time when the US public was calling for withdrawal – the surge made a significant difference. The most violent actors, al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) and Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi army (MA), were either pushed back or forced to change their posture. Sunni Arab “awakening” councils – which had cautiously emerged a few months before the surge but found critical protection only once it got underway – succeeded in driving AQI out of Anbar and Baghdad. AQI remains active in Diyala but is on the defensive; and, having learned its lesson, it melted away in Ninewa ahead of a combined US-Iraqi government assault earlier in 2008. Its fighters are biding their time; they may join legitimate structures if these open up to them or rejoin the insurgency if and when Arab leaders determine they have failed in their bid to reinvest in state structures. The Mahdi army has gone to ground as well. The al-Sadr movement, unlike AQI, has popular support (among Shi’a); its main rival is the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). The MA has no interest in a military confrontation with combined US/Iraqi forces that would decimate its ranks and thus could only serve ISCI’s interests. It knows the Americans will leave eventually, and al-Sadr expects at that point to have the strongest force: capable of prevailing over ISCI, practiced in guerrilla tactics, experienced in popular action, and ensconced in the security apparatus. Muqtada al-Sadr’s political cleverness can be seen in the way he kept in place a unilateral ceasefire in the face of ISCI-inspired provocations, and facilitated government forces’ entry into neighbourhoods the MA controlled by allowing them to take over his movement’s offices in Basra, Baghdad and Amara.” “The drop in violence is significant; but the current relative security is both fragile and (even more important) not sustainable unless it is buttressed by a set of basic accords that cut across the ethnic, sectarian and political divide. In approaching such a project, however, fundamental questions remain unresolved:…” concerning the power and structure of the state, and the management and revenue sharing of oil fields. “If agreement is found on these issues, it would lay the basis for rebuilding a non-sectarian state apparatus and its security forces. The current immobility derives from a number of factors,” including the conflict over Kirkuk, a lack of trust between the principal stakeholders, * the weakness of the George W Bush administration, which cannot muster any bold initiatives at this late stag, and “the spoiler role Iran plays as long as it feels under military threat from Israel and the US over its nuclear activities. Iran has serious strategic interests in Iraq – that it be friendly but weak, without weapons of mass destruction, and relatively coherent. The bottom line is that there will not be substantive progress in Iraq without Iran’s green light and active participation. In this uncertainty, politics is deadlocked while the actors themselves are in flux. Between now and the end of 2009, elections in the United States, Iran and Iraq promise to bring changes, possibly with dramatic impact: a new US president might reach out to Iran and offer to engage in meaningful negotiations on a range of concerns; a new Iranian president might reciprocate, and this alone could lead to a lessening of tensions throughout the middle east; the provincial elections in Iraq could spawn a new generation of local leaders less beholden to the unpopular former exiles who have ruled Baghdad since 2003, untarnished by the record of corruption and overall poor governance of the Nouri al-Maliki government and its provincial representatives, more in touch with the needs of their constituents, more nationalist and thus protective of the country’s unity, and potentially therefore enjoying a great deal more legitimacy than the current local leadership. There could be further effects: some local leaders could start graduating to national office via parliamentary elections that should take place before the end of 2009. Such developments would lead to further progress inside Iraq, and in the region.” But, the reverse could also happen: “a new US president could continue the George W Bush administration’s hawkish approach toward Iran, the Iranian leadership would respond in kind, or serious negotiations between the two sides could falter over unbridgeable differences, Iraq’s ruling parties could perpetuate their power at the local level by rigging elections or pushing out their competitors. Such developments would be fatal for stability, in both Iraq and the region. Amid these imponderables, the fundamental questions in 2009 will be: whether and how fast a new US president will withdraw American forces from Iraq, whether this will occur in the context of a new US-Iran understanding or unremitting rivalry, * what the impact of this change will be on Iraq and the region.” Depending on the choices, there are a wide range of possible developments. “In its reporting, the International Crisis Group has suggested what an overall compromise might look like. It would have to involve some concessions by the Kurds on territory they claim, especially Kirkuk, in exchange for the right to manage oil resources in the Kurdish region; there would have to be agreement also on an asymmetric federal structure that recognises the Kurdistan region but decentralises power in the rest of Iraq along governorate boundaries. These deals would need to be reflected in the constitution, currently under review. It is highly unlikely, however, that Iraqi groups would agree to such compromises, or even negotiate them in an official forum; it is significant here that current discussions have excluded some key stakeholders, such as leaders of the “awakening” councils and the so-called Sons of Iraq amalgam of groups, who are predominantly Sunni Arabs. This heightened approach would require a increased role for such recognised multilateral actors as the United Nations; and equally important, some basic consensus of, coordination with, and active input from all of Iraq’s neighbours. This latter requirement cannot be fulfilled as long as US-Iranian hostility endures. The conclusion is also a dilemma. If accommodation between Iran and the United States that is sufficient to reach an understanding of shared interests in Iraq proves impossible, should the US nonetheless withdraw its forces from Iraq – knowing that in doing so it will bequeath to Iraq and the region a legacy of chaos? In turn, this will force the question whether for the U.S. the harm from having an over-stressed and over-extended military and a reputation at an all-time low internationally exceeds any damage to its strategic interests in the Persian Gulf.”
Adil E. Shamoo, “An Honorable Way Out of Iraq,” Foreign Policy In Focus, June 20, 2008, www.fpif.org, considers, “The Iraqis have reached a consensus — the U.S. should leave Iraq. Regardless of whether they are Kurds, Sunni, or Shi’a; regardless of political party, there is a general agreement that the United States should depart soon — within the year, or at most, three years.” “Instead of negotiating a long-term presence, the U.S. should be negotiating a withdrawal. Both large portions of Iraqis and U.S. citizens are widely supportive of a timetable for withdrawal. The following ten point plan would set the stage for a responsible withdrawal: 1. Announce that we respect the Iraqis as co-equal in their humanity and aspirations. 2. We will leave Iraq fully and completely within a maximum of two years with a schedule of withdrawal to be negotiated with Iraqis. During the remainder of the occupation all contractors will be subject to Iraqi laws. 3. We will leave no military bases in Iraq. 4. We will support the United Nations to provide security forces from Iraq-friendly countries to help the Iraqis, if needed. 5. Appropriate military equipment currently in Iraq will be transferred to the Iraqis. 6. We will have the right to compete for Iraqi oil in the open market. Iraqis will not be forced to hire U.S. companies to manage it. 7. We reserve the right to attack al-Qaeda training camps if they appear in Iraq. We will give Iraq notice before we attack them. If the Iraqis eliminate these camps on their own, there will be no need for our action. 8. We will have a reconstruction package that will include financial assistance but will emphasize technical support. We will help in re-settling refugees back into Iraq. 9. The U.S. will encourage non-government organizations from the United States and around the world to help in the reconstruction of Iraq. 10. We will increase the quota for Iraqis to study in the United States on condition that they must return to Iraq. Let us prove to the Iraqis and the rest of the world that our main concern is to deter terrorism. While the current Administration does not have the moral fortitude to take these suggestions, the next president can and should adopt, at least, a similar outline of policies toward Iraq, if we ever want to repair our tarnished image around the world.”
Yelena Biberman , “Learning from the Soviets in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy In Focus, June 20, 2008, www.fpif.org, states, “The Soviet experience in Afghanistan has been compared to the U.S. experience in Vietnam, but the most recent Iraq War is a better fit for comparison. Both the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. invasion of Iraq stemmed from a decision made exclusively at the highest echelons of power. Both the Soviet Union and the United States did not intend to occupy their host counties, but merely to impose their own political systems. Both countries faced the dilemma of withdrawal. And one of the worst-case scenarios of U.S. withdrawal is Iraq’s Afghanization – the cultivation of extremism brought on by the overthrow of a weak central authority followed by violent rivalry between opposing factions. “ “What can the United States do to avoid the kinds of mistakes the Soviet Union made in Afghanistan? On the international level, it is critical that Iraq does not become a platform for another great power rivalry. Global and regional powers, including Russia, China and, very importantly, Iran, must pledge their commitment to stability in Iraq and agree on a definition of this stability. On the regional and domestic levels, the various militias and factions vying for power in Iraq will use not just violence, but publicsentiment. Most Americans did not support the war in the first place; many have become desensitized to the headlines about the situation there. However, completely abandoning Iraq is not viable. Creating real economic opportunities for Iraqis would be a good pre-withdrawal step that would help cement the legitimacy of the Iraqi government in the eyes of the Iraqis and promote more durable and reciprocal U.S.-Iraqi relations. Finally, when it comes to Iraq, the United States has a live opportunity to unveil a new foreign policy course – one that takes into account other countries’ interests.”
The U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) stated, in June, that several critical measures the Bush administration used to demonstrate political, security and economic progress in Iraq were incorrect or misrepresented. The report indicated that the administration’s plan for stabilizing Iraq lacks a strategic frame work that meshes with its goals, contains serious flaws in its operational guidelines and is falling increasingly out of touch with realities on the ground.
Ciara Gilmartin, “The ‘Surge’ of Iraqi Prisoners,” Foreign Policy In Focus (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=cbdkzlgPhqXyrM1F34%2BKA%2BkJSoeJFhim>http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5207), says, “Amid all the talk about the U.S. military “surge” in Iraq, little has been said about the accompanying ‘surg’ of Iraqi prisoners, whose numbers rose to nearly 51,000 at the end of 2007”.
One in five Iraq and Afghanistan veterans – roughly 300,000 – report symptoms of PTSD or major depression, as of the beginning of May. The V.A. covered up the fact that 12,000 veterans attempt suicide each year while under V.A. treatment.
ICG, “Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon,” July 10, 1008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5563&l=1, finds, “Although the security situation in Iraq shows progress, Iraqi refugees remain stranded, jobless and deprived of essential services, while the Iraqi government and the wider international community have failed in their responsibilities and are ill prepared to cope with a new refugee crisis, should it occur.” “If the host countries can be faulted for unfriendly treatment of refugees, they deserve credit for receiving so many at great cost to their societies. By contrast, it is difficult to give the Iraqi government any credit. Flush with oil money, it has been conspicuously ungenerous toward its citizens stranded abroad. The attitude of Western nations also has been deeply troubling. This includes the U.S., which, while contributing more than most, has admitted few refugees and provided far less assistance than needed. The Iraqi government should assume its responsibilities toward citizens turned refugees by stepping up direct and indirect support, providing a mechanism to support refugees willing to return and facilitating transfer of pensions and other allowances to state employees living abroad. Neighboring states should do more to protect the most vulnerable, such as women, children and the aged, and provide schooling, health care and job opportunities. The U.S. should accelerate processing and resettlement and provide funding and technical support to Iraq and host countries.”
Basically, the nuclear development situation with Iran remains unchanged, with Iran continuing to enrich uranium of only electric generating quality (not refined enough for weapons), but at a faster rate with new equipment, while western nations have added some additional sanctions on Iran for continuing to do so. There remain concerns that the U.S., or Israel, might yet attack Iran before the end of President Bush’s term. Israel has carried out a military exercise widely believed to be practice for such a strike.
Developments in Asia (including the Middle East) and the Pacific
The International Crisis Group,” Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?” July 24, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5589&l=1, finds, “The Karzai government and its international supporters must become much better at countering sophisticated Taliban propaganda if they are to defeat an insurgency that is driving a dangerous wedge between them and the Afghan people.” “The Taliban has created a sophisticated communications apparatus that projects an increasingly confident movement. It tries to wear out its opponents. Influencing perceptions at home and abroad is a vital component of this strategy. The vast majority of the material is in Pashtu, and a shortage of language skills in the international community means much either passes unnoticed or is misunderstood. The Afghan and other governments engaged in Afghanistan have failed to communicate robustly and honestly with their populations in a way that would help build and sustain popular will for a long-term endeavour. The Karzai government and its allies must make greater efforts, through word and deed, to address sources of alienation exploited in Taliban propaganda. By building institutions and offering the services that give the Afghan people a better life, the government can gain public support, thus denying the insurgents opportunities to exploit local grievances and thereby gain a modicum of legitimacy. The international community must provide the necessary support and pressure for improved performance, while also examining its own actions. The governments of countries contributing international troops must improve communications with Afghans on the directions and activities of the international engagement, including doing more to avoid civilian casualties.” Samina Ahmed, Crisis Group‚s South Asia Project Director, comments, “The Taliban is not going to be defeated militarily. Peace will only be possible if Kabul and the international community replace their fire-fighting approach with a long-term strategy of services and security.” Meanwhile, a UN special investigator stated, in July, that night time raids by foreign intelligence agencies in Afghanistan are killing Afghani civilians with impunity. Other sources, including complaints from Afghani President Karzai, indicate that civilian deaths from NATO actions is undermining the government. Food inflation and resulting hunger is not only a humanitarian issue, but undercuts the government. In In June, the commander of Company C of the 24th U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit, said that they had learned a lesson from the Iraq war, and were changing approach to focus on developing good relations with local people to keep the Taliban out. If properly and fully carried out, this is the community development approach to peace building that we have long shown in these pages to be far superior to ending civil strife than the search and destroy approach usually used by the military.
