WHAT KIND OF PALESTINE? Javier Solana

WHAT KIND OF PALESTINE?

Javier Solana*

Source: Al-Ahram (http://weekly.ahram.org), 26 June 26, 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at http://www.commongroundnews.org. Copyright permission is granted for publication.

Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have now been talking to each other for more than six months, since the peace process was re-launched at Annapolis in November 2007, with the stated aim of reaching agreement on a Palestinian state before this year is out. The final status issues of borders, Jerusalem and refugees are back on the agenda, and the outlines of a two-state solution are visible. There have recently been some encouraging signals: Egypt has mediated a truce between Hamas and Israel in Gaza; there are signs of inter-Palestinian dialogue; and there appears to be movement on the Israeli-Syrian track. We have to grasp the opportunity for peace.

Comprehensive peace in the Middle East is the strategic goal of the European Union, and resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict on the basis of a two-state solution is the key to achieving this. Europe wants, and needs, to see the creation of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living in peace alongside Israel. For this, the foundations and the structures of a Palestinian state have to be created, which is where the European Union is playing a distinctive role. It is leading international efforts to assist the Palestinians with their state-building efforts under a major strategy adopted by the EU last year. An important part of this strategy is devoted to developing security and the rule of law, which are the cornerstones of the fledgling Palestinian state and the theme of a large international conference of foreign ministers hosted in Berlin on 24 June.

The EU is making a tangible difference on the ground. It is helping the Palestinians strengthen their civilian security capabilities not just with words or money but also with people. Our police mission, EUPOL COPPS, has been active in the Palestinian territories since November 2005, advising and mentoring the Palestinian Authority in its efforts to build up a civil police force and establish law and order. Canada, Norway and Switzerland are supporting the mission and we are working in close coordination with our US partners. We are now about to increase the mission in size and expand its scope to the broader rule of law sector, embracing in particular the penal and judiciary systems. A democratic Palestinian state needs a properly equipped, trained and disciplined civil police and it needs functioning law courts and prisons.

The EUPOL COPPS is not the only EU security mission in the Middle East. Our border assistance mission, EUBAM Rafah, established at the Rafah crossing point between Egypt and Gaza in 2005, is currently on standby and ready to deploy as soon as circumstances permit and EU member states form the backbone of the United Nations force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Our efforts are bearing fruit and are helping to make a real difference on the ground. In the past year alone, the EU mission has trained 800 civil police officers in public order, refurbished police stations and contributed to the communications network of the civil police. The Palestinian Authority has begun to deploy forces in major urban areas such as Nablus and is gradually taking over responsibility for security in the West Bank. Palestinian and Israeli security forces are cooperating and this cooperation must continue and increase.

These measures in the area of security and rule of law are part of a wider effort to improve conditions for the Palestinian people and revive the economy. For democracy to take root, the people must see that their lives are improving. Roadblocks must come down, trucks must be able to transport goods freely, people must be able to travel to work, to school and to hospitals unhindered, farmers must be able to grow and sell produce, investors must be encouraged to come with foreign capital, and businesses must be set up. And, of course, it is not only the Palestinians who gain from this. Israel’s security interests can only stand to gain from a peaceful, democratic, and ultimately prosperous Palestinian state. In truth, the entire region will be stabilised if the Israelis and Palestinians resolve their 60-year- old conflict. The EU is doing everything it can to help with this.

*Javier Solana is the EU’s foreign policy chief. He wrote this article on the eve of a conference in support of Palestinian civil security and rule of law in Berlin.

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CEASEFIRE: TO WHAT END?

CEASEFIRE: TO WHAT END?

Alon Ben-Meir*, March 11, 2008

An Egyptian brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hamas could temporarily stop the bloodshed, and if it saves the life of one Israeli or Palestinian, is still worth the effort. But a ceasefire which is not followed by a new strategy that leads to ending hostilities permanently will only play into Hamas’ hands and undermine the ultimate goal of both Israel and Palestinian moderates. Israel and the moderate Arab states must look outside Gaza to change the dynamic of the conflict. Only a major shift in American policy towards Syria could provide the impetus for a breakthrough.

The argument that if Israel takes certain steps to shore up the Abbas camp by easing the humanitarian crisis, which would demonstrate that moderation pays off while pointing out Hamas’ failure to deliver the goods, has some merit. In particular, permitting the Palestinian Authority’s security personnel to take charge of the crossings to Israel from Gaza and allow for the flow of goods in both directions will enhance Fatah and undermine Hamas in the public’s eye. But, however useful these and other measures may be, they are temporary and will not, by themselves, provide a long-term solution without some drastic action being taken concurrently to change the conflict’s entire equation. Leave it to Hamas to take credit for any improvement in the daily lives of Palestinians or to skillfully exploit their despair. Moreover, a ceasefire, whatever the circumstances, allows Hamas to recruit, retrain, as well as amass more weapons, rockets, and munitions and be better prepared for the next confrontation with Israel. This is not a scenario Israel is likely to accept. However enticing a ceasefire may appear, it will strengthen rather than weaken Hamas to the detriment of Palestinian moderates. With a strong religious conviction and determination to liquidate Israel, Hamas as a movement can be weakened but not destroyed. As long as Iran, through Syria, continues to support Hamas with money, weapons, and training, and Egypt is unable to stop the flow of weapons to Gaza, it will be beyond the Palestinian Authority’s capability to replace Hamas, and beyond Israel’s reach to completely eliminate it as a militant group.

The March 6 attack on Mercaz Harav Yeshiva, an elite religious college in the heart of Jerusalem that killed eight students is more than an act of revenge for the scores of Palestinians killed in Gaza a few days earlier. It represents an assault on a religious learning institution that supports the settlement movement and further underscores the ominous danger of the escalating religious conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Israel and the Arab states have every reason to stem the tide of such developments before they spin completely out of control.

The solution has been staring the Americans, the Israelis, and the Arab states in the face for a long time. But the Bush administration, especially, has remained stuck in its failed policy of attempting regime change in Syria instead of luring Damascus into the peace process. Syria’s support of Hezbollah and Hamas is motivated, first, by its special interest in Lebanon and its desire to regain the Golan, and, second, by the benefits, including financial assistance, it derives from Iran. The real culprit is the regime in Iran, which, committed with religious zeal to undermining the peace process will do anything to destabilize the region. Here is where the interests of Tehran and Damascus coalesce. Tehran can do little without Syria’s logistical and political support of Hezbollah and Hamas. The net result is Syria holds the key to both groups’ fortunes and will continue to agitate the situation in Lebanon and in the Palestinian territories for its own benefit. Thus Damascus and Tehran’s collaboration is tactical; it has no long-term strategic value for Syria but will endure as long as Washington insists on isolating and marginalizing Damascus.

It is not too late for the administration to change this policy, especially after the Annapolis peace conference, which Syria attended. But it remains unlikely that President Bush will do so without very strong prompting by Israel and the Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States, along with Egypt and Jordan. Their combined weight in Washington is considerable. Therefore, they must make it abundantly clear to Mr. Bush that if decisive action is not taken immediately, the current explosive situation could end catastrophically. Israel can no longer find comfort with Mr. Bush’s dead-end policy towards Syria giving the Israeli government the false hope that it can hold onto the Golan indefinitely. The Arab states know only too well that luring Syria out of Iran’s orbit is of paramount importance to both their internal security and to regional stability. They must make it crystal clear that the Bush policy thus far has only strengthened the forces of Islamic radicals, while giving Iran a free hand to undermine the interests of America and its allies. Neither the crisis in Lebanon nor the one with Hamas can be resolved unless Iran is isolated. To achieve that, the administration must deal directly with Syria. Syria is ready to dramatically modify its relations with unsavory groups and with Iran, but this comes with a high price tag. That said, Damascus’ wish list, including normalization of relations with the United States, regaining the Golan, and maintaining a special relationship with Lebanon is not extravagant and in any event, may be inevitable.

A ceasefire between Israel and Hamas will not endure unless Syria is on board. With no political backing, limited financial assistance, and reduced weapon supplies, Hamas will have no choice but to live with the ceasefire and adjust to the new reality without being challenged to violently resist Israel.

*Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies, 212-600-4267, alon@alonben-meir.com, www.alonben-meir.com.

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ALL QUIET ON THE GAZA FRONT by Uri Avnery

ALL QUIET ON THE GAZA FRONT

Uri Avnery, June 21, 2008

And suddenly: quiet. No Qassams. No mortar shells. The tanks are not rolling. The aircraft are not bombing. In Sderot, sighs of relief. Children venture out. Inhabitants who have exiled themselves to other towns return home.

And the reaction? An outburst of jubilation? Dancing in the streets? Applause for the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense, who at long last have come to their senses? Not at all. The expression on the nation’s face is a grimace of disgust. What kind of thing is that? Where is our victorious army?

The people of Sderot are really angry. OK, so there are no Qassams, but this was supposed to happen only after the army had entered Gaza and wiped it out. Haaretz headed its front page with the mendacious headline: “Israel pays with deeds – and gets promises”.

“It’s fragile,” Ehud Olmert soothes us, it can come to an end any minute. And the other Ehud, Barak, who pushed for the cease-fire, has an excuse: we have to go through the motions before starting the Big Operation in Gaza. For the sake of Israeli and international public opinion. And nobody says: Thank God, the killing has stopped!

Why? What causes this almost unanimous reaction of disappointment? Why is there a general feeling of humiliation, almost of defeat? It’s because the national ego is hurt. How wonderful it would have been to see the Israeli army in Gaza destroying Hamas, together with the entire city. But, instead of the crushing victory, we have something that smacks of a rout. And that in spite of the assertions of those now rooting for re-occupying the Gaza Strip: that at any minute, with just a little more starvation and closure, the population would have broken and rebelled against Hamas.

From the military point of view, a year of war in the Gaza Strip has ended in a draw. IDF-Hamas 1:1. But the IDF and Hamas are not two football teams of equal standing. Hamas is an armed political-religious movement, what is termed in current Western parlance “a terrorist organization”. When such an organization achieves a draw with one of the mightiest armies in the world, it can justifiably claim victory. The aim of Olmert’s war was to topple the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip and to destroy the organization itself. This has not been attained. On the contrary, according to all reports, Hamas is stronger than ever, and its hold on the Strip is solid. Even in Israel that is not questioned.

For a year, the Israeli government has maintained a total blockade of the Strip – on land, at sea and in the air. It has enjoyed the unqualified support of Europe, which assisted in starving a population of one and a half million men and women, children and old people. The US was, of course, a full partner in this glorious enterprise. Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt, dependent on the US, collaborated, if unwillingly. All this was not enough to beat poor and crowded Gaza, a narrow strip of land 35 km (22 miles) long and 10 km (6 miles) wide, into submission. Not only did the rockets not stop, but their range increased. Their victims in Israel were few, a child could count them, but their impact on morale was immense.

The Israeli army was helpless against this primitive weapon, which costs next to nothing. The army killed wholesale and in retail, on land and from the air, with missiles, shells and infantry weapons. To no avail. Hamas has survived, but it, too, did not achieve its aim. It had no answer to the blockade. Only the pressure of international public opinion (as well as the Israeli peace forces) prevented total starvation, but in the Strip there was a shortage of everything. Unemployment was rampant, fuel disappeared, many inhabitants suffered from undernourishment, bordering on starvation. That is the nature of a draw: neither of the two sides is able to force a decision and impose its will on its opponent.

A ceasefire only comes about when both sides need it. (True, Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian military philosopher, has said that in war it is impossible for a situation to be beneficial to both sides at the same time, that something that is good for one side is necessarily bad for the other. But in real war there are exceptions.) Indeed, the Israeli army needed the ceasefire no less than Hamas. That became clear from the comments of the “military correspondents”, almost all of whom are thinly disguised army spokesmen. Of course, not one of the cabinet members would have agreed to a ceasefire if the army brass had objected. Usually, the army bosses press for one more action, one more operation, one more war. Have they suddenly turned into doves? Not really. But they knew that they had to choose between two “bad” options: a ceasefire or the “Great Operation” – the re-conquest of the entire Gaza Strip.

The commanders did not like the first option, and that is an understatement. It means admitting failure. But the second option they liked even less – much, much less. The Great Operation, which a large part of the public yearned for, which almost all the media demanded at the top of their voices, is very problematical. Hamas has had a lot of time to prepare for it. No army likes to fight in a built-up area, among a crowded population. Every alley is a potential trap, every man – and every woman – a potential suicide bomber. Even if the army succeeded in entering and occupying the strip with only “tolerable” casualties, that would just be the beginning of the troubles. Every day soldiers would be killed. The mutual bloodletting would be endless. See: the Iraq war.

Public opinion is fickle. Every dead soldier whose smiling picture is shown on television increases the pressure to get out. Sooner or later the army would be compelled to leave – and the situation would revert to what it was before, only worse. The army chiefs know this. Olmert and Barak also know this. The lesson of the Second Lebanon War has not been forgotten. There is no mood for war.

The ceasefire has far-reaching political implications. It changes the Palestinian – and perhaps the regional – map. One can protest from here to eternity, one can shout from the rooftops that “we don’t negotiate with Hamas” and that “we have no agreement with Hamas” – every child understands that we indeed do, and indeed have.

This is an agreement between the Government of Israel and the Gaza authorities. It means a de facto recognition of the Hamas government there. In Gaza, too, every child understands that the Israeli government was compelled to agree because it was unable to break Hamas by force. In the eyes of the Palestinians, the situation is clear: Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah has not got anything from the Israelis, Hamas has. Abbas tries by peaceful means. He is the darling of the Americans and the Israelis. But since the great performance in Annapolis, not only has he not achieved any meaningful concessions at all and not freed a single prisoner, but additional prisoners are being taken every night, the settlements are being enlarged and the Israeli government announces grandiose new building projects in East Jerusalem and the entire West Bank. And the Israeli government would not dream of agreeing to a ceasefire there.

While at the same time Hamas, besieged by the whole world, losing fighters every day, has attained a significant military and political achievement: goods will flow into the Strip, cars will again bounce along the potholed roads, the Rafah crossing, which cuts off the Strip from the world, will be opened. In the coming prisoner exchange, hundreds of Palestinian prisoners will be released in return for the captured Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit.

The conclusion? Everybody can ask themselves: if I were a Palestinian, what conclusion would I draw? The ceasefire affects the balance of power within the Palestinian people. Hamas has proved that it can maintain an orderly government. Now it is proving that it can control the radical organizations, too. The wisest thing Mahmoud Abbas can do now is to form a Unity Government, based on both Hamas and Fatah.

Will the ceasefire hold? The correspondents report that nobody expects it to. When Olmert says that it is fragile, he knows what he is talking about. There is no written agreement. No orderly mechanism for settling disputes. No arbitrator to decide, in case of need, which side is responsible for a violation. If somebody in Israel wants to break the ceasefire, nothing will be easier: a squad leader opens fire on a group of Palestinians near the border fence, because he suspects that they are about to plant an explosive device. A spy helicopter pilot believes that he is being shot at and launches a missile. The army intelligence chief claims that large quantities of arms are being smuggled into the Strip.

It can be done in other ways, too. The army will kill half a dozen Islamic Jihad militants in the West Bank. In response, the organization will fire a salvo of Qassams at Sderot. The army will announce that this is a violation of the agreement and answer with an incursion into the Gaza Strip. It will even be right formally, since the ceasefire does not cover the West Bank. Every agreement holds only as long as both sides believe that it serves their interests. If one of them thinks otherwise, it will break it (and assert that the other side broke it first). In this case, the first to break it will most likely be the Israeli side.

A ceasefire is not peace (salaam), and not even an armistice or truce (hudnah). It is no more than an agreement between combatants to stop shooting for some time. In the nature of things, each side will use the ceasefire to prepare for the next round of fighting – to breathe deeply, to rest, to train, to plan, to obtain more advanced weapons. But the ceasefire can become more than that. It can lead to Palestinian unity, to Israeli re-thinking, to a practical advance towards a peaceful solution. At the very least, every day of the ceasefire saves human lives. And in the meantime the Hebrew and the international dictionaries have acquired another Arabic word: Tahdiyeh, calm.

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CAUGHT IN A VICIOUS CYCLE OF VIOLENCE

CAUGHT IN A VICIOUS CYCLE OF VIOLENCE

Alon Ben-Meir*, March 18, 2008

The killing by Israeli undercover troops of four Palestinian militants in Bethlehem, on March 12, raises questions not as much about Israel’s right to self-defense but about the context and the circumstances under which this right is exercised. Even the right to self-defense and matters of national security must be balanced against the prevailing conditions. In this instance, Israel has made an egregious mistake by killing four individuals whose continued threat to Israel pales compared to the Palestinian rage the act has provoked and with it the potential for retaliatory violent acts against Israel.

However justified the killing may have been from the Israeli perspective, neither the targeted men nor the circumstances, or for that matter, the timing end credence to Israel’s claim of self-defense, not to speak of its commitment to a negotiated settlement. Here is why: First, the four individuals appeared to have renounced violence, they posed no imminent danger, and hoped to be included in an amnesty agreement with Israel but were refused. Second, their killing shattered the calm of Bethlehem, a city which has been the calmest of all the Palestinian cities and which was planning to host an international investor’s conference in May. Third, the Israeli raid occurred at a delicate time embarrassing the Egyptians who were hard at work trying to arrange for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Fourth, Israel is in the midst of peace negotiations with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, who now feels severely undermined by the Israeli action. Fifth, the raid came on the heels of two-weeks of intensified violence in Gaza and Jerusalem, which killed 126 Palestinians and at least 12 Israelis and shook both communities amid international calls for calm. Finally, the raid seems to defy the logic behind Israel’s peacemaking strategy, as this particular act of killing will certainly play itself out in the Palestinian streets.

It will be a mistake to ignore Israel’s legitimate concerns over the countless acts of violence perpetrated against its citizens by radical Palestinians from different political and religious affiliations. The string of suicide bombings during the second Intifadah left an indelible mark on every Israeli, and the endless barrage from Kassam rockets as well as the recent killing of eight young Yeshiva students has only reinforced Israel’s zealous concerns over the security of its citizens. Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad’s sworn commitment to destroy Israel has created a fatalistic mindset among the Israelis that has made their survival a zero-sum game against the survival of members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Moreover, the Israeli government argues that while it is committed to the peace process, it cannot afford to sit by idly, allowing known killers of Israelis to freely roam or not intervene to foil an imminent terrorist attack when the PA has failed to act. Thus, from the Israeli perspective, the four had to be killed not only because they have Jewish blood on their hands but because, given the opportunity, they would have killed Israelis again and again because they do not

accept Israel’s right to exist.

But while understanding Israeli logic and sympathizing with it, there remains one fundamental question: When will Israel’s leaders conclude that, despite the constant belligerency, there is a time when the elimination of certain individuals causes more harm than good and that targeted killing is not the answer to Palestinian resistance? However Israel explains its recent targeted killing, the government cannot avoid the perception if not the reality that this act is 1) totally inconsistent with the peace process, 2) plays into the hands of extremist Palestinians who argue against the peace negotiations, 3) perpetuates the vicious cycle of violent acts of revenge and retribution, 4) weakens the authority of Mahmoud Abbas, Israel’s main negotiating partner, 5) raises serious questions about Israel’s ultimate intentions, especially as it continues to expand existing settlements, and 6) angers many Arab states that view the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as central to their stability.

Whereas the targeted killing has been, from the Israeli vantage point, extremely effective, the Israeli defense apparatus must consider the political context under which these attacks are occurring. If peace with the Palestinians is Israel’s strategic choice, then it behooves its leaders to demonstrate not only the ability to reach every terrorist but the political skills to manage the ongoing violence without damaging the peace negotiations. The principle of killing every Palestinian fugitive with blood on his hands, regardless of the circumstances, is blindly misguided because it begs the question as to when and under what conditions should the killings end. Peace between Israel and the Palestinians requires more than cessation of hostilities; it demands a demonstration of good faith, the rebuilding of trust, and genuine efforts to reconcile. The wounds inflicted by both sides are deep, painful, and have left many ugly scars. A measure of forgiveness and forgetting on both sides, whenever the opportunity presents itself, is critical if Israelis and Palestinians wish to ever coexist in peace.

Israel will not be able to redeem every Palestinian militant, but it must give a chance to those who have forsaken violence, even if they have not embraced peaceful coexistence. Israel’s demonstrable desire for peace must not be put to question by mindless and unnecessary killings.

*Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies, alon@alonben-meir.com, Web: www.alonben-meir.com.

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A HUMAN RIGHTS CRIME:THE WORLD MUST STOP STANDING IDLE WHILE THE PEOPLE OF GAZA ARE TREATED WITH SUCH CRUELTY

A HUMAN RIGHTS CRIME:

THE WORLD MUST STOP STANDING IDLE WHILE THE PEOPLE OF GAZA ARE TREATED WITH SUCH CRUELTY

Jimmy Carter

Reprinted from “The Guardian, 8/5/08, with permission to republish.

The world is witnessing a terrible human rights crime in Gaza, where a million and a half human beings are being imprisoned with almost no access to the outside world. An entire population is being brutally punished. This gross mistreatment of the Palestinians in Gaza was escalated dramatically by Israel, with United States backing, after political candidates representing Hamas won a majority of seats in the Palestinian Authority parliament in 2006. The election was unanimously judged to be honest and fair by all international observers.

Israel and the US refused to accept the right of Palestinians to form a unity government with Hamas and Fatah and now, after internal strife, Hamas alone controls Gaza. Forty-one of the 43 victorious Hamas candidates who lived in the West Bank have been imprisoned by Israel, plus an additional 10 who assumed positions in the short-lived coalition cabinet.

Regardless of one’s choice in the partisan struggle between Fatah and Hamas within occupied Palestine, we must remember that economic sanctions and restrictions on the supply of water, food, electricity and fuel are causing extreme hardship among the innocent people in Gaza, about one million of whom are refugees.

Israeli bombs and missiles periodically strike the area, causing high casualties among both militants and innocent women and children. Prior to the highly publicised killing of a woman and her four children last week, this pattern had been illustrated by a report from B’Tselem, the leading Israeli human rights organisation, which stated that 106 Palestinians were killed between February 27 and March 3. Fifty-four of them were civilians, and 25 were under 18 years of age.

On a recent trip through the Middle East, I attempted to gain a better understanding of the crisis. One of my visits was to Sderot, a community of about 20,000 in southern Israel that is frequently struck by rockets fired from nearby Gaza. I condemned these attacks as abominable acts of terrorism, since most of the 13 victims during the past seven years have been non-combatants.

Subsequently, I met with leaders of Hamas – a delegation from Gaza and the top officials in Damascus. I made the same condemnation to them, and urged that they declare a unilateral ceasefire or orchestrate with Israel a mutual agreement to terminate all military action in and around Gaza for an extended period.

They responded that such action by them in the past had not been reciprocated, and they reminded me that Hamas had previously insisted on a ceasefire throughout Palestine, including Gaza and the West Bank which Israel had refused. Hamas then made a public proposal of a mutual ceasefire restricted to Gaza, which the Israelis also rejected.

There are fervent arguments heard on both sides concerning blame for a lack of peace in the Holy Land. Israel has occupied and colonised the Palestinian West Bank, which is approximately a quarter the size of the nation of Israel as recognised by the international community. Some Israeli religious factions claim a right to the land on both sides of the Jordan river, others that their 205 settlements of some 500,000 people are necessary for “security”.

All Arab nations have agreed to recognise Israel fully if it will comply with key United Nations resolutions. Hamas has agreed to accept any negotiated peace settlement between the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, and Israel’s prime minister, Ehud Olmert, provided it is approved in a referendum of the Palestinian people.