Chuck Spinney, “Should Obama Escalate the War in Afghanistan?” CounterPunch, July 30, 2008, http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4348&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=37&from_page=index.cfm, questions “whether it is a good idea to ramp up our efforts in Afghanistan with more troops, more military force, more “precision” bombing, which means more collateral damage, including more innocent civilian deaths, and is likely to breed more resentment, and more radicalization. Or whether the inept Mr. Bush and his neocon henchmen have created the conditions for another classical guerrilla war in Afghanistan, not unlike that created by the Soviets in the early 1980s which created misery for them in the late 1980s. In this regard, readers would do well to remember that (1) Soviets had an easy ride for the first few years, while the Afghan guerrillas leaned how to fight them through a process of trial and error; and (2), that the Soviets reached a point where it became clear that pouring in more Soviet troops and increasing the firepower created more problems than it solved. Which begs the question: Is escalating the war in Afghanistan becoming a yawning trap, into which Mr. Obama and the Democrats seem eager to plunge? At the heart of this question is the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, specifically the question of whether or not it has mutated into something that is more akin to a classical guerrilla war as opposed to being part of a Fourth Generation War against al Quaeda.” “A recent report in Newseek entitled ‘The Taliban’s Baghdad Strategy,…’ describes how the Taliban are pursuing a strategy to systematically undermine the authority of the government of Mr Karsai, a man who, it should be remembered, the West, particularly the United States, put into place as the President of Afghanistan, and who, according to some reports, might be receiving financial support from Pakistan’s rival India. Is this Taliban strategy something new and peculiar to the so-called Global War on Terror — a war that Mr. Bush, the Pentagon, and now apparently many of Obama’s defense advisors, seem to think they can prosecute successfully by relying on more boots on the ground coupled to more ‘precision firepower?’ Or is the Afghan War more in the nature of a modern guerrilla war, wherein a government established and propped up by unwanted outsiders with their own agendas usually becomes a critical losing vulnerability?”
The Center for Defense Information July 8, 2008 “Afghanistan Update: June 2008,” found, “This month saw the Taliban, in a display of force and coordination, launch a daring prison break at a large facility in Kandahar freeing nearly 1,000 prisoners and around 400 Taliban fighters. While the coalition has been shifting troops to meet the security demands of the present situation, the American government has had difficulty convincing allied nations to send more troops and resources to the country. Coalition deaths in Afghanistan have overtaken those in Iraq for the second consecutive month, and the populaces of many coalition allies do not want their troops there. Caveats are becoming an increasing problem, as some troops within ISAF are constrained by orders to patrol only certain provinces, not to engage in offensive operations, or not to patrol at night.” “The Taliban has repeatedly threatened cell phone networks unless their towers are shut down during the night, when they often launch their operations. Approximately 50 cell towers have been attacked in Helmand province alone since the beginning of the year. This is just one tactic among many new ploys the Taliban have been employing. The main Taliban approach has been to exert their influence in as wide an extent as possible. Infiltration of villages has become widespread as coalition forces struggle to hold the ground after clearing out the insurgents. The Taliban also take reprisals against villagers who cooperate with ISAF, and in regions that have heavy Taliban influence, particularly the south and eastern provinces, obtaining trust from the Afghan people is difficult for the coalition forces. Close air support for coalition and Afghan troops has resulted in limited casualties during engagements, but has caused a row in Pakistan after 21 Pakistanis were killed in an air strike. The incident highlights one of the fundamental issues NATO has in dealing with Afghanistan: Pakistan acting as a launching board for attacks and safe haven for the Taliban. Pakistan’s policy toward its essentially autonomous tribal area has long been a target for U.S. criticism, particularly after Pakistanis agreed to a ceasefire with the Taliban last month. Cross border incidents have become such a problem that they have caused an exasperated Afghan President Hamid Karzai, facing numerous political, ethical and legitimacy problems at home, to state that Afghanistan may consider sending troops into the region. Concurrently, a report was released that alluded to the U.S. congressional leadership giving President George W. Bush authority to authorize large-scale, covert missions into Pakistan to hunt down Osama bin Laden.” In late August, the Taliban were intensifying attacks near Kabul.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, in early August, approved a plan to increase U.S. aid to Afghanistan to $20 billion to greatly enlarge the Afghani army and to reorganize the U-S-NATO command. (see Thom Shanker, “Gates Pushing Plan for Afghan Army,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/08/world/asia/08military.html?scp=1&sq=Gates%20Endorses%20%2420%20Billion%20Bid&st=cse). This summer, not only did the death rate of U.S soldiers in Afghanistan come to exceed that of Iraq, but the number of U.S. military deaths in Afghanistan since the beginning of operations there exceeded 500.
In the face of continuing extreme repression by the government of Myanmar (Burma), the impact of the huge cyclone which has inflicted massive destruction over an extremely wide, mostly rural area, has created a deadly crises as the military junta has prevented aid from reaching most people, allowing in only a small amount of aid, but extremely little through aid workers, and insisting that only the government can distribute aid, and that aid has to be labeled as being provided by the government. Even private Burmese citizens have been prevented from distributing aid. The government has been using the aid situation, not only to take credit for what aid is distributed, but more important, to deny aid to those it opposes, and those connected to them (or who just happen to be in the wrong location), exacerbating suffering and causing a great many deaths – in addition to the more than 100,000 directly resulting from the storm. The longer term impact is that a great deal of this year’s harvest in the effected region is expected to be lost.
ICG, Comment by Gareth Evans on Burma/Myanmar and R2P, “Facing Up to Our Responsibilities”, in The Guardian, May 12, 2008, available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org, and below, in Articles states, “If the intransigence of the Burmese generals continues, it is a very real issue whether in the name of humanity some international action should be taken against their will – like military air drops, or supplies being landed from ships offshore ˆ to get aid to the huge numbers who desperately need it right now, in the inaccessible coastal area in particular. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner opened up a hornet‚s nest when he argued last Thursday, as others are now doing, that this is a proper case for coercive intervention under the “responsibility to protect” principle unanimously endorsed by 150 heads of state and government at the 2005 UN World Summit. His proposal that the Security Council pass a resolution which ‘authorizes the delivery and imposes this on the Burmese government’ met with immediate rejection not only from China and Russia, who are always sensitive about external intervention into internal affairs, but from many other quarters as well. It generated concern from the UK and others, including senior UN officials, that such an “incendiary” approach would be wholly counterproductive in winning any still-possible cooperation from the generals. It also provoked the argument from humanitarian relief agencies ˆ who know what they are talking about – that simply as a practical matter any effort to drop supplies without an effective supporting relief on the ground would be hopelessly inefficient, and maybe even dangerous with the prospect of misuse of medical supplies. These are strong arguments, and they weigh heavily in the policy balance. But as the days go by, with relief efforts impossibly hindered, only a trickle of the government‚s own aid getting through, and the prospect of an enormously greater death toll looming acutely within just a few more days, they are sounding less compelling, and at least need revisiting. My own initial concern, and it remains a serious one, with Bernard Kouchner‚s invocation of the “responsibility to protect” was that, while wholly understandable as a political rallying cry ˆ and God knows the world needs them in these situations ˆ it had the potential to dramatically undercut international support for another great cause, to which he among others is also passionately committed, that of ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all.” “If it comes to be thought that “R2P”, and in particular the sharp military end of the doctrine, is capable of being invoked in anything other than a context of mass atrocity crimes, then such consensus as there is in favor of the new norm will simply evaporate in the global South. And that means that when the next case of genocide or ethnic cleansing comes along we will be back to the same old depressing arguments about the primacy of sovereignty that led us into the horrors of inaction in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s. But here‚s the rub. If what the generals are now doing, in effectively denying relief to hundreds of thousands of people at real and immediate risk of death, can itself be characterized as a crime against humanity, then the responsibility to protect principle does indeed cut in.”
The Civilian leadership in Pakistan’s parliament, on August 7, moved to impeach President Musharraf, and he resigned, August 19.. For more on early background, see Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Coalition Moves to Impeach Musharraf,” The New York Times, August 8, 2008. A political struggle and negotiation is now in progress to choose the new President.
The Pakistan government, that came into office earlier this year, has so far had mixed results in attempting to negotiate peace in the tribal areas. The army, after initially holding back, has made some attacks against militants, most notably pushing back Taliban forces around Peshawar, a major point on the U.S.-NATO supply line across the country to Afghanistan. There continues to be concern among western intelligence agencies that the tribal areas of Pakistan remains in the process of attracting more Islamic militants, and that al Qaeda, estimated as having renewed itself to pre-Afghanistan operations strength, is continuing to grow in the tribal areas. Many Pakistanis have expressed fear at the prospect of unilateral U.S. attacks within their borders. Pakistan also continues to suffer violence in many places, including bombings, some of them quite loarge and deadly.
ICG, “Reforming Pakistan’s Police,” July 14, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5570&l=1, holds, “Major reforms to the dysfunctional Pakistani police force are urgently needed if the country‚s newly-elected government is to ensure a secure state and efficient counter-terrorism measures.” “The current force is incapable of combating crime, upholding the law, or protecting citizens and the state against militant violence. A change in mindset and legislation is needed urgently, because the transition to democracy could falter if deteriorating security gives the military a new opportunity to intervene and justify derailing the democratic process on the grounds of good governance.” “Police reform should be high on the agenda of the democratically-elected governments that have now taken power at the centre and the provinces.” “Political appointments must end; postings, transfers, recruitment and promotions must be made on merit alone,”, says Samina Ahmed, Crisis Group’s South Asia Project Director. “The recommendations of police managerial bodies must be given due weight, and emphasis placed on the police serving and protecting citizens.” “The international community, particularly the U.S. and the European Union, should realise that helping the police and civilian intelligence agencies with training and technical assistance would pay counter-terrorism dividends. The government and its Western allies would be best served by reallocating resources from the military to the police. This means not only more money and the latest weapons and equipment, but vitally also better training and an end to military dominance and control of internal law enforcement institutions, processes and decision-making.”
Former President Jimmy Carter met, in Syria, with exiled Hamas leader Khaled Meshal, despite objections from the Bush administration and the government of Israel, after talking with the President of Syria, as part of a tour to promote peace in the Middle East, in mid-April. Carter stated that Meshal said that if Palestine became a state, he would accept recognizing Israel, if that were approved by a Palestinian referendum. Meshal later stated that that was not his position. However, on April 20, Hamas said that they would offer a 10 year truce to Israel if it returned all of the occupied territories and permitted the Palestinians to have their own state.
As of July 8, Hamas was continuing to keep its commitment for a cease fire with Israel. Haaretz (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1000068.html) stated in an editorial, July 8, “Islamic Jihad broke it after Israel killed a few of its members in the West Bank; it then adopted the cease-fire again. The latest Qassam was reportedly fired by a Fatah-affiliated group, which apparently strived to undermine belief in Hamas` ability to control things on the ground. Alongside all this, Hamas` public effort to fully keep its commitment is evident. The Hamas mufti has called anyone who fires a Qassam a `criminal,` and its leadership is declaring that the Qassams damage Palestinian interests. While other organizations have not condemned the firing, they have stressed they are sticking to the deal.” and that essentially continues in late August.
A Hamas raid on a Fatah stronghold in Gaza City, August 2, became the bloodiest day of Hamas-Fatah fighting in Gaza, since the Hamas takeover there, in June 2007, with 11 people killed and more than 80 wounded, and 188 Fatah members fleeing into Israel. The Palestinian Authority, on August 3, urged a complete international boycott of Hamas and said it would work toward removing all recognition of it as a political movement, Israel Radio reported. A Fatah representative in Ramallah, Fahmi A-Zahrir said Hamas must be taken out of the Palestinian Authority’s legal demarcation, adding that the Islamist group had lost its right to political existence. At the same time, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas refused to grant West Bank asylum to dozens of Fatah supporters who fled Hamas-ruled Gaza to Israel under fire, during fierce factional fighting, saying that his embattled Fatah group must maintain a presence in Gaza. There were concerns, however, that the returnees could face mistreatment by Hamas. Meanwhile, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel petitioned the Israeli High Court of Justice, August 3, to order the defense ministry to halt the deportation of Fatah refugees back to Gaza. Hamas confirmed it detained the first group of 32 who were sent back to Gaza on August 3, saying it had released all but five in that group. For more go to: http://www.tikkun.org/.
International Crisis Group, “Ruling Palestine II: The West Bank Model?” July 17, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5574&l=1, reports, “Over the past year, the West Bank has witnessed real progress, but there is a natural ceiling against which, without changes in the overall political environment, the authorities in Ramallah inevitably will bump.” “In the past twelve months, there have been gains in the West Bank, particularly in re-establishing order”, states Robert Blecher, Crisis Group‚s Analyst for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. “But Israel has not relaxed its security measures, nor has the economy seen much growth. Plus, the paralyzed parliament and harsh tactics against Hamas sympathizers are inconsistent with good governance.” “A number of steps should be taken. Among these, the Palestinian Authority (PA) should enhance the security campaign by bolstering its amnesty program for militants who disarm, expediting their integration into the workforce and providing them with adequate support. It also should investigate and, if warranted, prosecute cases of arbitrary detentions, torture and other human rights violations. Israel should allow the PA to take the lead in areas handed over to its control and facilitate the movement of goods and people. The donor community should provide longer-term pledges, deliver them expeditiously and earmark some for the reintegration of former militants. And the U.S. should unify and enhance the missions of its three security envoys. Beyond that, Fatah and Hamas should move toward reconciliation, because as long as the unnatural division between the West Bank and Gaza endures and democratic institutions are unable to function, it will be difficult both to plan for long-term, sustainable improvement and to seriously advance the peace process.” Robert Malley, Crisis Group‚s Middle East and North Africa Program Director believes, “From the start, the leaders in Ramallah have been in a race against time, hoping that the overall political context would catch up with their security and economic agenda, But that has not happened. Under current conditions, the West Bank can no more become a model than Gaza can be effectively governed.”
Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon have undertaken a prisoner exchange.
In Lebanon, after months of politics and an increasingly more violent situation, which erupted into days of serious clashes between Sunnis and Shiites, particularly in Beirut, in May, a settlement was reached near the end of that month, leading to the election of a new president, General Michel Suleman, as part of a new power sharing structure.
ICG, “Hizbollah’s Weapons Turn Inward,” May 15, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org, “The announcement of an Arab League-mediated agreement is welcome, but if Lebanon is to step back from risk of a new civil war, a package deal must be crafted that defines and regulates use of Hizbollah’s weapons without disarming it at this time.” “Although Hizbollah‚s takeover of much of West Beirut began as a strike on 7 May protesting the rising cost of living, the real trigger lay in the government‚s earlier decision to reassign the Hizbollah-friendly chief of airport security and to challenge the legality of the Shiite movement’s independent telephone network. In other words, the crisis reverted to its origins: an existential struggle over the future of Hizbollah‚s arms. ‘The government has wisely withdrawn the controversial decisions that sparked the crisis’, says Patrick Haenni, Crisis Group‚s Lebanon Analyst. ’Now the onus is on all Lebanese parties to de-escalate the situation and reach a broader political accord.’ “No party has emerged a clear victor in what has been a lose-lose confrontation. Hizbollah and its allies clearly prevailed in the military showdown. But outside its own constituency, Hizbollah is seen more than ever as a Shiite militia brutally defending its parochial interests rather than those of a self-proclaimed national resistance. The March 14 coalition continues to govern, but it has been humiliated and is exposed to the anger of a rank-and-file that felt defenseless. The army emerged with its reputation somewhat weakened and accused by members of the majority and ordinary Sunnis of failing its duty to protect civilians. On all sides of the deepening confessional divide, there will be a temptation to radicalize and bolster military capabilities. Sunnis in particular could be drawn to more militant, jihadi groups.” Robert Malley, Crisis Groups Middle East Program Director, states, “To stabilize the situation, Lebanon must find a middle ground between irresponsibly allowing Hizbollah unfettered use of its weapons and recklessly seeking its forcible disarmamen. That may not be enough. But it probably is the best one can achieve until a broader settlement dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict but also relations between the U.S., Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia is reached.”
ICG, “The New Lebanese Equation: The Christians‚ Central Role,” July 14, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5573&l=1, states that with the formation of a new government, in early July, “the Lebanese crisis is entering a new phase focused on the 2009 parliamentary elections in which the Christian community will play a decisive role.” “In the context of intense Sunni/Shiite polarization, the signing of the Doha agreement and the election of General Suleiman as president give the Christian community the ability to play the role of arbiter and put it in a position to advance community demands that have long been ignored.” “Patrick Haenni, Crisis Group’s Lebanon Senior Analyst sys, “Lebanon‚s Christians, whose 2009 electoral preferences are by far the least predictable of all, will be courted by powerful Muslim actors, who will not be able to support their allies‚ position unless they realize the Christian electorate’s demands.” “For Lebanon’s Christians, today‚s dynamics represent potentially momentous changes. First, by leading to the election as president of Michel Suleiman, the former army commander, the Doha agreement enabled the Christian community to recover the institution to which they are constitutionally entitled. Secondly, it paves the way for a more Christian-friendly electoral law. Lastly, Christians will be in a position to revitalize old demands. Syria’s 2005 withdrawal enabled the return of key Christian leaders, but the Christian political scene split into two camps. On one side, Samir Geagea’s Lebanese Forces and Amine Gemayel’s Phalanges banked on the end of all Syrian influence, attempting to mobilize support for the need to restore a sovereign Lebanese state by pressing for Hizbollah’s disarmament and by setting up an international tribunal charged with investigating Rafiq Hariri’s murder. On the other side, General Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement challenged the political system as a whole, breaking its isolation by forging a controversial understanding with Hizbollah.”
Yoav Stern, “Interfaith meet signals thaw in Saudi hostility toward Israel,” Haaretz 07/18/08 (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1003217.html), reports that, “In an apparent easing of traditional Saudi hostility toward Israel, King Abdullah has urged followers of all the world’s leading religions to embrace reconciliation. `We must tell the world that differences don’t need to lead to disputes,` he said at the opening of an interfaith conference in Madrid, addressing Muslim and Christian delegates and even one Israeli envoy who also shook his hand.”
David R. Sands, “Israel-Syria talks hindered,” Washington Times, July 25, 2008, http://www.washingtontimes.com and also available at: http://www.commongroundnews.org, stated, “An Israeli-Syrian peace deal could be signed by the end of this year, but that requires Bush administration involvement that has not been forthcoming, the head of a high-profile Syrian delegation visiting Washington said last Thursday.” Delegation lead spokesman Samir al-Taki, director of a leading Damascus think-tank and an adviser to Syrian Prime Minister Naji al-Otari, stated. “If the political will is there, we could achieve an agreement within three or four months The security issues involved in an agreement I would say are about 95 percent finalized,” “Using Turkey as an intermediary, Israel and Syria acknowledged this spring they conducted ‘indirect’ talks on a peace accord after a break of nearly a decade. Syria seeks to reclaim the Golan Heights, lost to Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and sees an Israeli settlement as a pre-condition for better ties with the United States. Israel, for its part, hopes an agreement would weaken Syria’s alliance with Iran and would pressure Damascus to end its support for militant groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, which are hostile to Israel. The Bush administration, which accused Syria of trying to undermine US allies and interests in Lebanon, Iraq and Israel, has been cool to the talks, fearing in part they will erode an American push for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.” The Syrian team was brought to Washington by Search for Common Ground.
Claude Salhani, “Can Syria be taken seriously?” Middle East Times, July 29, 2008, http://www.metimes.com, also available at: http://www.commongroundnews.org, comments, “Syrian President Bashar Assad appears to be serious about pursuing peace. But just how serious is he? Assad seems to be taking his desire to talk peace with Israel to heart.” “The Syrian president indicated during his visit to Paris earlier this month that he was willing to open a Syrian diplomatic legation in the Lebanese capital; a move that recognizes de facto Lebanon’s sovereignty, a gesture that the Syrians have been reluctant to extend to their Lebanese neighbors ever since the country’s independence from France at the close of World War II. And there are indications that Damascus may be clamping down on Hamas and Hezbollah, two groups supported by Iran and accused by the West of engaging in terrorist activities. The Turkish government is taking the Syrian initiative seriously and has been acting as the middleman relaying proposals and counterproposals between the Israelis and the Syrians. French President Nicolas Sarkozy is taking the Syrian president seriously. He was the first to bring Assad out of the cold by inviting him to the Union for the Mediterranean summit in Paris and then asked him to remain as a guest of honor on the reviewing stand for the Bastille Day July 14 parade. It is believed that Syria’s acquiescence to establish an embassy in Beirut – after decades of refusal – can be attributed to the success of French diplomacy. The Israeli government is taking Syria’s peace overtures seriously by following up on Syria’s advances and repeated statements that Damascus is genuinely interested in forging a peace treaty with the Jewish state.” “However, there is one major element missing, and that is slowing down the peace drive between Syria and Israel, as well as the other changes proposed, or hinted at by the Syrians: the crucial missing element is the participation of the United States. The George W. Bush administration remains the only side not taking Syria seriously regarding their desire for change.”
Nawara Mahfoud and Robert Worth, “Syrians see an economic side to peace,” International Herald Tribune, July 29, 2008, http://www.iht.com, available also at: http://www.commongroundnews.org, reports, “Like most Syrians, Samer Zayat has no love for Israel. He was a little uneasy when Syria announced in late May that it was holding indirect talks on a peace settlement with its old nemesis. Yet Mr. Zayat, a 35-year-old television cinematographer, says he views a peace deal with Israel as necessary and inevitable˜not just for political reasons, but because Syria‚s vulnerable economy needs all the help it can get. ‘We are tired, the country is suffocating,’ he said, ‘We have suffered a long time from the political boycott and the sanctions.’ That sentiment is echoed by many others. Prices soared here after the Syrian government cut fuel subsidies in May, deepening the gulf between rich and poor in this nominally socialist state. It had little choice. The oil reserves Syria has relied on for so long are rapidly disappearing. The hefty budget surpluses of a decade ago have turned into multibillion-dollar deficits. A country that could once afford to be serenely indifferent to Western sanctions is now being forced to liberalize and open its economy. None of this has changed Syria‚s conviction that any peace agreement must include the return of the Golan Heights, the area captured by Israel in 1967. But a profoundly uncertain economic future has created additional incentives for peace, which could help lure foreign investment by ending Syria‚s pariah status in the West.”
ICG, “Egypt’s Muslim Brothers: Confrontation or Integration?” June 18, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5487&l=1, states, “The three-year clash between the government and the Muslim Brothers is damaging Egypt’s political life. Ending this confrontation and moving towards the long-term goal of integrating the Brothers into the political mainstream is a far better option.” “Since their surprisingly strong electoral performance in 2005, when they won nearly a fifth of parliamentary seats while running as independents, the Muslim Brothers have redoubled efforts to contest elections. The resulting backlash and mass arrests have further discredited Egyptian electoral democracy and increased political tensions. Although the regime has used the Brothers to frighten domestic and foreign audiences into accepting the status quo, this has mainly served to reinforce the Brothers at the expense of other political currents. By restricting the political field, the regime has assisted a hybrid organization that is uniquely positioned to evade restrictions on recognized political parties and work outside a strict legal framework. The Muslim Brothers also carry their share of responsibility. While they more explicitly embrace political reform as a main goal and have built alliances with opposition groups, their program’s distinctly non-democratic and illiberal tone, as well as its ambiguous pronouncements on the role of women and the place of religious minorities, is cause for genuine concern. To break this standstill, the regime should recognize the Muslim Brothers‚ ambition to create a legal political party, take the opportunity to set clear standards for integration and end its campaign of mass arrests, made possible by the draconian Emergency Law. For their part, the Muslim Brothers should finalize and clarify their political program in order to reassure their critics.”
Qatar, attempting to remain on good terms with all nations and factions in, or involved with, the Middle East, has had its diplomats mediating conflicts around the region, including brokering a major settlement in the crisis in Lebanon.
The Winter 2008 issue of Arab Insight, available at: http://arabinsight.org/, offers in-depth analysis of a number of trends emerging in the Arab world and illuminates transformations taking place, from the widening use of the Internet and new technology in Islamist activity, to women’s reform movements in the Gulf and arms proliferation in Yemen.
Nationalist militants, fighting against the government in Algeria, have greatly strengthened their formerly collapsed campaign by becoming part of al Qaeda, and as some other of the militant group’s affiliate’s have declined, ‘al Queda in the Magrib’ has risen to become one of the strongest affiliates of al Quaeda.
China and Japan reached an agreement, in June, to jointly develop undersea gas fields, whose ownership was contested, between the two nations. Also in June, China and Taiwan agreed at a meeting to establish permanent offices in each other’s capitals to help coordinate improving relations. As China faces protests abroad over its actions in Tibet, and also in Sudan, there have been counter, anti-western demonstrations in several cities in China, in late April. There is an ongoing series of meetings between the Dali Lama’s representatives and Chinese officials, with no concrete results achieved to date. There has been some new ethnic unrest, since the beginning of April, in a Tibetan area of in Sichuan Province, A growing number of Tibetans are breaking with the Dali Lama’s nonviolence and peace oriented approach, and are embracing armed struggle, in the face of China’s continuing repression. China experienced a number of violent acts, even as it tightened security for the Olympics. This included bombs going off on two busses in Kunming, killing two and injuring 14 people. Seemingly taking note of the approach of the Bush Administration, China set up an out of the way area in Beijing for peaceful demonstrations during the Olympics. But all who came to register to demonstrate there were refused permits, and one permit seeker was arrested. There was at least one very brief protest during the Olympics, in Beijing, concerning Tibet,that was quickly ended by police.
Samuel Bleicher, “China: Superpower or Basket Case?,” Foreign Policy in Focus (http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5210), comments, “Just as we failed to predict and prepare for the implosion of the Japanese economy and the collapse of the Soviet Union, we appear unready for a dramatic economic and political reversal in China that would be a defining event of the 21st century.” “The depth and scale of the transformation taking place in every dimension of Chinese social, economic, and political life is difficult even for the most knowledgeable observers to comprehend. With luck, this great experiment can be one of the most successful developments in human history. If it fails, the consequences for China and for the rest of us could be tragic, and possibly catastrophic.”