This holds promise of progress, but despite the brief fanfare and positive statements at the peace conference last November in Annapolis, the process has gone backwards. Nine thousand new Israeli housing units have been announced in Palestine; the number of roadblocks within the West Bank has increased; and the stranglehold on

Gaza has been tightened.

It is one thing for other leaders to defer to the US in the crucial peace negotiations, but the world must not stand idle while innocent people are treated cruelly. It is time for strong voices in Europe, the US, Israel and elsewhere to speak out and condemn the human rights tragedy that has befallen the Palestinian people.

*Jimmy Carter, a former president of the United States, is founder of The Carter Center project-syndicate.org.

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CARTER’S TRIP: BOON OR BUNGLE by Paul Scham

CARTER’S TRIP: BOON OR BUNGLE

Paul Scham*

This article was written for the Common Ground News Service (http://www.commongroundnews.org)with permission for republication.

It is unclear what Jimmy Carter thought his recent meetings in the Middle East with Hamas leaders would actually accomplish. Given his political experience, he could not have believed that his trip to Damascus was likely to succeed in jumpstarting a process that would quickly include Hamas in actual peace negotiations. More probably, he decided that he was in a unique position to focus Western attention on the possibilities of engaging Hamas, concluding that provocation was his most effective tool, just as he did when he titled his 2006 book, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid. The furore resulting from both actions was similar. Now, he has helped provide a clearer perspective of Hamas’ current red lines, which future attempts at engagement will necessarily build on.

It is notable that few of Carter’s critics seem to be able to put forward a realistic alternative to dealing with Hamas. None seem to believe that Hamas will disappear, or that military action will destroy or tame the political organisation. In fact, some readily admit that sooner or later Israel will have to deal with Hamas ˆ that there is no choice. So why do some people attack Carter so ferociously?

The ostensible reason is that he broke ranks with the international consensus that defined Hamas as a terrorist organisation; that his trip provided Hamas with de facto international legitimacy. Carter’s laying a wreath on Yasser Arafat’s grave, and his public, physical embrace of Hamas leader Khaled Meshal, provided grist for claims that he is anti-Israel and truly supports Hamas. Harvard professor Alan Dershowitz has also alleged that money Carter’s centre receives from Arab sources is motivating his “anti-Israel” initiatives. However, a surprising number of his detractors seem only able to recycle insults based on pure dislike of the man.

What is more important is that a number of significant Israelis ˆ including former heads of the security services ˆ have been urging the government to accept the reality of Hamas and find a way to engage it. In a recent poll, 64 percent of the Israeli public indicated a willingness to engage Hamas. Only in the United States does opinion seem almost uniformly negative.

So where are we with regard to Middle East peace progress? It now seems to be a fact that Hamas will not disappear, no matter what Israel, the United States or the international community does. Hamas’ popularity is due to several factors, including Palestinian disgust with Fatah’s corruption, the rise of political Islam throughout the Middle East, the perception (shared by most observers) that the post-Annapolis process will not succeed, and a general Palestinian conviction (whether right or wrong) that Israel will never peacefully agree to a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders.

In addition, Hamas’ success in its confrontations, political and military, with Fatah and the growing international impatience with the Israeli blockade of Gaza have helped Hamas establish a role from which it cannot be easily dislodged.

Hamas has given tentative indications of wavering from its traditional insistence that formal recognition or acceptance of Israel’s legitimacy is theologically forbidden. It seems to be genuinely trying to develop theological and political mechanisms to enable it to deal with the powerful and inescapable reality that is today’s Jewish state. This constitutes progress in the current context.

The inescapable fact is that Hamas has already established its “legitimacy” in the way every new political force does: by amassing political and military power that makes it impossible to ignore. It is no longer an option to deny this; the question for Israel, the United States and the West is in what manner to come to terms with it. This is not amoral Machiavellianism; it is recognition of reality.

There are times when even the powerful must bite the bullet˜and this is one of them. While Carter’s trip continues to provoke political posturing, realities are being recognised. On 30 April, Egypt announced that Hamas and 11 smaller Palestinian factions had agreed to honour a six-month truce with Israel. It now covers only Gaza, but may expand to the West Bank. Egypt’s powerful Intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, is currently trying to obtain Israel’s acquiescence.

If this cease-fire takes hold, then other possibilities are likely to open, even if a formal peace agreement cannot now be reached. There are significant precedents for co-existing with sworn enemies. In 1948, Israel’s four neighbours vowed to destroy it, but today two have signed peace treaties and a third insists it is ready for one. Similarly, the USSR and the United States (and their allies) faced off in the Cold War for decades and, to the surprise of many, avoided a general war. When the killing stops, possibilities open.

*Paul Scham is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute and co-editor of the book Shared Histories: A Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue.

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A CEASEFIRE IS NO SMALL THING

A CEASEFIRE IS NO SMALL THING

MJ Rosenberg*

Source: Israel Policy Forum (http://www.ipforum.org), June 20, 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service, with permission for republication

The ceasefire is still in effect, which is something of a surprise. After all, this is a ceasefire few like˜especially in Israel. Some of the same government officials who secured it, wasted little time in saying that they did not expect it to last and that, when it did collapse, Israel would launch its long-deferred invasion of Gaza.

In essence, the critics are saying that all the ceasefire will accomplish is a delay in the deaths of dozens or hundreds of Israeli soldiers and hundreds or thousands of Palestinians. I suppose this is a classic example of the half-empty half-full syndrome. But in this particular case, it is indefensible to insist on viewing the glass as only half-empty. Another week, month, or year with the children, with parents, with friends. How much is that worth?

Now I know some readers are already thinking: “Better to fight them now. They will use the ceasefire to get ready for war.” No doubt that is true. Both sides will use the intermission to enhance their combat capacity. There probably has never been a ceasefire in history during which the combatants did not work to enhance their ability to fight. Of course, that is what Hamas and the Israelis are doing anyway. Ceasefire or no ceasefire, neither side is turning its swords into plowshares.

Nonetheless, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not going to be resolved by way of some decisive military action. Palestinian extremists are not going to achieve their goal of dismantling Israel, and Israeli extremists are not going to achieve their goal of Greater Israel˜not without committing national suicide in the process.

The Israeli novelist A.B. Yehoshua wrote in Yediot Aharonot last Thursday that the whole idea of “victory,” does not apply in the Israeli-Palestinian case. “It is important to remember one principle in the 100-year war with the Palestinians. The Israelis and the Palestinians are neighbours˜people who will live in proximity to each other forever. Therefore, the military considerations in this war are not similar to those in force between distant countries that are fighting each other. The residue of blood, both ours and theirs, remains in the region, trickling into the memory and infrastructure of the two peoples. Therefore, an immediate cessation of the bloodshed is more vital than the fantasy of complete ‘victory’ in the long term.”

A ceasefire is a start. Israel should do everything it can to make it last. That means living up to the promises it has made to the United States and to President Abbas about improving conditions for the Palestinians. That means finally adhering to a settlements freeze in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem. Every new or “thickened” settlement is a gift to Palestinian extremists who point to them as evidence that Israel will never permit establishment of a Palestinian state.

It means removing redundant and unnecessary checkpoints within the West Bank. Most checkpoints are not on the border but deep inside the West Bank. They serve no purpose except to make it difficult, or impossible, for Palestinians to move between their homes and jobs, homes and hospitals, homes and school. It means demolishing those ubiquitous unmanned earthen mounds, which are nothing but traffic bumps to prevent the movement of innocent civilian traffic. It means allowing the Palestinian Authority to have the equipment it needs to defend itself against extremists. Neither Israeli nor Palestinian interests are served by a weak Mahmoud Abbas. (It is getting tiresome to hear Israelis complain that Abbas is weak when they are denying him the wherewithal to be strong).

In Gaza, it means easing the humanitarian crisis, allowing ailing Palestinians access to medical care and those separated from family members in the West Bank freedom to travel. As for Hamas, it means maintaining the ceasefire, preventing others from breaking it, and releasing Corporal Gilad Shalit. In short, ending the violence.

That is no small thing. As Yehoshua writes, the one demand that supersedes all others is an end to bloodshed. Nothing else comes close. He dismisses the idea that Hamas’ failure to recognise Israel is paramount, “as if all the ceasefires we have made in the past 60 years, both with Arab countries and with the PLO in Lebanon, were made on the basis of ‘recognition of Israel’ and not on the basis of ‘a mutual and unconditional halt to bloodshed’.” For Yehoshua, the ceasefire is a very big deal.

“Concessions” should not be made only in response to terror. Doing so only confirms the view held by Palestinian radicals that “the only language Israelis understand is violence.” This whole Gaza debacle (including the election of Hamas and its seizure of Gaza) would have been prevented if Israel had negotiated its withdrawal from that territory with the Palestinians, rather than refusing to talk and simply leaving. Ever since Oslo in 1993 the Israelis have refused to implement a settlements freeze and have allowed settlers to terrorise the local population, especially in Hebron. It has to stop.

One thing is certain: The ceasefire will not last if both sides simply sit back and wait, taking no pro-active actions to preserve and deepen it. At this point, there is no way of knowing what will happen next. In this arena, it is always safe to be pessimistic˜safe but unproductive. There is an opening here. Seizing it with both hands is infinitely less risky than letting the moment pass.

* MJ Rosenberg, Director of Policy Analysis for Israel Policy Forum, was a long time Capitol Hill staffer and former editor of AIPAC’s Near East Report. The views expressed in IPF Friday are those of MJ Rosenberg and not necessarily of Israel Policy Forum. This article is (CGNews) and can be accessed at

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STRENGTHENING EXTREMISTS

STRENGTHENING EXTREMISTS

Nicholas D. Kristof*

Source: International Herald Tribune (http://www.iht.com), June 19 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service, with permission for republication.

The yearlong siege of Gaza may soon end with the new ceasefire there, marking the eclipse of one more American-backed Israeli policy that backfired by strengthening extremists. Here in Gaza, sulphurous with fumes from cars burning cooking grease because the siege has made gasoline scarce, the entire last year of the blockade feels not only morally bankrupt ˆ a case of collective punishment ˆ but also counterproductive. The fragile new truce between Hamas and Israel just might create a new opportunity to stabilise the Palestinian territories, but only if we absorb the lessons of what has gone wrong.

Consider Adham Sharif, a 26-year-old man whose only child, a baby girl named Mariam, had a tiny hole in her heart and needed surgery. Gaza hospitals were unable to perform such an operation, but doctors said that surgeons in Israel or in neighbouring countries could save her. In theory, there was an exception to the siege to let people out of Gaza in medical emergencies. But Sharif could not get the Israeli permit for Mariam to leave, and she died in November. “It’s so hard,” he told me. “You see your child dying, and you can’t save her.”

Does Sharif blame Hamas as the cause of the blockade that cost his daughter’s life? “Of course not,” he said. “I blame the ones who closed the border: Israel. And America, its ally.” Now when he hears of extremists firing rockets at southern Israeli towns like Sderot, Sharif has a warm feeling all over.

When Hamas won democratic elections in Gaza and then seized full power a year ago, there were no good choices for Israel and America. Hamas includes terrorists, Islamic fundamentalists and ideologues, and it has cultivated ties with Iran. It has decent governance by the region’s devalued standards ˆ it is not particularly corrupt; it delivers social services efficiently, and the streets are safe ˆ but it runs a police state and alarms all its neighbours.

Of all the bad choices, Israel chose perhaps the worst. Punishing everyone in Gaza radicalised the population, cast Hamas as a victim, gave its officials an excuse for failures and undermined the moderates who are the best hope of Israel and the Arab world. If the United States and Israel had formed a Joint Commission to Support Hamas Extremists and Bolster Iranian Influence, they could hardly have done a better job. The episode is the latest evidence that hard-liners in Israel, Palestine and America all reinforce each other. Arab terrorism led to the rise of Israeli hawks and to two invasions of Lebanon. The first Israeli invasion helped give birth to Hezbollah, and then the Israeli assaults on Palestinian police helped nurture Hamas. So while Israelis denounce Hezbollah and Hamas, they helped create them. And while Palestinians denounce the separation barrier, their suicide bombings built it.