International Crisis Group, “Nepal‚s Election: A Peaceful Revolution?, an extensive analysis of the 10 April vote” http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5551&l=1, and “Nepal‚s New Political Landscape,” http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5552&l=1, July 3, 2008, propose that “Nepal’s major parties should cooperate in a coalition government led by the Maoists, who won the April Constituent Assembly (CA) elections, to help the world’s newest republic avoid political instability.” That has not happened, however, though the Maoists, who won the largest vote, but less than a majority in recent national elections, have attained at least some positions in the newly formed government. ICG points out that considerable political integration is still needed to create a stable and peaceful Nepal. “The political landscape has changed irrevocably, but the old parties have not woken up to the new realities,” says Rhoderick Chalmers, Crisis Group‚s South Asia Deputy Project Director. “The aftermath of the election has been marred by the behavior of powerful losers, who are reluctant to keep the promise of working on the basis of consensus.” “Multiple issues need to be tackled in order to build a sustainable peace, most critically security sector reform. The continuing existence of both the People‚s Liberation Army and the Nepal Army is inherently destabilising. The national army remains outside meaningful democratic control, and Maoist willingness to discuss compromise options has met with a brick wall.” “The CA and the new government must also rebuild law and order in the countryside, put an end to the culture of impunity that grew during the long civil war, do more to build peace at the local level and adjust to other changes in the political landscape such as the rise of identity politics.” In mid-August, a Maoist became Prime Minister of Nepal.
By June, India was experiencing a wide variety of protests across the country, over food and fuel prices, jobs, land, and in some locations, separatist desires. In May, months of quiet were shattered, when a series of bombs set of in Jaipur killed 56 and wounded 84 people. There have been several weeks of severe clashes as well as peaceful protests in Kashmir, straining India Pakistai relations, this summer. In May India and Pakistan agreed to give prisoners access to consular services and to increase cross border bus service in the disputed region of Kashmir.
ICG, “Restoring Democracy in Bangladesh,” April 28, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5408&l=1, finds, “The caretaker government, along with the international community, must take credible steps to restore democracy to Bangladesh ahead of the December 2008 general elections.” “On 11 January 2007, Bangladesh‚s military installed a caretaker government, which used emergency powers to clamp down on violence in the run-up to bitterly contested elections. Prime Minister Khaleda Zia‚s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) had attempted to rig the polls, prompting the opposition Awami League to launch street protests. The caretaker government ended violence and raised hopes of political change, promising to tackle nepotism, infighting and corruption, which has included the jailing of the leaders of the two main political parties, the two ex-prime ministers, Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia. While some progress has been evident, the suspension of democratic functioning, the arbitrary and partisan nature of the anti-corruption drive and the military‚s effort to embed itself into the political process threaten to create many more problems than they solve. There is an immediate need for dialogue between the government and the main parties. Any viable roadmap for elections has to be agreed by all major actors. The first step must be to address mistrust between the two sides, as well as the acrimonious relations between the Awami League and BNP. Ideally, a new consensus would not only cover how to hold elections but also develop commitments on post-election behavior and democratic functioning such as addressing human rights abuses committed during the emergency during which over 400,000 arrests may have been made. International actors who have too placidly accepted the government‚s rationale and supported its agenda should recognize that the priority is to maintain pressure for timely and credible elections. They should also be prepared to act as a possible guarantor to facilitate a delicate transfer of power and to support a longer-term program of sustainable reforms to put the country’s democracy back on track.”
Protesters in the Mongolian capitol of Ulan Bator, angry at reports of fraud in parliamentary elections, ransacked the headquarters of the ruling political party, at the beginning of July,
The Geneva based mediation organization, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre), helped facilitate the peaceful handover to the authorities of Lt. Gastao Salsinha and his armed supporters, in April, in Timor-Leste’s capital, Dili. The men were wanted in connection with the attacks on President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao on February 11 2008. Lt. Salsinha also led the group of petitioning soldiers whose dismissal prompted the crisis in Timor-Leste in 2006. Lt. Salsinha and eleven of his supporters handed over eleven weapons in a ceremony led by President Ramos-Horta, the President of the Parliament, and other senior government and UN officials at the Palacio do Governo today. The HD Centre had been in direct negotiations with Lt. Salsinha and his men since the February 11 attack, at the request of the State of Timor-Leste. It also helped organize the modalities of the handover with the Government and the complex logistical arrangements of the transfer from Ermera District to the capital Dili. Three HD Centre staff members provided close protection during the actual handover to ensure that it was peaceful. The HD Centre closely coordinated its initiative with Timor-Leste’s Prosecutor General, the Offices of the President and Prime Minister, the national army (F-FDTL) and members of the Church. For more information on the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue or its activities in Timor-Leste, please contact: Michael Vatikiotis in Singapore, +65 927 26 385, vatikiotis@hdcentre.org, or Flore Brannon in Geneva, +41 22 908 11 30, brannon@hdcentre.org, http://m1e.net/c?50573564-oLAx9ANsqPYlE%403290553-habn8H31l4kGc.
The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre) assisted the April 24 signing of an agreement declaring the capital town of Jolo, on the provincial island of Sulu, in the southern Philippines, a zone of peace. The Declaration of Principles, signed by local officials, the police, the military, civic and human rights advocates, HD Centre representatives, and Jolo Mayor Hussin Amin, prohibits the carrying of firearms, explosives, and any other form of deadly weapon in the entire municipality. The ban concerns all residents, visitors, and off-duty soldiers, police and security officers. To reinforce the agreement’s impact, the campaign against illegal drugs and other forms of criminality will also be reinforced. In addition, Jolo residents will be empowered to participate actively through the development of an information and communication network for immediate police and military response and action. The HD Centre has been engaged in the region since 2005, in an effort to reduce violence and insecurity in the province, and to facilitate the implementation of remaining elements of the 1996 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front. For details go to: http://m1e.net/c?50573564-ZXrpJmlioWFgs%403291104-SH6×524SamCio. In August, in Mindanao, Islamic separatists attacked several towns, killing 18 people, mostly civilians.
ICG, “The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. Counter-terrorism in Mindanao,” May 14, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5441&l=1, recommends, “The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. Counter-terrorism in Mindanao, the latest report from the International Crisis Group, warns that U.S.-backed security operations in the southern Philippines are confusing counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism and risk pushing the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) ˆ their target – into the arms of the broader insurgencies in Mindanao, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). ‘The Mindanao model‚ of combining military operations with civic action operations against the ASG has been widely heralded as a success, but the gains could be short-lived,’ says Kit Collier, a consultant for Crisis Group. ‘The model involves using counter-insurgency techniques for counter-terrorism goals, but the only way the Philippines will effectively manage domestic terrorism is to secure the cooperation of the MILF and MNLF – and that requires concrete progress toward formal peace agreements.’ The urgency of finalizing agreements is even more acute since the Malaysian government announced last month that it was withdrawing from an international monitoring team that has kept the lid on conflict in Mindanao since 2004. The report urges the Philippines government to revive the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG). Designed to facilitate information-sharing between the Philippines government and the MILF, AHJAG was critical to the prevention of conflict escalation in 2005-2007 as the search for terrorists intensified. After a six-month hiatus, its mandate was formally extended in November 2007 but is not yet fully restored. A similar arrangement should be developed with the MNLF. But the leadership of both insurgencies will only be willing to provide information on terrorists in their midst as part of a political endgame, and the Philippines government is stalling, while the U.S. appears more focused on economic aid than political agreements.”
North Korea, in fulfilling its commitment to military denuclearization, destroyed the cooling tower of its main military nuclear weapons plant, before intenational witnesses, in June, following turning over to the U.S., in May, 18,000 pages of documents detailing its plutonium program from 1990-2008. Meanwhile, this spring North Korea suffered growing food shortages, causing it to cut food rations in its capital. As increased U.N World Food Program Aid, from the U.S., began to arrive in North Korea at th end of June, the government granted aid workers unprecedented access to the nation’s isolated, hunger stricken territory.
ICG, “South Korea‚s Elections: A Shift to the Right,” June 30, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5522&l=1, finds, “Months of street demonstrations and virtual government paralysis in South Korea suggest President Lee must show more flexibility if he is to carry out promised policy changes.”
ICG, “Indonesia: Communal Tensions in Papua,” June 16, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5485&l=1, warns, “Conflict between Muslim and Christian communities in Papua could erupt unless rising tensions are effectively managed.” “The potential for communal conflict is high in Papua because both sides consider themselves aggrieved,” according to Sidney Jones, Crisis Group‚s Senior Adviser. “Indigenous Christians feel threatened by ongoing Muslim migration and a sense that the government is endorsing Islamic orthodoxy at the expense of non-Muslim minorities; Muslim migrants feel democracy may be leading to a tyranny of the majority, where in the long term they will face discrimination or even expulsion.” “Tensions are most acute along Papua’s west coast – violence was narrowly averted in Manokwari and Kaimana districts in 2007. The Manokwari drama started in 2005, when Christians mobilized to prevent an Islamic centre and mosque from being built on a site they considered holy, and intensified in 2007 when a draft of a local government ordinance on ‘spiritual guidance’ appeared that would have discriminated against non-Christians. A new draft, much milder but still likely to face opposition from the Muslim community, appeared in May 2008. Changes in demographics are part of the problem, but even if migration from outside Papua were to stop tomorrow, communal polarisation would probably continue because of other developments. Papua‚s Christians are only too well aware of attacks on churches elsewhere in Indonesia and fear what they see as „Islamization‰. Muslims from outside Papua are easily mobilized to defend what they see as slights to a beleaguered community. Indigenous Papuan Muslims are divided, too, as more study Islam abroad and come home with ideas that are at odds with traditional practices. Christian Pentecostals and charistmatics are gaining ground at the same time as hardline Islamic groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir, exacerbating the problem. Goverment officials at all levels ˆ central, provincial and district ˆ should avoid support for exclusivist religious groups, and ensure that funding for all religious activities is fully transparent.” Crisis Group’s South East Asia Project Director, John Virgoe, states, “Government officials should work with donors to identify areas of high tension, where conflict might be defused by non-religious projects that would involve cooperation across communities.”
ICG, “Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree,” July 7, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5556&l=1, reports, “An Indonesian government decree restricting activities of the Ahmadiyah sect demonstrates how hardline Islamic groups, which have little political support, have been able to use classic civil society advocacy techniques to influence government policy.” John Virgoe, South East Asia Project Director, stated, “„One official told us that this was not about freedom of religion but about law and order – without a decree, social unrest would increase. But the prospects of unrest have in fact increased because of the way in which hardline groups have worked the issue both at the grassroots and top levels of government. Having won this victory, they‚ll look for others.”
Russia announced, April 16, that it is increasing its support for two breakaway regions of Georgia. Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia, which have been self-ruled since brief wars over their move to independence from Georgia just after the break up of the Soviet Union. As the fighting there intensified at the beginning of August, the International Crises Group, “Georgia Conflict Alert: The Need for an Immediate End to Hostilities in South Ossetia,” August 8, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org, announced, “The current fighting in South Ossetia represents a humanitarian threat to 75,000 civilians in the region and risks a larger regional conflict if it expands to other parts of Georgia including Abkhazia. All sides should immediately cease hostilities in South Ossetia, uphold humanitarian law, protect the civilian population and resume talks to stop an expansion of the conflict. After weeks of low-level hostilities in South Ossetia, Georgia declared last night that it would restore constitutional order there and launched an offensive on the entity’s capital Tskhinvali early on 8 August. Georgian forces have taken control of much of the city and most surrounding villages. It appears that only the northern Java region remains outside Georgian control. Moscow has said it will protect Russian citizens living in South Ossetia. It has sent in large numbers of tanks and reportedly bombed locations in Georgia. A united international position is essential to forestall further conflict and loss of life. Russia, the United States and the European Union should push for a statement by the UN Security Council that demands: All sides immediately cease hostilities and withdraw all forces to prior positions. Georgia abide by all laws of war, protect the civilian population and guarantee access to humanitarian assistance. Russia refrain from taking steps outside its peacekeeping and negotiator mandate, and close its border to any paramilitaries attempting to cross into Georgia. All parties work to ensure calm throughout the region, including Abkhazia. It is particularly important that humanitarian assistance be immediately provided to the 75,000 civilians living in South Ossetia. Authorities need to ensure that there is full access to water, food and medical services. Roads should be open to emergency and humanitarian traffic. Persons who wish to evacuate should be allowed free passage, but no forced displacements should occur. All civilians and combatants should be assured protection according to international law and human rights obligations, and those who breach these obligations should be held accountable. Crisis Group has repeatedly warned of the dangers of a resumption of intense conflict in South Ossetia in the absence of a substantive dialogue between the sides. Since hostilities resumed between Georgians and South Ossetians in summer 2004, confidence between the two has been low and the security situation volatile. While the South Ossetians have been demanding full independence from Georgia, Tbilisi has tried to encourage them to return to Georgia. All negotiations have been stalled since summer 2006 contributing to increasing tensions and the likelihood that any violence could quickly spiral out of control. Efforts were made on 7 August to hold talks between Georgians and South Ossetians in the presence of Russian representatives but failed. There is a real danger that the conflict will expand beyond South Ossetia to Abkhazia and other parts of Georgia. Abkhazia has announced that it will deploy forces to its border with Georgia in the Gali region, in direct violation of the 1994 Moscow ceasefire agreement. Gali is predominantly populated by ethnic Georgians. All efforts must be made to assure their security and no extension of the conflict. For several years, Georgia has accused Russia of supporting the South Ossetians with military aid and argued that it cannot be an honest broker in the conflict‚s resolution. Tbilisi wants a change in the negotiations and peacekeeping formats in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While this should be considered in principle, and with a greater role for the European Union, it is not the right time to insist on a change of negotiations format to restart talks. The immediate focus should be on ceasing hostilities and responding to the humanitarian crisis.”
On August 8, Russian troops invaded Georgia’s breakaway province of South Ossetia, following Georgia’s launching an offensive to try to retake the province, which has a population who are mostly Russian citizens, but ethnically Ossetian, ehose native language is neither Russian or Georgian. As Russia overran Ossetia, and much of the other breakaway Georgian province along the Russian border, while making some air and ground attacks elsewhere in the country, Georgia took the issue to the UN. By August 18, it appeared that the Russians had agreed to join the Georgians in a truce, and would shortly begin withdrawing troops. However the Russians were not withdrawing, and instead consolidated their positions, including bringing in short range ballistic missiles. The main issue behind the Russian action appears to be Russia’s desire to control the territory through which future oil and gas pipelines are likely to be built. The United States has acted to oppose such Russian action, training Georgian troops – ostensibly for participation in the occupation of Iraq – and airlifting Georgian forces from Iraq to Georgia, when the Russians attacked. For more, see Michael Schwirtz and Anne Barnard, “Russian Troops Enter Rebel Enclave, The New York Times, August 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/09/world/europe/09georgia.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin. In late August reports surfaced of ethnic cleansing against Georgians in South Ossetia and Russians in Georgia. *ICG, “Georgia Conflict Alert: Russia must withdraw its troops from Georgia,” August 11, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org, asserted, “Russia must cease its advances within Georgia, immediately withdraw its troops to its peacekeeping positions, and restore the status quo ante. During the course of today, 11 August 2008, Russian troops, backed by its air force, advanced deep into Georgia, well beyond the boundaries of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and apparently took control of the Georgian towns of Gori, Senaki and Zugdidi, among others. Russia has no legitimate security interests justifying its advance beyond the boundaries of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is not performing a peacekeeping function or defending the rights of Russian citizens. Today’s advances and attacks raise real doubts about Russia’s intentions with respect to Georgia. These steps appear aimed at undermining Georgia’s capacity to function as a state. Russia must immediately agree to the ceasefire proposal made by European Union and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) envoys, the French and Finnish Foreign Ministers Bernard Kouchner and Alexander Stubb, which Georgia has signed. The international community, and particularly the United States and the European Union, must make it unequivocally clear that Russia’s aggression is a flagrant violation of international law and undermines its legitimacy as a defender of that law. It must also declare that failure to withdraw its troops back to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and then to Russia, will be strongly condemned and will significantly damage Russia’s relations with the U.S. and EU. Western heads of state should deliver this message forcefully to the Russian president and prime minister, including in person in Moscow. Once hostilities have ceased and withdrawal occurred, negotiations should take place between Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia to sign a non-resumption of hostilities text and agree to a revised peacekeeping arrangement and new negotiations format. All parties must secure the return of displaced persons and provide humanitarian assistance.”
Stephen Zunes, “U.S. Role in Georgia Crisis,” Foreign Policy In Focus, August 14, 2008, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5465, comments” The international condemnation of Russian aggression against Georgia – and the concomitant assaults by Abkhazians and South Ossetians against ethnic Georgians within their territories – is in large part appropriate. But the self-righteous posturing coming out of Washington should be tempered by a sober recognition of the ways in which the United States has contributed to the crisis.” Many commentators believe that Russian invasion would not have occurred, had not the U.S. lead NATO to expand up to Russia’s borders, and that Georgia might not have launched the offensive into South Ossetia, that the Russian incursion countered, had the U.S. not provided Georgia so much rhetorical support, including proposing its membership in NATO – which clearly worried the Russian government.
Cambodia and Thailand, after asking the U.N, for help in a dispute along their border which Cambodia said constituted ‘an imminent state of war,” reached a settlement over the ownership of the ancient Hindu temple of Preah Vihear, which straddles the boarder.
Developments in Europe
In May, The European Union began broad ranging negotiations with Russia in an attempt to greatly extend cooperation, for the first time in a decade. That effort has been side tracked, at least for the moment, by the Georgian war. In June, voters in Ireland defeated, and thus blocked, the Lisbon Treaty to consolidate European Union power and stream line its bureaucracy, which has been becoming increasingly unwieldy.
Following Russia’s invasion of Georgia, Poland agreed to the United States stationing 10 antiballistic missiles, as a defense against a rogue nation or group firing an atomic missile, to be stationed on its territories, to which Russia objects.
ICG, “Will the Real Serbia Please Stand Up?” April 23, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5402&l=1, asserted, “The international community should refrain from counter-productive intervention in Serbia’s May 11 elections, including offering to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA).” The elections brought to power a pro-western government, wishing to join the European Union. An important result was the arrest of Bosnian Serb military commander, Radovan Kardzic for trial in the Haugue on war crimes charges. Karadzic is accused of a leading role in the massacre of almost 8,000 Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica, and other atrocities, during the war in Bosnia. In April, Montenegro’s westward leading President Fiolip Vuljanovic was reelected.
Chris Patten, “A Ticking Clock on Kosovo“, the Boston Globe, August 10, 2007, finds, “Despite Belgrade’s adamant rhetoric demanding Kosovo remain a part of Serbia, the Serbian authorities have never offered any proposal as to how the 90 percent Albanian population of the breakaway province would ever again actually live under a Serb wing. Of course, thinking about the people of Kosovo has rarely been Serbia’s strong point: This is, after all, where Belgrade conducted an ethnic cleansing campaign in 1999, massacring thousands of Albanian civilians and driving 800,000 into neighboring countries, until NATO bombing forced a change of policy.” “In the meantime, the clock is ticking, and Kosovo needs answers. Kosovo Albanians have waited eight years for the international community to pull them out of international legal limbo and resolve their status. Although outnumbering all minorities 9 to 1, they have agreed to establish a multiethnic state with the strongest minority protection regime ever seen in Europe. As they see it, the international community is running out of excuses for further delays in a status resolution of its design, to which Albanians have conceded everything possible short of compromising the new state’s ability to function. The United States and Europe have asked them for another 120 days of patience. Beyond this, pressure will build for a unilateral declaration of independence whether or not it has international support. The bottom line is that Pristina demands nothing short of independence and Belgrade refuses that, so the new troika will end up where Ahtisaari did: stalemate between the parties and the need for the UN Security Council to cast the deciding vote. Given the Kosovo people’s overwhelming desire to be free from the state that tried to eliminate them and the lack of any realistic alternative from Belgrade, the international community has little choice but to give Kosovo its independence.” Kosovo’s new constitution took effect in June.
The Institute for 21st Century Agoras, who has developed participatory democratic process for dealing with complex issues, (SDD) and has applied that process for building peace in Cyprus, reported this summer. in “Cyprus Tipping Point,” http://www.globalagoras.org/ebuzz.html, “Agoras believes that by extending many experiences of SDD in a specific community we can hope to reach a “tipping point” where SDD will become the design option of first preference. This will move a community away from the back-office, expert design and public advocacy tradition into a new world of authentic democratic design. The standing guess is that when 20% of the community activists have experienced SDD, the community will come to request and then demand SDD for complex problem resolution. A small but growing group of Turkish and Greek Cypriots put this hope to the test. They have been working towards national unification for over 10 years using SDD to identify obstacles to unification and work collectively to overcome them. About 4 years ago the United Nations took notice and decided to further this; push for unification. In the timeworn procedure for these sorts of things, Kofe Annan commissioned a team of experts to draft a unification plan. This plan was put to a vote. Cypriots viewed the unification measures as alien, not what they had been discussing, and as imposed by outsiders. The vote failed. To its credit, the UN did not give up. In 2006, it funded a Civil Society Dialogue project.The project focused on the peace and reconciliation of the two divided communities. To accomplish this goal, it funded public events and a series of SDD co-laboratories dealing with economic, communication, relations to the European Union, and other topics that need to be addressed before unification would be possible. Those co-labs did their job admirably. Earlier this year, the UN recognizing this progress proclaimed that it was not taking any position regarding unification plans. It thus left unification completely up to the Cypriots and the plans jointly worked out in the co-labs. This is exactly what the Cypriots both Turkish and Greek wanted. At the end of July, the Greek president and the leader of the Turks sat down to work out the details of that unification.”
Developments in Africa
While piracy elsewhere has declined, it has become a growing and serious problem off the 530 mile coast line of Nigeria, including for local fishing boats, and along the coast of Somalia. Oil and other shipping has been imperiled, bringing the U.S. and other Navies to increase patrols in those waters, beginning in late July. While worldwide piracy has declined steadily from 234 reported incidents from January 1-June 30 in 2003 to 114 in the first half of 2008, pirate attacks on the coast of Africa after dropping in the ifrst six months of the year from 49 in 2003 to 27 in 2005, have risen annual in the first half of each year to reach 64 (the majority of acts of piracy world wide) in the first half of this year.
As the 30 plus year conflict in the Western Sahara between Morocco and insurgents continues, many refugees have been left in limbo, stranded in camps with meager supplies and poor living conditions, while others flee to Algeria (Cara Buckley, “Western Sahara’s Conflict Traps Refugees in Limob,” The New York Times, International, June 4, 2008).
Repression to keep President Mugabe in power was rising in late April, with gangs of Mugabe supporters roaming the countryside, asking to see party membership cards, and beating suspected or known opposition people – sometimes to death. Neither international pressure or negotiation between Mugabe’s party and the opposition have resolved the crisis (as of August 22). One result is that 1000 people a day have been fleeing Zimbabwe into South Africa. In South Africa, there have been demonstrations and serious acts of violence against foreigners in the country
The .situation in Darfur continues to worsen with ethnic cleansing continuing, refugees, aid workers and the few peace keepers more at risk, and the international community still providing too little pressure or adequate peace keeping forces, equipment and supplies. The conflict there also continues to spill over into surrounding territories, including Sudan and Chad, who are aiding rebellions in each others nations.
ICG issued a statement, “New ICC Prosecution: Opportunities and Risks for Peace in Sudan,” July 14, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org:” Today’s application by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for a warrant of arrest for Sudanese President Omar Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Darfur creates both big opportunities and big risks for peace in Sudan.” “In seeking this warrant, the Prosecutor is acting within his mandate under the Rome Statute and from the UN Security Council, which in 2005 referred crimes committed in Darfur to him for investigation and prosecution. That mandate has been consistently frustrated by the Sudanese government – not least in its refusal to hand over the government minister, Ahmad Harun, and Janjaweed commander, Ali Kushayb, against whom warrants were issued in April 2007 ˆ and it is important for the Prosecutor to protect the credibility of the Court by pursuing further prosecutions. It may also prove to be the case that in initiating this process the Prosecutor will be advancing the interests of peace…. But it may be that the increased pressure now placed on the NCP governing regime will lead it to take long overdue steps to cease all violence, implement genuine and credible measures to resolve the Darfur crisis ˆ including allowing the full and effective deployment of the UNAMID peacekeeping force ˆ and fully carry out its side of the bargain to implement the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The problem for international policymakers is that the Prosecutor‚s legal strategy also poses major risks for the fragile peace and security environment in Sudan, with a real chance of greatly increasing the suffering of very large numbers of its people. Hard-liners on all sides may be reinforced, with the governing regime and other actors reacting to today’s application, and any subsequent warrant, in ways that seriously undermine the fragile North-South peace process, bring an end to any chance of political negotiations in Darfur, make impossible the effective deployment of UNAMID, put at risk the humanitarian relief operations presently keeping alive over 2 million people in Darfur, and lead to inflammation of wider regional tensions.” “The best way through this dilemma may be for the UN Security Council to take advantage of the likely two to three month window before the judges‚ decision on the arrest warrant, to assess whether genuine and substantial progress is in fact being made in stopping the continuing violence for which the governing regime bears responsibility, engaging in genuine peace negotiations in Darfur, expediting UNAMID deployment and advancing the CPA. If it believes such progress is being made, and that the interests of peace justify this course being taken, the Security Council could ˆ even if the Prosecutor and the ICC wanted to proceed ˆ exercise its power under Article 16 of the Rome Statute to suspend any prosecutions, for an initial twelve months but with such suspension able to be renewed indefinitely. Such a decision would have to be made in light of the regime‚s history of repeatedly flouting agreements it has entered into. But the need for any Article 16 deferral to be renewed on an annual basis would provide an incentive, hitherto lacking, for the regime to abide by commitments made under threat of ICC prosecution. This is not the time to be relieving pressure on the Bashir regime ˆ or the rebel groups who are making their own major contribution to conflict in Darfur. But the most critical of all needs is to end the horrific suffering of the Sudanese people and to ensure there is no new explosion of mass violence.”