“Extremists need each other, support each other,” noted Eyad el-Sarraj, a prominent psychiatrist in Gaza. He laments that the siege of Gaza has discredited pro-American voices: “Whoever is not going along with the US is a hero, even the crazy ones.” The United States and Israel devoted their energies to punishing Hamas and didn’t work to make a success of our preferred interlocutors. So moderates like Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, now come across as weak, irrelevant and ineffective, while Hamas emerges as the victor.

We should talk to Hamas, not because negotiations will necessarily get anywhere, but because a failure to negotiate will necessarily get nowhere. Israel’s decision to block Gazans from studying abroad was particularly short-sighted. Educating Gazans might help build a contingent of moderates, but Israel has continued to block three Fulbright scholars from leaving for the United States. “For Israel to have a better future, it should want neighbours with better education,” Zohair Abu Shaban, one of the Fulbright students, noted reproachfully. So far, Hamas has outmanoeuvred Israel and the United States.

Opinion polls this year show Hamas gaining over all in the West Bank and Gaza. And, when we help Hamas, we inadvertently boost its backer, Iran.

Perhaps most depressing, large Palestinian majorities – more than before ˆ now favour terror attacks.

A university student in Gaza, Rajaa Batrikhi, 20, told me she has suffered so much from the siege that she relishes the rocket attacks from Gaza on Israeli towns. “I think it’s good when we hit them with rockets,” she said defiantly. “Our rockets are nothing like the rockets they hit us with. At least they feel the fear that we feel every day.” It’s a credit to Israel that it was willing to negotiate indirectly with Hamas, and with the truce, we now have a chance to break this downward spiral. Let’s stop bolstering Hamas.

*Nicholas D. Kristof is a columnist for the New York Times and a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner. He has lived on four continents, reported on six, and traveled to 120 countries. He’s also one of the very few Americans to be at least a two-time visitor to every member of the Axis of Evil.

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AN APOLOGY

AN APOLOGY

Uri Avnery

Source: Arabic Media Internet Network (http://www.amin.org), 14 June 14, 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for republication.

This week, the Prime Minister of Canada made a dramatic statement in Parliament: he apologised to the indigenous peoples of his country for the injustices done to them for generations by successive Canadian governments.

This way, White Canada tries to make peace with the native nations, whose country their forefathers conquered and whose culture their rulers have tried to wipe out.

Apologising for past wrongs has become a part of modern political culture. That is never an easy thing to do. Cynics might say: there is nothing to it, just words. And words, after all, are a cheap commodity. But in fact, such acts have a profound significance. A human being ˆ and even more so, a whole nation ˆ always finds it hard to admit to iniquities performed and to atrocities committed. It means a rewriting of the historical narrative that forms the basis of their national cohesion. It necessitates a drastic change in the schoolbooks and in the national outlook. In general, governments are averse to this, because of the nationalistic demagogues and hate-mongers who infest every country.

The President of France has apologised on behalf of his people for the misdeeds of the Vichy regime, which turned Jews over to the Nazi exterminators. The Czech government has apologised to the Germans for the mass expulsion of the German population at the end of World War II. Germany, of course, has apologised to the Jews for the unspeakable crimes of the Holocaust. Quite recently, the government of Australia has apologised to the Aborigines. And even in Israel, a feeble effort was made to heal a grievous domestic wound, when Ehud Barak apologised to the Oriental Jews for the discrimination they have suffered for many years.

I believe that peace between us and the Palestinian people ˆ a real peace, based on real conciliation ˆ starts with an apology. In my mind’s eye I see the President of the State or the Prime Minister addressing an extraordinary session of the Knesset and making an historic speech of apology.

Madam Speaker, Honourable Knesset, On behalf of the State of Israel and all its citizens, I address today the sons and daughters of the Palestinian people, wherever they are. We recognise the fact that we have committed against you a historic injustice, and we humbly ask your forgiveness.

The burning desire of the founding fathers of the Zionist movement was to save the Jews of Europe, where the dark clouds of hatred for the Jews were gathering. In Eastern Europe, pogroms were raging, and all over Europe there were signs of the process that would eventually lead to the terrible Holocaust, in which six million Jews perished.

All this does not justify what happened afterwards. The creation of the Jewish national home in this country has involved a profound injustice to you, the people who lived here for generations. We cannot ignore anymore the fact that in the war of 1948 ˆ which is the War of Independence for us, and the Nakba for you ˆ some 750 thousand Palestinians were compelled to leave their homes and lands. As for the precise circumstances of this tragedy I propose the establishment of a “Committee for Truth and Reconciliation”‘ composed of experts from your and from our side, whose conclusions will from then on be incorporated in the schoolbooks, yours and ours.

We owe you an apology, and I express it hereby with all my heart. I trust that our two states ˆ Israel and Palestine, living side by side in this beloved but small country, will quickly come together on the human, social, economic, technological and cultural levels, creating a relationship that will not only guarantee our security, but also rapid development and prosperity for all.

Together we will work for peace and prosperity throughout our region, based on close relations with all the countries of the area. Committed to peace and vowing to create a better future for our children and grandchildren, let us rise to our feet and bow our heads in memory of the countless victims of our conflict, Jews and Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians ˆ a conflict that has lasted far too long.

Such a speech is, to my mind, absolutely essential for opening a new chapter in the history of this country. In decades of meeting with Palestinians of all walks of life, I have come to the conclusion that the emotional aspects of the conflict are no less ˆ and perhaps even more ˆ important than the political ones. A profound sense of injustice permeates the minds and actions of all Palestinians. Unconscious or half-conscious guilt feelings are troubling the souls of the Israelis, creating a deep conviction that Arabs will never make peace with us. I do not know when such a speech will be possible. Many imponderable factors will have an impact on that. But I do know that without it, mere peace agreements, reached between haggling diplomats, will not suffice.

The public apology by the Canadian Prime Minister is not the only thing we can learn from that North American country. 43 years ago, the Canadian government took an extraordinary step in order to make peace between the English-speaking majority and the French-speaking minority among their citizens. That relationship had remained an open wound from the time the British conquered French Canada some 250 years ago. It was decided to replace the Canadian national flag, which was based on the British “Union Jack”, with a completely new national flag, featuring the maple leaf.

On this occasion, the Speaker of the Senate said: “The flag is the symbol of the nation’s unity, for it, beyond any doubt, represents all the citizens of Canada without distinction of race, language, belief or opinion.” We can learn something from that, too.

*Uri Avnery is a journalist and peace activist. He is the founder of the Gush Shalom peace movement.

MIDEAST CONFLICT: NEED FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE

MIDEAST CONFLICT: NEED FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Ziad Asali*

Source: Arab News (http://www.arabnews.com), May 5, 2008.Ddistributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for republication.

Peace is not easy. Achieving it requires summoning the deepest forms of courage. It means examining one‚s darkest prejudices that dehumanise and demonise the other. The quest for mutual recognition of humanity and dignity is an arduous task.

The question facing both Israelis and Palestinians is: Do they prefer to cling to the pain of past injuries and the suffering of their forefathers, or will they determine to move forward and build a better future for their children?

While there have been all too many shrill voices lamenting the grievances of decades and centuries between Israel and the Palestinians, there is a harmony that strums through us all. When we fight for peace, we fight not against each other, but together and for all of us. This means accepting that there are like-minded people on the other side, and identifying, making common cause, and building peace with them.

Israelis and Palestinians live in the same land with divergent national narratives, and both want and need sovereignty and self-determination. The only means to reach a reasonable accommodation is to have two states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side in peace. No other solution has any serious prospect of ending the conflict and creating a modus vivendi between the parties. The two-state solution, for all its faults, is the only way out of the cycle of violence and hatred that has plagued Israel and the Palestinians since 1948.

This idea enjoys the support of solid majorities of both Israelis and Palestinians, and of the international community. In many ways we have never been closer to realising this all-important goal. And yet, as I write, the only realistic hope for the future is in serious jeopardy due to the actions of extremists, driven by nationalist fantasies or religious zealotry, among both Israelis and Palestinians.

Extremists on both sides feel that time is on their side. Some Israelis delude themselves that Palestinians over time will become exhausted or new generations will forget their national identity. They believe they will win complete control of the entire area between the river and the sea. Meanwhile, some radical Palestinians are under the illusion that Israel is an artificial foreign imposition akin to the Crusader states that cannot last and will eventually collapse. They too believe that time is their greatest weapon, and that the best strategy therefore is to never compromise.

We cannot afford to sacrifice generation upon generation in order to test the validity of these competing metaphysical visions and certainties about the trajectory of history.

These dangerous delusions are most damagingly expressed in the expansion of Israeli settlements and by the use of terror by Palestinian extremist groups. Settlements threaten a peace based on two states by strengthening rather than loosening Israel‚s grip on the occupied territories˜greatly complicating the process of creating a Palestinian state. They also profoundly erode Palestinian confidence that Israel is interested in allowing a viable, contiguous state of Palestine to be born. Similarly, the use of terror by Palestinian extremist groups makes Israelis question whether Palestinians would ever accept Israel and agree to live with it in peace and security.

It is up to both peoples to decide whether they will allow themselves to be driven by extremist agendas, or to pursue what is plainly in their national interests. Their past trespasses against each other, both real and imagined, have to give way to the recognition that Israelis and Palestinians clearly now need exactly the same thing: An end of conflict based on two states.

I do not believe that the conflict should be seen any longer as pitting Israelis against Palestinians, but must be re-conceptualised as a struggle between those who are committed to ending the conflict based on two states against those on both sides who persist in clinging to hostility. Those who are prepared to recognise each other‚s dignity and self determination in two sovereign states share a common purpose, and have more in common with each other than with their compatriots who are bent on conflict for generations to come.

At 60, Israel is a technologically and politically sophisticated state with a diverse population and vibrant economy. Israelis deserve a peaceful country with security and economic progress. Palestinians deserve no less.

* Ziad Asali, MD, is president of the American Task Force on Palestine. For more information: mailto:gala@americantaskforce.org. This article was taken from a discussion on Israel-Palestine in the Rosner’s Guest column in Ha’aretz.

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MIDDLE EAST PEACE REQUIRES FORGIVENESS

MIDDLE EAST PEACE REQUIRES FORGIVENESS

Ghassan Rubeiz*

This article is distributed by the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at: http://www.commongroundnews.org.

Peace requires forgiveness. Jimmy Carter‚s meeting in Damascus last week with the leadership of Hamas has aroused strong emotions. If compromise of principles disqualifies parties from peace making, the Middle East is doomed forever. The Damascus visit involves five main parties: Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, Israel, the United States, and former President Carter. There is no uncompromised party among the five listed. Hamas compromised in violence, the Palestinian Authority in corruption, Israel in a harsh occupation, the United States in nursing erosion of justice, and Jimmy Carter in over-tolerance of Arab autocracy.

I am a strong critic of Hamas for not recognising Israel and for not exploiting non-violent resistance˜the most powerful weapon that Palestinians can muster for liberation from an oppressive Israeli occupation. But whether one supports Hamas or not, this grassroots movement did win the last parliamentary national elections. This historical election authorised Hamas to lead the government of the Palestinian communities ˆ under Israel‚s occupation ˆ in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza.

The election of Hamas in January 2006 was a remarkable event in Arab democracy-building. It is rare that a corrupt Arab regime, the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, is ousted through ballots rather than bullets. However, since the surprise victory of Hamas, Israel and the United States have been working with the (rival secular) Palestinian Authority and its artificially formed government in the West Bank. In contrast, Hamas, which now controls Gaza by force, is being isolated, pauperised, and targeted militarily to force it to accept Washington and Tel Aviv‚s recipe for peace. Although it has shown subtle signs of moderation, Hamas refuses to yield.