ICG, “Côte d‚Ivoire: Ensuring Credible Elections,” April 22, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5400&l=1, “If Côte d’Ivoire is to avoid a return to violence, all actors must focus on creating the political and security conditions necessary for free and fair elections.” “The 4 March 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Accord (OPA), in which the ex-Forces Nouvelles (FN) rebellion leader Guillaume Soro was appointed prime minister by his former adversary, President Laurent Gbagbo, has produced mixed results. There has been a general improvement in the security environment. However, overall implementation is far behind schedule, and there has been no decisive progress on two critical issues: ‘identification’ of the population – determining who is a citizen and who may vote – and the disarmament of ex-rebels and militias and their reinsertion or reintegration into civilian life or the military. These are the most politically sensitive and risky tasks, and they need to be undertaken now. The calm political climate since the signing of the OPA, though genuine, should not fool anyone. It will be difficult to reach an agreement among all political actors to create the conditions for democratic elections. Three things are critical: strict adherence to the OPA by the signatories; implementation of a consensual security plan for the identification operations and the elections; and a conflict prevention strategy worked out with the help of Burkina Faso President Compaoré ˆ the facilitator and arbitrator of the peace process – and the UN mission (ONUCI). Compaoré should expose the spoilers and recommend individual sanctions to the Security Council, of which Burkina Faso is currently a member. ‘The struggle to influence the electoral process and the presidential campaign will be harsh and divisive, with the risk of returning the country to turmoil, says Daniela Kroslak, Deputy Director of Crisis Group’s Africa Program. ‘But a successful outcome to the peace process is critical for the stability and economic future of all West Africa’.”
ICG, “Congo: Four Priorities for Sustainable Peace in Ituri,” May 13, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5425&l=1, “Congo’s reconstruction hinges on the Ituri district, where a new integrated peace-building strategy is required to prevent another round of violence.” The international community has worked hard to take weapons away from armed groups and has to a large extent assumed the lead in the political and military process that has allowed for the progressive surrender of those militias during the transition process. Beyond the issue of disarmament and in view of the risk that the local elections in 2009 could trigger renewed violence, however, further challenges have to be addressed. Land-related tensions that were at the origin of the conflict have not been eased and constantly threaten to lead to new inter-ethnic confrontations. With the return of refugees to their homes, a resurgence of those tensions seems inevitable. It is, therefore, indispensable to take preventive measures on the ground and to clarify the judicial muddle on land law and the status of chieftainships. The uneven, opaque distribution of revenues from exploitation of gold, collection of customs fees and extraction of oil at Lake Albert also risks renewing tensions. It is critical to the peace process to establish a framework for transparent treatment of Ituri‚s resources, to dismantle local mafia networks that extract resources from mining and forestry and to manage expectations raised by the discovery of oil at Lake Albert. Francois Grignon, Director of Crisis Group’s Africa Program, stated, “If peace is to be consolidated, a voluntary and integrated approach is required that reunites national and regional institutions and international partners, otherwise, the return of chaos is likely, which would signify the failure of the peace process.”
ICG, “Beyond the Fragile Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Averting New War,” June 17, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5490&l=1, recommends, “The Ethiopia-Eritrea impasse is a major source of instability in the Horn of Africa region and risks becoming a new deadly war.” “ Following Ethiopia‚s refusal to accept virtual demarcation of the border by the now defunct Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC), Asmara unilaterally implemented it and forced out the UN peacekeeping mission (UNMEE), significantly raising the stakes and shattering the status quo. ‘The departure of the Boundary Commission and the UN peacekeepers has made this conflict much more dangerous, removing the means both for dialogue between the parties and for stopping small problems from escalating’, says Andebrhan Giorgis, Crisis Grou’s Senior Africa Adviser. ‘Neither regime wants war at present. Both prefer to keep tensions simmering, giving them an excuse to maintain authoritarian rule, but a minor border incident or miscalculation could produce a disastrous return to conflict.‘ The Security Council has been largely passive, refusing to take strong action against either Ethiopia for breaking its commitment under the 2000 Algiers peace agreements to accept the EEBC border decisions or Eritrea for its provocations. Preoccupation with its counter-terrorism concerns has made the U.S. unwilling to use its influence with Ethiopia. But the bilateral dispute is also increasingly dangerous for the region, in particular in Somalia, where Eritrean proxies are fighting Ethiopian troops who support the Transitional Federal Government. It will not be easy to overcome either the parties‚ entrenched positions or the West’s neglect, but the stakes are too high not to make an attempt. A strongly backed international action plan which reconfigures the old failed process from the 2000 peace agreements is needed to break the deadlock. The immediate priority is to persuade Ethiopia to withdraw from all land the EEBC awarded Eritrea, and Eritrea to pull back from the Temporary Security Zone. Wider dialogue on normalisation of relations demanded by Ethiopia should start in parallel with progressive border demarcation required by Eritrea. This would be consistent with Security Council resolutions, which demanded both Ethiopian implementation of EEBC decisions and the start of a normalization dialogue, but might also give both sides more reason to show flexibility, since each would get something it wants early in the process.” Human Rights Watch, complained, in June, that Ethiopian soldiers had murdered, raped and evicted civilians in a crackdown on insurgents in the Ogaden region.
In the Horn of Africa, Djibouti, which has had tensions with all its neighbors, has been involved in a tense boarder dispute with Eritrea.
In Somalia, the government remains tottering as fighting continues. Some observers suggest that with the politics of the so called nation long having been based upon clans, international attempts to establish a national government as a mechanism to begin peace is staring in the wrong place. They suggest that a bottom up approach to building peace is necessary.
ICG, “Guinea-Bissau: In Need of a State,” July 2, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5549&l=2, finds, “The international community must encourage reform tendencies in Guinea-Bissau to counter the risk of the West African country becoming a narco-state and political no-man‚s-land of interest to Maghreb criminal and terrorist networks.” Daniela Kroslak, Crisis Group‚s Deputy Africa Program Director, states. “The creation of a democratic state is increasingly urgent as the risk of criminalization is growing. Cocaine trafficking from Latin America has increased tremendously in recent years, and the country has become a pivotal transit point in the route to European markets.” No leader since 1974 has tried to establish the necessary structures for a functioning democratic state. Consequently, the country’s infrastructure, bureaucracy, administration, political institutions and human- and social-development indexes remain largely unaltered since the first years of independence. Presently, the movement towards greater reform and democracy, fuelled by the Stability Pact and promoted by the government of Martinho Ndafa Cabi, faces the same military resistance and is hampered by a dangerous institutional vacuum. Fundamental changes are required to the way the country is run. Above all, army reform is needed to free the political system from military interference. The stakes are considerable both for the country and the West African region, already touched by repeated political crises (Guinea) and drawn-out peace-consolidation processes (Sierra Leone, Liberia). The international community has taken tentative steps to lend its assistance. A program of reforms addressing major security sector and public administration challenges was adopted in 2007, and, at the request of the prime minister, the country was added to the agenda of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). However, for these steps to have tangible results for the people of Guinea-Bissau, foreign partners must galvanize their efforts and seize what appears to be a genuine opportunity. ‘Only a serious institution-building process and a legal framework that can regulate political life and free it from the guerrilla mentality of pre-independence can allow Guinea-Bissau to escape its crisis once and for all,’ according to François Grignon, Crisis Group‚s Africa Program Director. ‘The country must start building a real democratic state’.”
The Government of Kenya, last spring, was Preparing a Conflict Resolution Syllabus for Schools in response to effects of post-election violence. For more information go to: http://allafrica.com/stories/200804300114.html. Signs of reconciliation and reconstruction have been evident in Kenya this summer.
In the strife ridden delta of Nigeria, Royal Dutch Shell stopped oil production at its off shore Bonga field, in June, following the first attack on a far off shore oil rig.
ICG, “Sierra Leone: A New Era of Reform?” International Crisis Group,” Africa Report N°143, July 31, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5608&l=1, reports, “Sierra Leone has made much progress since the civil war ended in 2002, but a number of social and economic time bombs must still be defused if an enduring peace is to be built. The 2007 elections, in which Ernest Bai Koroma won the presidency and his All People’s Congress (APC) wrested the parliament from the ruling Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), restored legitimacy to the electoral process. Koroma’s reform agenda promises much but must overcome big challenges. The majority of the population lives in abject poverty, and an ever-growing army of unemployed, socially alienated youth is a perennial threat to security. Patronage networks and identity politics, though evolving, continue to constrain government decisions. The new government faces a fundamental political challenge in building public confidence in its agenda, while donor support to post-war reconstruction is gradually scaled down. It needs to do more than call for “attitudinal change” and a renewed “social contract” if it is to improve accountability and combat corruption. The UN Peacebuilding Commission can make a major contribution.” “The new president has exacerbated regional political rivalries by dismissing numerous functionaries appointed by the previous administration and replacing them with APC-supporting northerners. Returnees from the sizeable overseas diaspora, a major source of election campaign money, have contributed to the pressure on him to reward party faithful with government jobs. Koroma nevertheless has sought to fulfill his promise to run government “like a business concern”. He has streamlined the ministerial system, put civil service reform back on the political agenda and required ministers to sign performance contracts whose targets they must meet to keep their jobs. The president appears to be playing out a long-term strategy of reform in introducing new political discipline and accountability to the old system of patronage politics. His government’s success in securing donor support for emergency electricity supplies for Freetown, the capital, was a political triumph, enabling him to speak with authority about the need for a new “social contract” in which the government supplies services and responsible citizens pay for them. However, rising food prices highlight the government’s limited room for maneuver, and the Presidential Transition Team, underscored the continuing dependency on donors.” “Building a lasting post-war political settlement requires a genuinely national project. One possibility is formulation of a fully consultative National Development Plan to replace the recently expired Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Such a plan needs to enhance interaction between government and citizens and form the basis upon which future governments are held politically to account for meeting development targets.” Recommendations to the Government of Sierra Leone: 1. Give meaning to the rhetoric about “attitudinal change” and “zero tolerance on corruption” through specific policies for improving public service delivery and increasing government transparency and accountability. 2. Consolidate policy on youth employment, private sector development, infrastructure rehabilitation, public sector reform and decentralization into a National Development Plan and conduct extensive public consultations to determine local needs. 3. Ensure any future governmental audit is transparent, bipartisan and disseminated in a form that enhances public understanding of the operations, capacity and limitations of governmental ministries, departments and agencies. 4. Revive urgently discussion and consultation on the modalities of land tenure reform in the provinces. 5. Ensure the National Electoral Commission (NEC) remains politically independent, which may require bipartisan consultation over future staff appointments. 6. Honor public promises to separate the offices of justice minister and attorney general and to require senior officials to declare their private assets. Recommendations to Donors: 7. Support the creation of a National Development Plan that replaces the recently expired Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and commit long-term funding to it. 8. Continue supporting specific projects in partnership with the government but ensure, where possible, that these are integrated within the National Development Plan. 9. Continue supporting the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), which has an important role in promoting governmental accountability. Recommendations to the UN Peacebuilding commission: 10. Support the Koroma government’s efforts to forge political consensus and improve accountability, including by funding implementation of Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) recommendations and countrywide consultations on a National Development Plan and land tenure reform. 11. Use the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) strategically to support public consultations, consensus building and policy development rather than simply plugging gaps in existing development funding.”
ICG, “Guinea: Ensuring Democratic Reforms,” June 24, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5503&l=1, ”Unless all civil society actors, heads of political parties and religious leaders unite in their quest for real change, the Conté dictatorship will be restored in Guinea.” “There is every chance the government will break its promise of credible legislative elections in December 2008, compromise economic revival and bury the independent commission of inquiry tasked with identifying and prosecuting authors of the bloody 2007 crackdown. ‘The dismissal of the Prime Minister Lansana Kouyaté on 20 May 2008 and his replacement by Tidiane Souaré, a close ally of President Lansana Conté, puts the reform process at risk,’ says Daniela Kroslak, Deputy Director of Crisis Group‚s Africa Program. ‘The political and economic change Guineans demanded in 2007 at the cost of nearly 200 lives is in jeopardy.’ “The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU), the United Nations Office for West Africa, France, the U.S. and Guinea‚s other external partners must send a common message to the new prime minister. Direct assistance to the government should be made conditional on the organization of legislative elections in December 2008 and the provision of financial and logistic support and security measures necessary to launch the independent commission of inquiry into the events of June 2006 and January-February 2007.”
In Mauritania, army officers seized power in a bloodless coups, overturning the first elected government in twenty years, in a nation with a history of many coups.
Another effort to complete a peace arrangement in Uganda fell through when the rebel forces chief negotiator resigned and government officials left the site of the talks. Burundi took a step toward peace, in June, as the government and the country’s last rebel group signed a cease fire agreement, paving the way for a permanent termination of the 13 year old civil war.
Developments in Latin America
Lamia Oualalou, “US Navy Deploys Around Latin America,” Le Figaro,” April 28, 2008, reports, “Choosing to confront the rise in power of left-leaning governments in its backyard, the United States is recreating the Fourth Fleet…with the mission of patrolling Latin American and Caribbean waters.” “ While Washington assures that its sole interest in the region is combating “new threats” (terrorism, drug trafficking and the Maras gangs of Central America), Latin American people often see it as the pursuit of “imperialist” interests dictated by energy needs. The tensions between Washington and the radical presidents of the sub-continent’s main oil and gas producers (Venezuela, Equator and Bolivia) accentuate that perception. As a sign of defiance, almost all Latin American countries have refused to sign the American Serviceman Protection Act, a treaty that prevents legal pursuit of American soldiers for crimes committed abroad. The plan to install a military base in Paraguay, close to Bolivian gas fields, was denounced by Brazil and Argentina. Ecuador has made it known that the American military base installed in Manta until 2009 will not be allowed to renew its mandate. Worse still, Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, has relaunched the idea of a South American Defense Council, explicitly excluding all United States intervention. Washington’s sidelining comes at a time when new sources of conflict are arising in the region, as, for example, the one that pits Colombia on one side and Ecuador and Venezuela on the other, or that between Bolivia and Chile over sea access. An arms race is underway in the region, where governments have taken advantage of the economic revival to reequip their armies, neglected since the 1970s. American arms manufacturers are no longer alone in this market: some European countries, but especially China, Russia and Iran, are trying to get a footing in a region that also attracts them for its natural resource and energy potential.”
Kent Paterson, “U.S. Lawmakers Approve Mexico Military Aid as Human Rights Complaints Mount, Americas UPDATER, July 9, 2008, http://americas.irc-online.org/updater/5358, reports, “More than three months after the Mexican army kicked off “Operation Chihuahua Together” against drug trafficking organizations in Ciudad Juarez and the state of Chihuahua, multiple accusations of human rights violations committed by soldiers continue hitting the press. As of mid-June, 50 legal complaints against the army had been filed with the Office of the Federal Attorney General (PGR) in Ciudad Juarez. The complaints accuse the army of committing abuses of authority, carrying out illegal detentions, forcibly disappearing citizens, conducting improper searches, and inflicting bodily injuries and damages.” “Human rights advocates in Mexico and abroad have long contended that the use of the Mexican military in the drug war is a violation of the nation’s constitution which precludes the army from acting domestically in times of peace.” The deadly drug war has continued to cause heavy cassualties. In mid August 13 people were killed in Creel, Chihuahua, when gunmen opened fire at a family gathering. More than 2000 people have died this year in Mexican drug related battles, between drug gangs, and involving drug gangs and the army and police. The acting chief of Mexico’s federal police was assassinated in May. The Mexican Government, at the end of April, accepted an offer from the Ejercito Popular Revolucionario to negotiate, after the group, which bombed oil and gas pipelines last year, stated it was ceasing its attacks. There was renewed debate in Mexico’s Congress – and around the country – this spring, about how to update the state oil company, with parties of the left resisting government proposals to even partially privatize the firm.
Laura Carlsen, “A Primer on Plan Mexico,” Americas UPDATER, August 7, 2008, http://americas.irc-online.org/updater/5452, states, “In the end, even the weak conditions that had been placed on the bill were largely removed. Both administrations proclaimed themselves satisfied with the deal, and Congress hailed a new era in binational cooperation. But with human rights relegated to the sidelines, Mexican society and U.S.-Mexico relations face a militarized future, in which the unchecked power of abusive security forces adds to, rather than resolves, the alarming violence of organized crime.”
Saul Landau, “Cuba: The Struggle Continues,” Foreign Policy in Focus, May 7, 2008 (http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5206), finds” Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Cubans have lived through a “special period.” This euphemism stood not only for a drastic decline in the standard of living, but for a sharp alteration of social values as well. Soviet aid vanished along with the advantageous trade with the Soviet bloc. As Cuba’s economy went south, the state broke its part of the social contract: it no longer provided Cubans with their material needs of sufficient food and clothing. Basic health care and education remained, albeit cut back. But the government cut rations by more than half and cheap food disappeared. To survive, each Cuban felt himself morphed from the values of communism (sharing) to the values of individualism (dog eat dog).” “By 2007, Cuban leaders began a public debate to address some of the problems that developed in the post-Soviet period. Some of these problems had roots in the Soviet model itself. The leadership, however, had no intention of going capitalist. Those who have pushed the Chinese or Vietnamese models did not prevail when, last July 26, Raul Castro spoke of solving the pressing issues like daily adversity, shortage of food and low agricultural productivity, within a socialist model. The government has responded to popular discontent, alienation, and downright cynicism and over the last two years imported 35% more food. Raul also admitted that “wages are clearly insufficient to meet people’s needs.” This statement does not mean what U.S. journalists report or sneer at when they report that the average Cuban wage comes to $20 a month. They don’t factor in free health care and education from nursery school to PhD; no rent or taxes; practically free transportation, entertainment, and subsidized food. But it is still a long way from the cradle-to grave security Cubans experienced before the Soviet demise. Most foreign reporters also omit the obvious fact: Cuban leaders make choices on the basis of needs of the 11-plus million people, underlining health and education as basics.” “The new mood has extended beyond the material. The artists and intellectuals declared they would not tolerate censorship. The leadership agreed. All of the openings and reforms spelled progress. But all the positive steps aside, the revolution is in trouble. In the first months of this year, several thousand Cubans fled the island for Florida. They didn’t leave because of lack of freedom of speech, but rather for freedom to practice their professions and envision more possibilities for their and their children’s futures.” ” The question now is: can Cuba overcome the legacy of the special period, when individualism eroded the collective spirit, and can she transcend the three decades of the Soviet model that she had to adopt for survival? Her leaders have lived in and for the revolution and imparted its values to the population. Will Cubans respond and grab the initiative to maintain the enormous gains or succumb to the shiny lure of mass consumerism? We shall see.” See also Samuel Farber, “Life after Fidel,” Foreign Policy In Focus (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=2HDpdAEyFUHCucoJO8TSU%2BkJSoeJFhim>http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5205) on, “The new Cuban leadership is contemplating neoliberal economic reforms but democracy is still off the table,” and Samuel Farber and Saul Landau, “Strategic Dialogue on Cuba,” Foreign Policy In Focus (http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/dia/track.jsp?v=2&c=0jYzzID%2FarcLl6PMsUmrZOkJSoeJFhim>http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5208).
Rupa Chinai, “Haiti’s Compounding Food and Health Crises,” Americas UPDATER, Vol. 6, No. 15, August 7, 2008, www.americaspolicy.org, states, “Haiti today is a tragic case study of how developing nations can lose the sovereign right to ensure access to healthcare when they lose their right to local food self-sufficiency under globalization. Both crises have the same roots: the loss of food sovereignty and the basic ability of a nation to feed its own people. This has led to a situation that demands international attention.” In late June, The Center for Human Rights and Global Justice criticized the U.S. government for holding up funding for providing clean drinking water in Haiti, in an alleged attempt to leverage political change there.
President Daniel Ortega, of Nicaragua, in December, despite a no vote by the National Assembly, established Citizen Power Councils to give the poor a voice in directing antipoverty funding, with the aim of making them more effective. But as the councils are largely controlled by the President’s Sandanista Party, conservative politicians object to them, calling the councils a step toward dictatorship.
As the long civil war in Columbia continues, ICG, “Colombia: Making Military Progress Pay Off,” April 29, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5410&l=1, proposes, “Years of President Álvaro Uribe’s intensive security operations against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are beginning to produce tangible results, but military gains can only succeed if combined with a robust political strategy.” Security progress “has come at the cost of severely deteriorating relations with Ecuador and Venezuela and increased risk of regional isolation after the controversial 1 March 2008 bombing raid on the Ecuador-based camp of Rául Reyes, the FARC‚s second-in-command. It calls for a political strategy that consistently pursues a swap of imprisoned insurgents for hostages in FARC captivity, re-establishes working relations with neighbors along borders and strongly advances integrated rural development to consolidate security and broaden international 20support.” “The hostage crisis in particular has acquired great political significance in Colombia and internationally since mid-2007.“ “As a first step, it should consider offering the insurgents an internationally monitored demilitarized area for 45 days, provided there is prior agreement the swap will occur during that period. Internationally, it is crucial to engage Ecuador immediately and Venezuela subsequently to re-establish and strengthen border cooperation and prevent the FARC‚s use of sanctuaries. The government should give a clear mandate to the friendly countries supporting a swap and balance Cháve’‚s role by inviting more Brazilian activity. Internally, Uribe should massively increase integrated rural development where security permits.” Efforts by the Bush Administration to get Congress to approve a free trade pact with Columbia, to date, have been blocked, with opponents citing that Columbia is the most dangerous place for union leaders in the world, with more than 2,500 union members having been killed since 1985.
As of June, political conflict was continuing in Bolivia, between the Morales administration and opposition leaders from the wealthy half-moon regions of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija, but especially the Santa Cruz faction, as local voters went to the polls May 4 to decide on ”autonomy” for the region and whose results are another source of conflict. Following the May 12 passage of a referendum measure, Bolivian President Evo Morales is preparing for a national yes or no vote on whether he, his administration and the governors of all the regions are to keep their jobs until the end of their terms. All Bolivians will vote up or down, August 10, on his administration and the other leaders. For Morales and Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera, that means they would need at least 53.7 percent of the vote, or 1.54 million votes, to be able to stay in office. If they fail to reach that percentage – which was the margin that elected them last time – they would have six months to arrange another general election before leaving office. There is the same requirement for the governors, but if they fail to win their prior election margin, they will be required to leave office the next day, and the president would appoint interim governors until the elections were held. Opposition governors are ignoring the referendum legislation and pushing on with setting up autonomous governments. Morales had arranged for meetings, in mid-May, with all of the governors, but the half-moon delegation refused the offer (insisting that they would only cooperate if leaders of the Catholic Church were present). In effect, the opposition bloc is calling the results a mandate for autonomy and Morales, along with allies in five Latin American governments and the Organization of American States, is calling the results unconstitutional and a victory for Morales, with the pro-Morales side warning that the partition of Bolivia ”will not be accepted.” International support for further dialogue and for Morales was growing through May. At the beginning of the month the OAS passed a declaration, that listing seven points regarding the conflict. Points 2 and 4 allude to the institutions position on secession: ”2. To welcome the expressions of respect for the constitutional order and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bolivia, and to reject any attempt to disrupt them. … 4. To make a vigorous appeal to all actors to ensure that their actions are governed by respect for the rule of law, refraining from any action that may lead to a breakdown of the peace and/or constitutional order and affect coexistence between Bolivians.” A number of intellectuals and other leaders from the U.S., Latin America and Europe sent a letter to Morales that was delivered in mid-May, stating their support for his government and their concern about the nature of the opposition. ”Also, we have noted the belligerent, intransigent and illegal attitude of the powerful sectors that hide behind a shield of ‘autonomy efforts’ – far away from the just and inclusive autonomy of the indigenous peoples and from the proper departments and regions formed in the new constitution – to shatter the process of justice initiated by the popular government that you lead,” the letter stated. Among the 300 signatories were writers, human rights activists along with indigenous leaders from 20 countries. Several of the letter’s signers were from Brazil, where May 13 that country’s foreign minister, Celso Amorim stated, ”I don’t think we’ll see separatism. Even because South America would never accept it. ”Brazil is not against autonomy wishes as long as constitutional principles are respected and that is the will of the Bolivian people.” In the meantime, 34 indigenous peoples from the Oriente, Chaco and Amazonia regions are refusing to recognize the Santa Cruz autonomy movement, and have announced their support for the Aug. 10 referendum. In a press statement issued May 12, the group also ”resolved to declare themselves to be in a state of emergency and permanent mobilization at the national level until the conclusion of the constituent process with the approval of the new Magna Carta and the implementation of indigenous autonomies.” There have been discussions of possible dialogues between the Morales administration and the opposition continue, but as of early June, no fixed dates or places had been arranged. On August 18, tensions in Bolivia escalated as five Half Moon provinces undertook general strikes demanding a larger share of oil and gas revenue from production in their territory, while President Morales seeks a larger share to aid poor elder citizens.
The International Crisis Group (ICG), “Bolivia: Rescuing the New Constitution and Democratic Stability,” June 19 (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5499&l=1), reported that, “The confrontation between the Morales administration and the political and regional opposition centered in the eastern lowlands over Bolivia’s new, still provisional constitution and departmental autonomy is approaching a climax that may well lead to violence unless both sides commit to dialogue and compromise. On 22 June, Tarija department is expected to join its three neighbors (Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando) in adopting an autonomy statute in a referendum the central government does not recognize.” “President Evo Morales’s efforts to consolidate sweeping reforms on the basis of a controversial new constitution have steered Bolivia into a cul-de-sac. On 8 December 2007, his supporters in the Constituent Assembly provisionally passed the text by running roughshod over procedures and virtually excluding opposition delegates. Feeble attempts to bridge the deepening divide have failed, increasing potential for a violent confrontation all concerned still seem to wish to avoid.” Frédéric Massé, Crisis Group Senior Analyst, stated, “Bolivia needs both democratic stability and socio-economic progress. It is essential to move away from dueling referendums‚ and zero-sum strategies aimed at subduing the other side.” “With the Constitutional Court inoperative, unable to serve as an impartial arbiter, government and opposition must resume a meaningful dialogue. Basic consensus is needed regarding: the compatibility between departmental autonomy and the several further layers of autonomy, including for indigenous peoples, contained in the new constitution; use and distribution among the nine departments and between them and the central government of revenues from the Direct Hydrocarbon Tax (IDH); and the city of Sucre‚s status as the constitutional capital but not seat of government. The government should provisionally stop taking IDH money away from the departments for its new pension fund, and discussions about Sucre’s status should be put off to a later stage. But the autonomy question is top priority. It needs to be tackled immediately, and final adoption of the constitution should be postponed until a compromise is found. Markus Schultze-Kraft, Crisis Group’s Latin America Program Director commented, “Bolivia’s break-up does not appear imminent. but if mutual intransigence persists, the stand-off between the Morales government and the opposition over departmental autonomy and the new constitution threatens serious further destabilization.”