The news this week that Israel and Syria have started a new round of indirect peace talks (mediated by Turkey) is too good to be true. Similarly the news that President Bush is confident about „defining‰ the contours of a viable Palestinian state before he leaves office remains a trip to the land of fantasy. But fantasy is all we have got to live for in an increasingly gloomy Middle East. Why is Carter‚s attempt to open dialogue with the most important segment of Palestinian leadership perceived in some quarters as a threat to peace in a region that is hard to reach with understanding but easy to manipulate with force?

Carter is trying to help Israel by softening Hamas‚ hard line position, but, regrettably, many in the Jewish community and outside it do not trust the former US president anymore. They brush aside the Nobel laureate‚s breakthrough peace work of the late seventies.

Not many in Israel realise that their state can not achieve peace without creative compromise with Hamas, without political reconciliation within the leadership of the Palestinian community. Hamas is a grassroots movement that is bound to gain power through martyrdom; as a policy to restrain violent rebellion, the Israeli occupation continues to make living condition for all Palestinians unbearable. In conditions of extreme deprivation Hamas thrives politically, a David and Goliath phenomenon.

The peace process has been deadlocked for eight years and needs innovation to be revived. Former President Jimmy Carter is morally compelled to continue his mission of peacemaking. He initiated the progress toward peace in the Middle East four decades ago. His initial role in conflict resolution should not be forgotten as he marches onward in trying to break barriers between Arabs and Israelis.

Carter met with Hamas leaders last week defying a US government ban on formal negotiations with the Islamic Resistant Movement, better known as Hamas. Even in his capacity as a private citizen, Carter has antagonised the US congress by his meeting with the leaders of Hamas. This latest Carter mission follows his controversial 2006 book entitled: Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid.

The book is about the erosion of justice in the Occupied Territories. Carter‚s comparison of Israel‚s occupation of the Palestinian Territories with the former South African apartheid regime was considered unfair and inflammatory by many Israelis and friends of Zionism. Some members of the US Congress are upset with Carter for what they consider unauthorised „presidential‰ behaviour. As a punitive measure, a group of congressmen is considering legislation to cut funding for the Carter Center.

Before critics lose patience with Carter they should realise that he is a man of faith, and that he is applying his biblical principles in peacemaking. The former President is against the militant resistance strategy of Hamas. In fact, he is opposed to any form of resistance that exposes civilians to violence. Carter remains a true friend of Israel. His talks with Hamas were an attempt to jump-start a dying peace process. The visit should be commended, not condemned. The former president is reminding the world that there is no short road to peace. Hamas has to be included in a democratic march toward peace.

*Dr. Ghassan Rubeiz (mailto:grubeiz@comcast.net) is a Lebanese-American Middle East analyst. He was previously the secretary of the Geneva-based World Council of Churches for the Middle East.

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ISRAELIS ARE TALKING TO HAMAS: RELIGION AT THE CUTTING EDGE

ISRAELIS ARE TALKING TO HAMAS: RELIGION AT THE CUTTING EDGE

Marc Gopin*

Source: Common Ground News Service, May 15, 2008, http://www.commongroundnews.org, with permission for publication.

There are Israeli Jews who have been talking to Hamas for years, especially Rabbi Menahem Frohman. In fact, there are more Israeli Jews, official and un-official, who would be talking not only to Hamas, but also to Syria and Iran were the White House not pressuring them against dialogue with enemies of Israel. This is unprecedented: a third party, supposedly mediating for peace, that forbids two parties from talking to each other.

Sober intelligence analysts at the highest levels in Israel have been arguing the virtue of negotiation and a process of offers and counter-offers˜not because they are nonviolence activists, but because they are realists seeking the path of least resistance to a more stable and safe Middle East. They have every intention of confronting the military threat from Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, but through a subtle combination of approaches, not the least of which is negotiation. They understand very well that an offer to an inveterate enemy that does not recognise your existence is not a capitulation, but rather a test. It is a test that will put constructive pressure on radicals to come to the table, or split among themselves. All good news for realists.

There are also religious Israeli Jews who have honed their negotiation skills with Hamas over many years now. Rabbi Frohman, along with Khaled Amayreh, a Hebron Journalist close to Hamas, have come up with a ceasefire that is realistic, but also appealing to the religious frame in which Hamas exclusively operates. This was not an official document, but it has been followed by important statements released by Hamas leader Khaled Meshal in Syria, regarding interest in an agreement between Hamas and Israel to not target civilians, which would mean an end to suicide attacks. In addition, Meshal has come out with a statement that appears to accept Israel‚s existence within the 1967 borders, which appears to meet a major criterion for Western acceptance of Hamas. These are all positive signs, and yet it comes in the midst of military moves by Israel and Syria that are making everyone nervous about a coming confrontation.

This is all the more reason for an aggressive embrace of an agreement with Hamas that would prevent another unnecessary war or outbreak of hostilities. Here are excerpts from the ceasefire, or hudna, treaty that demonstrate a path toward uniting a cultural and realistic path away from violent solutions to the conflict between Hamas and Israel. The text is framed by quotes that honour the Koran and the Bible:

God is great, and he alone is able to bring a solution to the problems standing between the noble Palestinian people and the venerable people of Israel in the Holy Land∑.It is possible, based on Jewish and Muslim law alike, to present solutions that will bring divine providence to both noble peoples, since the blessed Lord has bestowed upon them the grace of residing in the Holy Land∑.Starting from this premise, we seek to establish a truce agreement (hudna) between the Palestinians and the Israelis, based on what we have learned from the Prophets and the Messengers∑.

According to the agreement, Israel and the Palestinian authorities in Gaza undertake the following:

To end and abolish the sanctions imposed on the Gaza Strip in all forms, effective immediately, including the following: Permitting normal economic ties between the Gaza Strip and the outside world; Opening all crossing points between Gaza and the outside world; this includes permitting free movement and flow of goods and services to and from the Gaza Strip∑.

Undertakings of the Palestinian side: The authorities in the Gaza Strip must take all necessary steps for putting a complete stop to the attacks against Israel∑.Halting indefinitely all attacks and rocket fire against Israel… stop any attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians… halting suicide attacks aimed at Israeli soldiers or civilians∑.

The purpose of a parallel process of establishing a Jewish/Muslim ceasefire is not to undermine the secular processes of negotiation, indirect or otherwise, but to build a better atmosphere of trust, and an understanding of what enemies want from each other. This will strengthen moderates in Hamas, like the Minister of Health, and weaken the more extreme voices. It will create confusion among those who are convinced that Jews and Israel will never compromise. With Hezbollah’s victory in Lebanon in recent days we simply cannot ignore such groups anymore if we are to deescalate the dangerous trends of the region. They are facts on the ground, and a hudna will help neutralise the atmosphere of complete war.

Political Islam is a nonnegotiable feature of the Middle Eastern landscape for the time being, but undermining its violent appeal by pursuing a ceasefire and substantive change in the lives of Palestinians is the only rational path to shared safety. This approach respects religious partisans on both sides of the divide, and also provides a practical way out of the current interminable cycle of violence.

*Marc Gopin is the James Laue Professor at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University.

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A CREDIBLE PEACE PROCESS

A CREDIBLE PEACE PROCESS

Mohammed Herzallah*

Source: Al-Ahram (http://weekly.ahram.org.eg), May 8, 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for republication.

Hamas just offered Israel a 10-year long truce. This is an important opening that could allow Israel and the United States to start engaging Hamas in the political process, either directly or through Arab allies, because the isolation of Hamas undermines the policy objectives of all parties presently involved.

Mahmoud Abbas is the elected president of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, but he cannot be expected to reach a credible and lasting political settlement with the Israeli government unless and until he secures Hamas’ consent and blessing. The Islamist movement maintains broad support in the occupied Palestinian territories and has demonstrated time and again that it has the necessary capacity to subvert negotiations with Israel. Discord in the Gaza Strip and the resultant security unrest in adjacent Israeli communities substantiate the claim that Palestinian national consensus is indispensable to the peace process.

Regrettably, the task of cultivating this consensus is becoming progressively more difficult. In the past, disagreements between Fatah and Hamas, the two political pillars of Palestinian politics, had always subsisted on their ideological differences. Now, the competing preferences of intrusive external powers have distorted Palestinian politics and have rendered factional differences more irreconcilable.

Fatah’s decision to retract its official consent to the Yemeni accord – a national reconciliation proposal for Palestinians sponsored by President Saleh of Yemen – late March is just one example. Fatah and Hamas spent weeks negotiating the terms for reviving a Palestinian national unity government and restoring the PA’s control over Gaza. Hours after the accord was signed by representatives from both parties, Fatah officials in Ramallah announced that there had been a “mix up” and subsequently withdrew their endorsement of the accord. Their announcement followed Vice-President Dick Cheney’s brief visit to Ramallah, in the course of which he relayed the message that the United States will not support reconciliation with Hamas unless the Islamist movement fundamentally changes. Israel also expressed strong objections to the deal. Putting it in blunt terms, an Israeli official told Ha’aretz that Fatah can “have a peace process and dialogue with Israel or a coalition with Hamas. But it’s clear that you can’t have both.”

The experience of the past year has proven that military and economic pressure cannot compel Hamas to discontinue showering Israel with homemade rockets. Worse, these strains are pushing Hamas closer to Tehran, which in turn is helping crystallise Iranian influence in the Palestinian-Israeli realm.

The fate of moderate Palestinian officials is also at stake. If truth were told, the very existence of a credible leadership, capable of advancing Palestinian interests through the political process, is in question. President Abbas is in a critical spot, and the United States and Israel expect him to continue negotiating with them regardless of Israel’s actions against Gaza. Collective punishment policies, that include depriving Gaza’s civilians of food and energy, are creating considerable popular resentment. The PA is commonly reproached by its people for not actively protesting against these violations and not doing enough to alleviate the suffering of Gazans. Some even wonder whether the PA is actually complicit in suffocating Gaza. Regardless of whether there is merit to such claims, the persistence of this perception in the Palestinian street is likely to have a long-term negative effect on the credibility of the PA among its own people. In all likelihood, this consequence will be particularly palpable when the PA is about to sign, presumably on behalf of the Palestinian people everywhere, a final peace deal with Israel.

The current approach that dominates American and Israeli policies towards Hamas might be defensible if it made Israel more secure. But this approach is only creating desperate living conditions in Gaza, which in turn are facilitating the emergence of a fiercer brand of militants such as the Army of Islam and the Army of Believers, two rogue groups that have claimed connections to Al-Qaeda and have carried out various operations in Gaza in the past year.

The launching of a credible peace process between Palestinians and Israelis ˆ one that could lead eventually to an enduring political settlement ˆ requires that all major players on both sides be brought to the negotiation table. Taking Hamas’ 10-year truce offer seriously would be a step in the right direction. The current policy towards Hamas, which aims to extract concessions through the interposition of sanctions and use of military force, always had a high propensity to backfire, and it did.

*Mohammed Herzallah is a research fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former president of the Palestine Solidarity Committee at Harvard University.

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SHOULD PALESTINIANS FORGIVE ISRAEL

SHOULD PALESTINIANS FORGIVE ISRAEL

Samir El-Youssef*

Source: The Guardian, “Comment is Free” (http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk), May 14, 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for republication.

In the first chapter of Amos Oz‚s novel My Michael, the protagonist Hannah recalls her childhood friends, Khalil and Aziz, two Palestinians who in 1948 disappeared along with 800,000 of their people. In the last chapter she imagines her two friends coming back to blow everything up. By then Hannah has descended into madness.

Hannah, like Oz and his generation of Israelis, knows that before the war of 1948 there was another, older and larger society than her own, and that that society was destroyed and its traces erased; the population was forced to leave, villages were razed to the ground and cities, neighbourhoods and streets were renamed. She must also know that the destruction of the Palestinian society was necessary for the creation of Israel. Unlike her generation, however, Hannah is willing to admit what she knows; but that‚s only because she is mad.

Israelis know that, within the ongoing conflict, making this acknowledgement could, as the novel concludes, be an act of madness and a call for self-destruction. For such an acknowledgement endorses the basic and uncompromising Palestinian claims. Practically every single Palestinian believes that before the Nakba – or ‘catastrophe’ – there was a Palestinian society similar to Arab societies in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt; that if it hadn‚t been for Jewish migration to Palestine, with the intention and means of creating a Jewish state, Palestine would have progressed into a sovereign Palestinian state.

Were the Israelis to endorse such claims they would have to admit that the creation of the State of Israel has blocked the natural birth of the Palestinian state; they would, therefore, risk facing the call to stand up to their responsibilities and correct the wrong they have done. But how could they do that without undoing their own nation and agreeing to become citizens of the long delayed Palestinian state? Could the Israelis ˜ as a nation whose ancestors suffered a long history of discrimination, prosecution and genocide ˜ take such a risk without being absolutely mad?

Madness, however, doesn’t always lead to the risk of self-destruction. Indeed, some of it could be so benign as to be the only hope. Let‚s imagine a Palestinian protagonist, a Palestinian Hannah who could understand the position of the Israelis ˜ that they have no choice but to evade or postpone admitting the embarrassing facts of pre-1948; that at best they could try to skip these facts by supporting a half-baked solution, such as the so-called two-state solution, by which Palestinians are offered a compensatory miniature state. A Palestinian Hannah would also acknowledge that the damage has been done and attempts to undo Israel could only lead to further damage˜and that Palestinians must forgive Israelis.

Forgiveness is good, and a decent society must do the good thing; it might also be the only hope to save present and future Palestinian generations from the curse of a damaged past. But surely one can‚t expect a stateless people, who for the past 60 years have been condemned to the life of refugees or, at best, second-rate citizens, to forgive? It would be a pure submission to eternal misfortune.

Well, Palestinian forgiveness would be a risk, one that would require the courage of the mad, hence Hannah. For Israelis could see this as an act of surrender, an incentive not for peace but for more seizure of Palestinian land and total suffocation of Palestinian life. If Israelis were to misuse Palestinian forgiveness then the act of forgiveness would be nullified. Forgiveness addresses past injustices only. By forgiving Israelis, Palestinians would exempt them from past responsibility, but not give them license to commit further injustice. On the other hand, Israelis might appreciate what they are offered; forgiveness would mean an end to violence motivated by past grievance, and if this didn‚t bring about a peaceful solution it would probably lead to a state of calm, in which Israeli restrictive measures would be removed and Palestinians could resume normal daily life.

For the Palestinians who are prepared to forgive the hope is that the majority of Israelis, out of decency or out of sheer desire for a quiet life, don‚t want any more war. Realising that Palestinian forgiveness meant that their national existence was no longer threatened, Israelis would want their government to seize the chance, not to confiscate more Palestinian land, but to consolidate the state of quiet and calmness, and do their best to rescue Palestinians from military occupation and second-rate citizenship.

This is probably a mad dream; a Palestinian Hannah might not exist, not in the near future, and if she existed she might be failed by the Israelis. The alternative, however, is the greater madness of a conflict that would go on for the next 60 years.

*Samir El-Youssef is a Palestinian writer and critic.

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THE ROADMAP REVISITED

THE ROADMAP REVISITED

Naomi Chazan*

Source: Bitterlemons.org (http://www.bitterlemons.org), May 5, 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for republication.

The “Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” highlights both the good intentions and the misplaced conceptions of its promulgators. Five years after its adoption, it lingers not as a tool for the achievement of a sustainable agreement but as a burdensome impediment to its realisation.

The roadmap was construed as a decidedly goal-oriented document. Substantively, it corrected the most glaring lacuna of the Oslo process by explicitly defining the destination of diplomatic efforts: “the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state [that]…will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 1967.”

Strategically, however, it was flawed from the outset. It sought to correct, but not to diverge from, the step-by-step approach undertaken in Oslo by setting out distinct phases, compressed timetables, clear benchmarks and visible monitoring mechanisms (overseen by the international community in the form of the Quartet). The built-in conditionalities on progress, coupled with the loose dependence on “the good faith of the parties,” meant that it was doubtful ˆ if not thoroughly unrealistic ˆ to expect that the chosen route could lead to the desired destination. Despite the shift in the locus of decision-making from the parties themselves to global actors, the reluctance of Israeli and Palestinian officials to agree to the roadmap’s main provisions, along with the numerous reservations they attached, is testimony to the unease with which it was greeted.

Since its inception, the roadmap has been stuck in its first phase, ostensibly aimed at enhancing security, improving the humanitarian situation, fortifying Palestinian institutions and halting all settlement activity. Indeed, the obstacles strewn on the tortuous path to the two-state objective have become increasingly daunting, effectively transforming the task of overcoming them into an aim in itself rather than a means to its attainment.

Conceptually, then, the phased approach has, for the second time since 1993, failed to stand the test of time. Its underlying logic is inherently faulty. First, it assumes symmetry in Palestinian and Israeli capacities when the formal standing of the two sides differs dramatically and asymmetry reigns. Second, it presumes that the creation of a supportive environment is conducive to diplomatic progress when in all probability amelioration of conditions on the ground is an outcome rather than a prerequisite of successful talks. Third, it relies on stringent verification and oversight mechanisms when the willingness of international actors to employ these tools has been consistently lacking. Fourth, it hopelessly conflates objectives and means, making forward movement on a pre-set trajectory more important than the fulfilment of its ultimate purpose. Finally, and most seriously, it holds final-status negotiations hostage to the purveyors of violence by granting them veto power over the diplomatic process.

Thus, ironically, the phased strategy ingrained in the roadmap – precisely because it dictated a series of steps necessary for the commencement of permanent settlement talks – enabled the pursuit of unilateral measures fundamentally antithetical to a negotiated resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. PM Ariel Sharon’s one-sided disengagement from Gaza was undertaken within this rubric; so, too, was the construction of the security barrier. The roadmap, in sharp contrast to its declared brief, gradually became an unconscious instrument for the legitimation of unilateralism.

The striking drawbacks of the roadmap did not, however, lead to its abandonment. The Annapolis meeting in November 2007 not only resurrected the outdated document; it embraced its weakest component. The bilateral permanent settlement talks were (much in line with the third phase of the roadmap) detached from its confining framework, as were the accompanying multilateral economic and institution-enhancing measures. But the implementation of the initial phase of the roadmap was reincorporated into the three-track package under the direct supervision of the United States. It was thus relegated not only to a secondary ˆ facilitating ˆ role; it was also stripped of its stated purpose.

The remnants of the impracticable course charted by the roadmap, far from being jettisoned in the last-ditch effort to bring about a two-state solution by agreement, may yet lay the foundation for the achievement of a long-term ceasefire. Thus, should this endeavour survive, it would do so as an exercise in conflict management, in direct contradiction to its professed aim of resolving the conflict.

The roadmap, in retrospect, stands as a monument to the inadequacies of incrementalism. Designed as a guiding compass leading to a two-state outcome, it has been increasingly utilised as a diversion from this goal, rendering it palpably self-defeating. This transmutation offers further testimony ˆ if such is still needed ˆ to the strategic misconceptions that have accompanied Israeli-Palestinian initiatives to date.

Clearly, no interim measures, no consecutive phases, no step-by-step approach can act as a substitute for full-scale negotiations on all outstanding issues. Without a substantial conceptual shift, along with the reverse engineering it entails, the promise embedded in the roadmap may become the victim of its pitfalls.

*Naomi Chazan is professor emerita of political science at the Hebrew University and a former member of Knesset (Meretz). (CGNews) and can be accessed at <http://www.commongroundnews.org>www.commongroundnews.org.

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ENCOUNTERING PEACE: CREATING A NEW REALITY ON THE GROUND

ENCOUNTERING PEACE: CREATING A NEW REALITY ON TH GROUND

Gershon Baskin*

Source: Jerusalem Post (http://www.jpost.com), Augustv 4, 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News with permission for re publication.

Danny Atar and Kaddoura Mousa, two relatively unknown people, have made great strides on the road to peace and could go much further if their governments would only stop interfering. Atar is the head of the Gilboa Regional Council, elected by the residents of the kibbutzim, moshavim and Arab villages in the Gilboa area; Mousa is the governor of the Jenin District, appointed by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. They have been working together quietly for the past years to create a new reality on the ground whose success is now being called “Jenin first.”

In this area, the most northern part of the West Bank, the Green Line and the separation barrier are on the same line. The absence of conflict on the territorial issue has enabled these two local leaders to march forward with ambitious plans that if brought to fruition will provide the best chance for prosperity, stability and security for Palestinians and Israelis on both sides of the line.

What they have achieved so far is mainly the building of a relationship of trust which is the most basic necessary ingredient in a recipe for peacemaking. In the Israeli-Palestinian reality, the almost total absence of trust is one of the main reasons why progress in negotiations between the leaders is so slow and tedious. In this conflict, which is so filled with rhetoric and hyper-verbosity, the absence of empty words and high politics is refreshing, especially when it is replaced by actions that build confidence and stability.

In the Gilboa-Jenin area, trust has been built by deeds, not by words. Mousa has diligently worked to bring law and order back to the Jenin area. He is a no-nonsense man who has zero tolerance for Palestinians who believe that they have the right and obligation to attack and kill Israelis. As governor, Mousa has direct authority over the Palestinian police and security forces in his area. With determination, the support of Abbas and PA Prime Minister Salaam Fayad, and support from the local communities, he succeeded in turning the area once controlled by Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants into the quietest in the West Bank.

Atar’s part in building trust has been achieved by his personal commitment and determination toward the economic and social development plans that are based on creating a new cross-boundary reality. The center of those plans is an industrial zone that will be built on the Palestinian side of the border. A logistical center and a medical center are planned on the Israeli side, and there are talks about cross-boundary projects in higher education and vocational training as well.

The connecting point is the Jelama crossing, which will probably have to be moved and expanded to accommodate the new plans. The plans are ambitious and visionary, and if Atar and Mousa are allowed to move forward without the interference of their governments, Jenin-Gilboa will become a model for moving from conflict to cooperation.

A key element in the success so far is the bridge-building role being played by Eid Salim, the representative of Mukeibila, a small Arab village and a member of the Gilboa Regional Council. Salim is an Israeli-Arab˜that is his definition. He has no conflicts regarding his identity. His amazingly rich fluency in both Hebrew and Arabic is only one small indication of his ability to stride both sides of the border and earn the full trust of both Israelis and Palestinians.

Eid’s Jewish colleagues on the council have no questions about his loyalty to Israel. They see him as a vital member, colleague and true friend. When Eid speaks about “our state,” he is only referring to Israel. The Atar-Eid partnership is a model of friendship and leadership based on a joint vision and, perhaps most importantly, on deeds and not words. This powerful duo together with Mousa can transform the northern West Bank into a real success story in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking and perhaps lay a new cornerstone in building peace from the bottom-up.

The Gilboa-Jenin development plans will move forward if the local leaders have their way. The central governments have only to facilitate their work. To begin the physical work on the industrial zone, they need final agreements on technical issues concerning electricity, water and access roads. The plans have been advanced; financing is available from Germany and elsewhere. Groundbreaking could take place by January and the process of creating thousands of new jobs on both sides of the border could begin. A meeting of these local leaders and others from both sides took place this past weekend in the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Center in Lake Como, Italy, sponsored by the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information and the Adenauer Foundation in Jerusalem.

The process could also be stopped by the national governments and by high politics. The Jenin-Gilboa plans will not end the occupation. The Palestinian state will not come into being as a result of cross-boundary cooperation in the North. The situation in Gaza will not be affected by the creation of thousands of new jobs in Jenin. Nor are the plans fostered by Atar and Mousa a blueprint for a more humane or benign occupation.