ICG, “Venezuela: Political Reform or Regime Demise?” July 23, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5583&l=1, reports, “Hugo Chávez’s radical course and increasingly autocratic Bolivarian revolution are under growing pressure from former supporters alienated by government mismanagement, food shortages, inflation, public insecurity and corruption.” “There is mounting resistance to Chávez‚s push to merge his coalition’s parties into a new United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), and concern about his foreign policy and further concentration of power in the president’s hands. If he fails to compromise and govern more transparently and inclusively, November municipal and regional elections could repeat the dramatic political setback Chávez suffered when his sweeping constitutional reform was defeated in a referendum last December.” “Many Venezuelans are dissatisfied with Chávez’s foreign policy. Massive arms deals, generous cooperation with allies and intrusive diplomacy throughout Latin America, including support for radical armed groups such as the Colombian FARC [which Chavez has since withdrawn], risk isolating the country internationally.“ Crisis Group’s Latin America Program Director, Markus Schultze-Kraft, states, “It is time for Chávez to change his radical course, regain the trust of a good part of his movement’s former social base, seek compromise with the democratic opposition and govern far more efficiently. Only by ending attempts to drastically alter the 1999 constitution is Chávez likely to return Venezuela to democratic stability.” Yet, as of August, Chavez was attempting to put many of the components of the defeated constitution into effect, through a series of administrative orders. In June Chavez reorganized national intelligence, increasing his control of the agencies. In May, President Chavez initiated additional nationalizations of private firms, and launched some government joint ventures with allies, such as Cuba and Iran.
Equcuador’s progressive Pesident Rafael Corea, alarmed at CIA ties of officers in the nations military, has been purging top military commanders and moving to close the U.S. military airbase near the city of Manta. In early August, ICG,” Ecuador: Overcoming Instability?” ,Latin America Report N°22, August 7, 2007, “Ecuador has been Latin America’s most unstable democracy for a decade. Starting with the ousting of President Abdalá Bucaram by Congress and street protests in 1997, weak, temporary governments have been the rule. In 2000, Jamil Mahuad was toppled by a civilian-military coup, and in 2005 protests brought down Lucio Gutiérrez, who had helped oust Mahuad. The government of Rafael Correa of the Alianza País (AP) movement, who took office in January and enjoys record-high approval ratings, is applying “shock therapy” to overwhelm the discredited opposition and pave the way for a constituent assembly (CA) intended to produce “profound, radical and fast change”. This triggered one of the sharpest clashes between branches of government since the return to democracy in 1979, including the Electoral Court’s firing of 57 opposition members of Congress in March, accompanied by street violence. To restore stability to the troubled country, Correa will need to pay more attention to upholding the rule of law, ensuring a level CA playing field and building consensus for fundamental reforms. Chronic instability has been linked to progressive undermining of the rule of law. Veto power of powerful economic groups and the parties in Congress and the judiciary has been strengthened, as has the street power of social movements, in particular indigenous organisations, but lately also sectors of the middle and upper-middle class in large cities, especially Quito. The military retains its behind-the-scenes influence but may be more reluctant to intervene directly than in the past unless collapse of public order is imminent. While the economic and banking crisis of the late 1990s, central to Mahuad’s fall, was patched over by introducing the dollar as the official currency in 2000, and economic growth is steady, there are sustainability questions. If oil prices fall, the uncertain investment environment and declining production of state-owned PetroEcuador could bring back economic stagnation. Correa is focused on fighting the opposition and making the CA happen. It is uncertain whether he could build the necessary consensus to steer Ecuador out of crisis, especially in the face of hostility from the elites. ” “If he is to succeed, Correa will need to: uphold the rule of law and guarantee the separation of powers; prepare the CA election with full transparency and guarantees for the opposition; seek consensus with the opposition on key points of the new constitutional framework to be elaborated by the CA, including economic reforms; advance institutionalization and democratization of Alianza País and the social and political movements; and elaborate, with broad citizen participation, an economically viable National Development Plan 2007-2011″.
In Brazil, which has taken a softer and quieter move to the left under President Lulu de Silva, then has his Presidential colleague in Venezuela, overcoming violence in poor areas remains a problem. Many of Rio de Janeiro’s slum neighborhoods are beset by violent drug gangs. In May, journalists discovered that a neighborhood in which a militia, including off duty police, had ousted a drug gang, was at least as dangerous for residents as gang centered areas, because of the brutal acts of militia members.
Indigenous people in the Amazon Basin of Peru, opposing imposed development of their homeland, occupied oil instillations and a hydroelectric plant in the area for 10 days, in early August, when the government of Peru declared a 30 day state of emergency.
Fernando Lugo won the election for President of Paraguay, ending 60 years of one party rule by the National Republican Party, also known as the Colorado Party, In late April.
UN and Other International Developments
Governments from around the world, but not the United States, met at the United Nations in New York from for the Third Biennial Meeting of States (BMS), July 14-18 to discuss progress on implementing the 2001 Program of Action (PoA) on Small Arms. Jonah Leff, “Small Arms Agenda at U.N. Biennial Meeting of States (BMS), Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4346&from_page=../index.cfm, finds, “UN Small Arms Process Back on Track: United States Plays Limited Role.” “The BMS focused primarily on three thematic issues: international cooperation, assistance and national capacity-building; stockpile management and surplus disposal; and illicit brokering. Governments also spent one day discussing the implementation of the International Instrument to Enable Sates to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (also known as the International Tracing Instrument, or ITI). The ITI is a politically binding document established through the PoA in 2005, which enhances international cooperation for the tracing of illicit weapons around the world….governments unanimously adopted an outcome document representing the conclusions of the meeting. One hundred thirty-four countries voted in favor of the document, while two countries abstained (Iran and Zimbabwe), and 56 countries were not in attendance, including the United States. The meeting’s final report primarily encourages states to uphold their commitments enshrined in the PoA, but also includes some new elements. For example, in the section on international cooperation, assistance and national capacity-building, states agreed to utilize two new mechanisms—a PoA Implementation Support System established by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) as well as a database designed by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)—to enhance assistance by matching needs with available resources. States also discussed the possibility of establishing a legally binding instrument on brokering in small arms and light weapons, but no timetable or commitment has been determined. In addition, the report’s section on stockpile management specifically defines regulations, standards and procedures for managing stockpiles and destroying surplus weapons. The report also listed concerns voiced by some states that in the past were too controversial: civilian possession of small arms and light weapons; linkages between security, armed violence, development and human rights; ammunition; prohibiting the supply of small arms and light weapons to nonstate actors and terrorists; and transforming the PoA into a legally binding agreement.” “Although the document was adopted, some states voiced strong opposition to the process. Iran objected to the negotiating procedures throughout the week, calling for a more transparent line-by-line negotiation of the draft outcome document. Iran argued that a “take it or leave it” approach sets an “unjustifiable precedent in the field of disarmament.” Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the Non-aligned Movement, agreed that the process had not been ideal, but said it would accept the draft’s text. All other states objected to Iran’s stance, some calling small arms a “matter of life or death” and stressing the importance of reaching agreement. “ “In addition to governments, over 150 representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) from 36 countries were also in attendance. In addition, over 20 states had NGO representatives serve on their delegations as advisors, demonstrating significant cooperation between governments and civil society. NGOs and intergovernmental organizations (IGO) also held more than 30 side events at the meeting’s margins, which included various presentations by members of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), the launch of the 2008 Small Arms Survey, as well as a rap performance by a former Sudanese child soldier, Emmanuel Jal. Jal was also invited later in the week to perform in front of states—a considerable break in UN conventionality—during the NGO presentation at the meeting. The outcome of the BMS demonstrated states’ rejuvenated commitment to eliminating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The next meeting of states to discuss the PoA will likely take place after January 2009.” The draft resolution of the third Biennial Meeting of States on Small arms and Light Weapons is available at: http://disarmament.un.org/cab/bms3/1BMS3Pages/1thirdBMS.html.
“111 Countries Agree to Cluster Munitions Treaty,” Center for Defense Information, July 1, 2008, http://app.bronto.com/public/?q=ulink&fn=Link&ssid=596&id=ix5vq7607erfz49oykj5dy7×0hyte&id2=1m5zg1rfvisqqq36sywnmo6fdzx2u>111 Countries Agree to Cluster Munitions Treaty, reports, “Nearly 10 years after the historic Ottawa Landmines Treaty banned an indiscriminate weapon causing tens of thousands of civilian casualties a year, more than 100 countries met in Dublin and agreed, on May 31, to ban another weapon system responsible for immeasurable human suffering [cluster munitions].” However the leading manufacturing nations of cluster weapons did not attend the conference, and stated their opposition to the treaty: China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and the United States.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees announced, in June, that refugees crossing international borders to escape conflict and persecution increased last year, and may further rise because of factors such as climate change and scarcity of resources. In 2007 the UN oversaw the well being of 11.4 million refugees, much less than the 17.9 million during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. But a rise of 1.5 million refugees over 2006 indicates worrisome trend. A UN study published in July finds that UN personnel have been increasingly attacked because the international organization is perceived by some as a tool of powerful members, rather than an unbiased advocate for all nations and people. “At the United Nations, a closer collaboration with religions,” One Country, January-March, 2008 (contact via: www.onecountry.org), reports that, October 4-5, 2007, the UN held a “High Level Dialogue and Informal Interactive Hearing with Civil Society on Interreligious and Intercultural Understanding and Cooperation for Peace,” which was the first direct connection of the General Assembly to representatives of a wide spectrum of religious groups. Since September 2001, numerous UN agencies have also begun or expanded interreligious dialogues.
Robert Weissman,“Opening the Schoolhouse: Undoing the World Bank’s Damage,” Focus on the Corporation, April 23, 2008, posted at: http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/corp-focus/2008/000284.html, reports, “For 30 years, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have remade much of the developing world according to a market fundamentalist ideology. The results — measured by lost wealth, stunted social indicators, depletion of natural resources and trashing of the environment, rising inequality and concentration of income, damage to indigenous communities, or many other standards — have been catastrophic.” The harm, however can be undone, as in the small but significant case of school fees in Kenya. In the 1980s and 1990s, the IMF and particularly the World Bank forced many (if they wanted to receive much needed loans) developing nations to charge students for going to school. “In practice, and predictably, school fees proved a disaster. Mary Njoroge… recently retired after 31 years in the Kenyan educational system… [and] Director of Basic Education in the Ministry of Education… says that, “even as the fees were introduced, poverty levels were rising in most of the country, and the parents were not able to pay the fees. That led to many, many children dropping out of school – just because of the inability of parents to pay the fee.” In Kenya, Njoroge says, school fees were a very important revenue source. They became an inadequate substitute for lost federal revenue — and the existence of school fees became a rationale for further federal spending cuts. ‘It was from the fees that the schools could buy books, buy chalk, buy exercise books and any readers that they were going to use,’ Njoroge says. ‘Fees also paid for the running of the school, the overhead of the school. That money was very important. The schools were not going to be able to run without it.’ Not surprisingly, the poorest families were hit the worst by this policy, and girls worst of all. There were no exemptions for the poor, though exemptions have proven an utter failure in other places.” “By the start of the 2000s, spurred by outside pressure, the World Bank came to recognize that school fees were a failure. But Kenya and other countries had come to rely on fees, and it wasn’t obvious how to do away with them. Then, something transformative happened. In the 2002 presidential elections, Mwai Kibaki ran on a platform that highlighted a commitment to eliminate user fees for education. This promise helped Kibaki get elected. And then he delivered on the promise. “When the new government came in and announced that in the new year [2003] children could attend school without paying fees,” says Njoroge, “we witnessed an additional 1 million new children in our schools, over and above the 5.9 million who had already been in the school system.” An additional million came soon thereafter. User fees had locked the schoolhouse doors to a quarter of Kenyan children. Abolishing fees opened the doors. Njoroge says that improved tax collection and better systems for financial accountability paid for most of the additional costs – both the lost school fees money, and the money needed to teach so many more kids. The excitement around the initiative also attracted donor funding.” “Everything is not perfect… And the system needs to hire more teachers.” “Teaching the additional 2 million kids in primary school requires at least 40,000 new teachers, Njoroge says, and Kenya has about 60,000 trained teachers who are unemployed. But Njoroge says that Kenya cannot hire new teachers, because agreements with the IMF restrict its ability to increase budgetary outlays for teachers. But just as user fee policy was changed even though it once seemed un-reformable, so too shall IMF policies that directly and indirectly block countries from undertaking desperately needed investments in healthcare and education soon come to an end.”
UNICEF reported, June 21, that in countries torn by war, such as the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Iraq, food shortages and poverty have added to the already hellish conditions children live in. The youngest in unstable countries have become primary targets for armed groups who see them as commodities, the agency said. For more information go to: http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/06/21/unicef/index.html
U.S. and Canada Developments
The United States has less than 5 percent of the world’s population, but it has almost a quarter of the world’s prisoners, with 2.3 million people in jail. In recent months unemployment has been rising in the U.S., bringing reliance upon food stamps to near record levels.
U.S. Army leaders have been expressing concern about the degraded mental health of many service personnel repeatedly sent back to Iraq.
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