Both of these local leaders fully support the two-state solution. But these are men of action. They understand that they can achieve nothing through political debates and arguments. They have the tools of local government at their disposal, and they plan to use those tools to build a piece of the peace that we all hope for.

In the absence of real hope that the heads of the Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams might actually reach an agreement, it is people like Atar and Mousa who provide the real hope that peace is reachable and not solely a vision on the horizon that continually moves away from us.

*Gershon Baskin is co-CEO of the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information.

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THE DAY AFTER

THE DAY AFTER

Amin Howeidi*

Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for republication.

Barring any unexpected developments, the Palestinians may have a state before the end of 2008. It will not be the best of states in the best of worlds. It will not match the historic realities of the region, nor will it reflect the true interests of all those involved. But it will give everyone something they wanted. It will leave much undecided, but it is the ambiguity that will make it possible, and we’ll have to get used to living with the ambiguities and contradictions. That will be the easy part.

Some would be pleased to see the name of Palestine put on the map once again. Some will be less excited about it. But that’s not what matters really. States do not live on promises or guarantees alone, but on the wisdom of their leaders and the hard work of their citizens.

Theodor Herzl didn’t like the Balfour Declaration at first. In his memoirs, Herzl admitted that he was disappointed because the declaration spoke of a national homeland rather than a state. But the newborn state managed to grow and became a power to contend with. This happened because its inhabitants managed to turn the promise into reality.

Following the Evian Agreement that gave Algeria its independence, Karim Belgacem, member of the Algerian Revolutionary Command Council, stopped by to see me. Following a quick dinner, he said, “the easy part is over now and the hard part is just beginning.” We were never to meet again. He was killed briefly afterwards in Europe; assassinated in the power struggle that followed.

The biggest challenge for the new state would be to hold together. See how Lebanon had to endure months without a head of state. See how Palestine is divided ahead of becoming a state. Once the Palestinians have a country to run, things may get harder than they already are.

Before Israel became a state, it had multiple of terrorist outfits running their separate shows. Then the Haganah, Zvai Leumi and Irgun became political parties and elected a terrorist, David Ben-Gurion, as prime minister and minister of defence. For a while, the paramilitary outfits of the gangs continued to co-exist. Then Ben-Gurion called a conference in April 1948 and had everyone agree to disband the militias. A state needs to have one army, he said.

Irgun had second thoughts about it. Ben-Gurion had banned all arms shipments ordered by the paramilitary outfits and Menachem Begin didn’t exactly see the point. So he ordered his militia to unload a shipment of military hardware from the ship Altalina. Without blinking, Ben-Gurion ordered the ship sunk. Dozens of Israelis died in the attack and hundreds of Irgun members were rounded up and thrown in prison. This action arguably saved Israel.

I am recalling this episode for the benefit of our Palestinian brothers. The hard part is what comes after the creation of the state. You cannot run a state in the same way you run a militia. A newborn state can be forever traumatised by a power struggle. For the new state to survive, the Palestinians must have one army. And that army should take orders from one political leadership and from that leadership alone.

*Amin Howeidi is former Egyptian minister of defense and chief of general intelligence. Source: Al Ahram Weekly (http://www.weekly.ahram.org),July31- August 6. 2008.

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DON’T BE AFRAID OF PEACE WITH SYRIA

DON’T BE AFRAID OF PEACE WITH SYRIA

Ha’aretz Editorial “

Source: Ha’aretz (http://www.haaretz.com), 28 April 28. 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for republication

Peace with Syria is once again knocking at our door, and it even seems to be meeting with a less-frosty reception on the Israeli side. The time is ripe for negotiations with Syria, especially since US President George W. Bush’s reign is drawing to a close, and among his potential successors, whether Democrat or Republican, there is a willingness to negotiate with Bashar Assad instead of boycotting him.

John McCain, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama all see a peace agreement between Israel and Syria as a recipe for relieving tension in the region. Removing Syria from the axis of evil might shuffle the Middle Eastern deck once again, breaking alliances and creating new interests. Israel can reap greater security from a new situation of that kind.

There seems to be a need to repeat, over and over, this basic fact: Nothing contributes to Israel’s security more than a peace accord. Before the protests of solidarity with the Golan Heights begin, it should be emphasised that withdrawal from the Golan in exchange for peace is endorsed not only by bleeding hearts, but by distinctly security-minded figures. The supporters of the Golan are West Bank settlers, like Golan resident Effi Eitam, who see any withdrawal as a national catastrophe; parties that gain strength by sowing security-related fears, such as Israel Beiteinu; those with economic interests in the region, hikers, bird-watchers, wine connoisseurs and winemakers; and mainly the people of the past, who still consider the lookout point on Mount Hermon to be “Israel’s eyes,” even though those eyes did not prove a very effective source of warning in 1973. Today, neither advance warning nor deterrence rely on the “Alpinists” (the elite IDF unit trained for snow operations), and the missile war expected in the future is not affected by natural boundaries, whether of the flowing or the ascending kind.

Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu have all supported withdrawing from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace and security arrangements, and they all worked to obtain such an agreement. Whether or not the current government is capable of carrying out an historical move that entails territorial concessions is a question of leadership ability. Peace is not a commodity in high demand when the border is quiet, but peace with Syria might open up the possibility of regional peace by changing the balance of interests in the area.

If there is truth in recent reports that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert sent Assad, through the Turkish prime minister, a message concerning his willingness to withdraw from all of the Golan Heights in exchange for peace, it is clear that most of the negotiations will not involve the withdrawal itself, but rather the attendant security arrangements.

In an article in the newspaper al-Hayat, published in London, Dr. Fawzi Shoaibi, head of the Data and Strategic Studies Centre in Syria and a close consultant of Assad, writes, “The time has come to break through the Syrian-Israeli channel.” Assad himself said in July 2007 that he was waiting for Israel to make an official and public announcement of its willingness to withdraw from the entire Golan Heights, so that the talks could focus only on the security arrangements.

The cost of peace with Syria has been known for years, and there is no reason to be alarmed by it. The security advantages of peace are greater than the strategic value of the Golan Heights. The problem is that even within Kadima, Olmert’s party, it is hard to locate sufficient support for this welcome move by the prime minister.

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THE UNITED STATES AND SYRIA SHOULD TALK (ABOUT EVERYTHING)

THE UNITED STATES AND SYRIA SHOULD TALK (ABOUT EVERYTHING)

Theodore H. Kattouf

Source: Common Ground News (http://www.commongroundnews.org), July 10, 2008, Copyright permission is granted for publication.

The recent compromise on power sharing in Lebanon spares the country further bloodshed, and allows its people to return to a modicum of normalcy. However, the underlying causes of the conflict remain, and Lebanon continues to be an arena where external powers play out their rivalries. Unless and until Syria and the United States reach a grand bargain, the Lebanese will continue to pay the price.

It should now be clear to the most casual observer that Syria’s military withdrawal from Lebanon was hardly the end of their influence there. Iran and Syria are in an alliance to thwart US and Israeli objectives in the region whenever and wherever they can. Despite the overwhelming military advantages the United States and Israel enjoy over their adversaries, Iran and Syria have been particularly adept at playing the spoiler through proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi tribal groups, and Shi’a militias.

Through much of its second term, the administration of US President George W. Bush has been loath to engage in a prolonged and serious dialogue with Syria, instead preferring attempts to isolate and marginalise its leadership. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, for his part, has borrowed pages from his late father’s playbook to demonstrate that there are no lasting solutions to regional problems without Syria. Yet even Turkish-brokered negotiations between Israel and Syria have not enticed the United States away from its policy of ignoring Syria diplomatically while throwing verbal jabs at the regime whenever it can.

The Israelis have been by far more pragmatic in dealing with Syria than has the Bush administration. The current Israeli government and its military/security leadership have concluded that they are ‘better off with the devil they know than the devil they don’t.’ This reasoning helps to explain why Israel went to great lengths in the summer of 2006 to assure Syria that it was not the target of Israel’s war with Hezbollah. It also helps to explain the lack of Israeli leaks after the bombing of an alleged nuclear reactor in Syria. Meanwhile, even after the Bush administration tried to discourage indirect Israeli talks with Syria about the Golan, Israel cautiously went ahead.

Both Israel and Syria recently concluded that making these talks known is advantageous to them. In the Israeli case, they can pressure the Palestinians for more concessions by suggesting they have another option for peacemaking. The more strategic reason is of course the hope that Syria can be weaned from its 30-year alliance with a nuclear ambitious Iran. For its part, Syria wants to ensure its relevance and better position itself with the next US administration while the clock runs out on the current one. However, both leaderships know that even if they can agree on the terms of peace, the US government’s role is indispensable to concluding, supporting, and enforcing a treaty.

All of this leaves Lebanon in limbo. Hezbollah has demonstrated that there is no combination of other forces in Lebanon that can challenge its military predominance. Hezbollah’s leader, Sheikh Nasrallah, has left no doubt that his spiritual guide (Marje) is Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. As its influence with the group diminishes, Syria can no longer promise to disarm Hezbollah’s militia in the context of a peace treaty with Israel and a positive new relationship with the United States. It can, however, shut down the Iranian resupply pipeline to Hezbollah through Syrian territory. Syria could be even more Machiavellian and work with the United States and others to strengthen the more secular elements in Lebanese society in the context of full peace.

The Syrian regime cares first and foremost for its survival. If ushering in a new relationship with the United States and signing a peace treaty with Israel enhances its prospects for longevity, it will go that route˜even at the expense of Iran and Hezbollah. If such a deal is not forthcoming, Syria will continue to play the spoiler role to the best of its considerable abilities.

It is therefore important that a new US administration work with Israel and our Arab allies to concoct a strategy that can pry Syria away from Iran. Despite the longevity of their alliance, the two regimes ˆ one secular, the other theocratic ˆ have little philosophically in common other than their shared insecurities concerning Israel and the West.

Thankfully, Syria appears open to a grand bargain, including perhaps one that could stabilise Lebanon without compromising that country’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

*Theodore H. Kattouf is a former US ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and Syria. He is currently the president and CEO of AMIDEAST (www.amideast.org), and serves on Search for Common Ground’s MidEast Advisory Board.

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ISRAEL-SYRIA TALKS HINDERED

ISRAEL-SYRIA TALKS HINDERED

David R. Sands, “Israel-Syria talks hindered”

Source: Washington Times (http://www.washingtontimes.com), July 25, 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for republication.

An Israeli-Syrian peace deal could be signed by the end of this year, but that requires Bush administration involvement that has not been forthcoming, the head of a high-profile Syrian delegation visiting Washington said last Thursday.

“If the political will is there, we could achieve an agreement within three or four months,” said delegation lead spokesman Samir al-Taki, director of a leading Damascus think-tank and an adviser to Syrian Prime Minister Naji al-Otari, during a luncheon with editors and reporters at The Washington Times. “The security issues involved in an agreement I would say are about 95 percent finalised,” he added.

Using Turkey as an intermediary, Israel and Syria acknowledged this spring they conducted “indirect” talks on a peace accord after a break of nearly a decade. Syria seeks to reclaim the Golan Heights, lost to Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and sees an Israeli settlement as a pre-condition for better ties with the United States. Israel, for its part, hopes an agreement would weaken Syria’s alliance with Iran and would pressure Damascus to end its support for militant groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, which are hostile to Israel.

The Bush administration, which accused Syria of trying to undermine US allies and interests in Lebanon, Iraq and Israel, has been cool to the talks, fearing in part they will erode an American push for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.

The administration has been harshly critical of the government of Syrian President Bashar Assad because of its inability or refusal to stop foreign fighters from entering Iraq, and its policies toward Lebanon. The Syrian government has been accused of involvement in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

The Syrian team, brought to Washington by the private group Search for Common Ground, earned some unexpected publicity when the State Department on Wednesday abruptly cancelled plans for a previously announced meeting by a top US diplomat with the delegation. “We were not very disappointed,” Mr. al-Taki said, “for, to tell the truth, we were not expecting with the current situation in Washington a real change.” He said no reason was given for the withdrawn invitation, but “it may be that the publicity about our presence here made too many people nervous.”

Riad Daoudi, a lead Syrian negotiator at the Turkish negotiations, was originally to accompany the delegation to Washington, but remained in Syria to prepare for the next round of talks. Issues in the talks include border demarcation, water rights, security guarantees and the normalisation of diplomatic relations. Mr. al-Taki said diplomatic and military reverses for Israel and the United States in recent years have left the Middle East in “a very dangerous situation.”

Israel, he said, failed to impose a political settlement in the Palestinian territories and failed to break Lebanon’s Hezbollah militant organisation in the summer war of 2006.

The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has not sparked Mr. Bush’s hoped-for political revolution in the region, and the Syrian said recent security gains in Iraq remain “very, very fragile” while the Bush administration tries to keep Syria and other regional powers from having a say in Iraq’s future. Mr. al-Taki said attempts to pressure or isolate Syria, in the end, hurt America’s own interests in the Middle East. “We are unhappy to see ourselves demonised whatever we do,” he said. “At the end of the game, you cannot succeed in Syria if the perception is you are not trying to change our behaviour but change our regime.”

Still, he argued Syrian officials recognise they need the United States to be active in the region, as a guarantor of any deal with Israel and as the only power capable of filling the security gap in the region’s interlocking crises from Iraq and Iran to Lebanon and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Mr. al-Taki said the prospect of a new US president next year was grounds for some optimism.

“Whether it is Obama or McCain, the good news is that no one can pursue the policies that President Bush tried first. It’s already a stuck policy,” he said. “Anyone who comes next will have to have a different approach.”

*David Sands is Diplomatic Correspondent for the Washington Times.

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ISRAELI-SYRIAN NEGOTIATIONS: THE NEED FOR A BOLD MOVE

ISRAELI-SYRIAN NEGOTIATIONS: THE NEED FOR A BOLD MOVE

Alon Ben-Meir,* July 9, 2008

By all accounts, the Israeli-Syrian indirect negotiations through Turkish mediation are going well, and the fact that a fourth round of talks is scheduled for the end of July suggests that both sides expect to make further progress. The reports from Damascus and Ankara, however, indicating that Syria will not enter into direct negotiations with Israel before the advent of new American administration show an obstructive apprehension on the part of the Syrian government. Indeed, Damascus should not only agree to direct negotiations with Israel–as Turkish officials strongly recommend–but time has come for it to make a bold move toward the Israelis. A high level meeting, for example, between Israel and Syria can change overnight the dynamic of their negotiations and dramatically increase the Bush administration’s stakes in its successful outcome.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s effort to write off the Bush administration, however antagonistic it may be toward Damascus, is ultimately a mistake because it fails to take into account what Bush’s attitude would be toward the prospect of an Israeli-Syrian peace under his watch. Assad knows that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert would not have entered any negotiations, directly or indirectly without, at a minimum, the acquiescence of the Bush administration. Having failed to demonstrate a clear-cut foreign policy achievement in Iraq, Iran or with the Palestinians, Mr. Bush is more than eager to capitalize on any potential breakthrough that may come his way during his waning days in the White House. Having just returned from an extended visit to Turkey and Israel where I met with officials from both sides, the sentiment is clear: while the negotiations are going well, something dramatic and bold is needed to secure the durability of the negotiations and ensure a successful outcome. We know that Israel and Syria have a clear understanding of each others requirements to make peace. Otherwise, Syria in particular, would have not entered into any peace talks, let alone made them public.

Despite the White House statements indicating that the US will not participate in talks with Syria, reaching an agreement between Israel and Syria will have a dramatically positive ripple effect throughout the Middle East. It will improve the conditions in Iraq, help to undermine Iran, weaken Hamas and give Lebanon breathing room to achieve political stability. This is what the Bush administration wants and needs more than ever at this time. Now that Israel has the potential to open Washington’s door for Damascus, Assad has a golden opportunity to capitalize on Bush’s desire to claim one important foreign policy achievement, all while enhancing his own international standing. Moreover, regardless of who is the next President of the United States, Barack Obama or John McCain, they will feel politically and morally inclined to engage Syria directly which is precisely what Damascus wants. If Bush can help broker an agreement even in principle between the two countries, it will drastically influence the decisions the next US administration will have to make in the Middle East. The upcoming Mediterranean Union Partnership conference held in Paris under the auspices of the French government offers President Assad a momentous opportunity to achieve an historic breakthrough. He must seize it.

A bold move by Syria will also have an incredibly wide appeal throughout Israel. For one thing, most Israelis remain skeptical about Syria’s ultimate intentions. They are looking for a credible gesture that only a bold move such as an official meeting between Olmert and Assad could validate. Many Israelis still feel nostalgic about the visit of the late President of Egypt Anwar Al-Sadat to Israel in 1977 and the profound impact it has had on the Israelis’ public opinion regarding the exchange of territory for peace. Moreover, Olmert is politically beleaguered and he may not survive but a few more months in office. What such a gesture can accomplish will transcend Olmert’s tenure in office as it will shift the Israeli public opinion which currently favors keeping the Golan Heights as a measure of safety. Regardless of who may succeed Olmert–including the Likud’s party leader Netanyahu who opposes the return of land–the public will be on the side of peace-making, even in exchange for the Golan Heights, and will demand the continuation of the peace process.

Surely President Assad has his own people he must consider first. There are no indications that the Syrian public will frown over such a gesture, knowing full well that their president is committed to regaining the Golan without the use of force but with tough diplomacy and negotiations. For the past two years President Assad has repeatedly called for peace negotiations with Israel and prepared the public for such eventuality. Many Syrians received with satisfaction the news about the Israeli-Syrian peace talks and understand the critical value of normalizing relations with the United States. Assad stated clearly in an interview on Monday that “The most important thing in direct

negotiations is who sponsors them…Perhaps we could give some trump cards to the new [US] administration to get it more involved.” Even if in the end a peace agreement with Israel is not fully materialized during the Bush administration, President Assad’s gestures now will position Syria in the best possible light for continued negotiations with the next US president, which he has made a top priority.

Turkey’s facilitation of any gestures leading to an agreement would certainly consolidate its leadership position in the Middle East as an international peace maker. At a time when Turkey is vying heavily for EU membership, every contribution to stability and peaceful developments between its neighbors will enhance its prospects favorably.

Both President Bush and Prime Minister Olmert are politically weak, and although they are not likely to make reckless moves to cover for their weaknesses, they are certainly more inclined to be accommodating if the prospect of real peace avails itself. What Damascus needs to understand is that for President Bush and Prime Minister Olmert, time is of the essence. Assad must therefore act with deliberation and do every thing in his power to seize a unique opportunity consistent with his bold move to make the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations public.

Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center fo Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies, alon@alonben-meir.com, www.alonben-meir.com.

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BURMA/MYANMAR: “FACING UP TO OUR RESPONSIBILITIES”

BURMA/MYANMAR: “FACING UP TO OUR RESPONSIBILITIES”

Gareth Evans*

First published in The Guardian, May 12, 2008, and carried by the International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5430&l=1.

If the intransigence of the Burmese generals continues, it is a very real issue whether in the name of humanity some international action should be taken against their will – like military air drops, or supplies being landed from ships offshore – to get aid to the huge numbers who desperately need it right now, in the inaccessible coastal area in particular.

French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner opened up a hornet’s nest when he argued last Thursday, as others are now doing, that this is a proper case for coercive intervention under the “responsibility to protect” principle unanimously endorsed by 150 heads of state and government at the 2005 UN World Summit. His proposal that the Security Council pass a resolution which “authorizes the delivery and imposes this on the Burmese government” met with immediate rejection not only from China and Russia, who are always sensitive about external intervention into internal affairs, but from many other quarters as well.

It generated concern from the UK and others, including senior UN officials, that such an “incendiary” approach would be wholly counterproductive in winning any still-possible cooperation from the generals. It also provoked the argument from humanitarian relief agencies – who know what they are talking about – that simply as a practical matter any effort to drop supplies without an effective supporting relief on the ground would be hopelessly inefficient, and maybe even dangerous with the prospect of misuse of medical supplies.

These are strong arguments, and they weigh heavily in the policy balance. But as the days go by, with relief efforts impossibly hindered, only a trickle of the government’s own aid getting through, and the prospect of an enormously greater death toll looming acutely within just a few more days, they are sounding less compelling, and at least need revisiting.

My own initial concern, and it remains a serious one, with Bernard Kouchner’s invocation of the “responsibility to protect” was that, while wholly understandable as a political rallying cry – and God knows the world needs them in these situations – it had the potential to dramatically undercut international support for another great cause, to which he among others is also passionately committed, that of ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all.

The point about “the responsibility to protect” as it was originally conceived, and eventually embraced at the World Summit – as I well know, as one of the original architects of the doctrine, having co-chaired the international commission that gave it birth – is that it is not about human security generally, or protecting people from the impact of natural disasters, or the ravages of HIV-AIDS or anything of that kind.

Rather, “R2P” is about protecting vulnerable populations from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” in ways that we have all too miserably often failed to do in the past, That is the language of the 2005 UN General Assembly resolution, and Security Council resolutions that have followed it, and it is only in that context that the question should even arise of coercively intervening in a country against the express will of its government. And even then, the responsibility to protect norm allows the use of military force only with Security Council endorsement, and only as a last resort, after prevention has failed, when it is clear that no less extreme form of reaction could possibly halt or avert the harm in question, that the response is proportional to that harm, and that on balance more good than damage will be done by the intervention.

If it comes to be thought that “R2P”, and in particular the sharp military end of the doctrine, is capable of being invoked in anything other than a context of mass atrocity crimes, then such consensus as there is in favour of the new norm will simply evaporate in the global South. And that means that when the next case of genocide or ethnic cleansing comes along we will be back to the same old depressing arguments about the primacy of sovereignty that led us into the horrors of inaction in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s.

But here’s the rub. If what the generals are now doing, in effectively denying relief to hundreds of thousands of people at real and immediate risk of death, can itself be characterised as a crime against humanity, then the responsibility to protect principle does indeed cut in. The Canadian-sponsored commission report that initiated the R2P concept in fact anticipated just this situation, in identifying one possible case for the application of military force as “overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened”.

The UN resolution does not pick up this specific language, but it does refer to “crimes against humanity”, and the definition of such crimes (in the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, as well as in customary international law) embraces, along with widespread or systematic murder, torture, persecution and the like, “Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health”.

There is, as always, lots for the lawyers to argue about in all of this, not least on the question of intent. And there will be lots for the Security Council to quarrel about as to whether air drops and the like are justified, legally, morally and practically. But when a government default is as grave as the course on which the Burmese generals now seem to be set, there is at least a prima facie case to answer for their intransigence being a crime against humanity – of a kind which would attract the responsibility to protect principle. And that bears thinking about, fast, both by the Security Council, and the generals.

*Gareth Evans is President, International Crisis Group; Co-Chair, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; Member, UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Genocide.

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NOT JUST ANOTHER INTERFAITH PARLEY

NOT JUST ANOTHER INTERFAITH PARLEY

Rabbi David Rosen*

This article is part of a series on Jewish-Muslim relations written for the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at: http://www.commongroundnews.org. Copyright permission is granted for publication byCGNews.

Last week, an amazingly colourful array of Arab princes and Muslim clerics came together with representatives of the world’s major faiths in the Spanish Royal El Prado Palace in Madrid. While the Western media generally failed to appreciate the magnitude of the event, the Arab media understood how important it really was. Not only was this the first international multi-faith conference ever initiated by an Arab Muslim leader, it was inaugurated by the king of the Muslim world’s heartland, Saudi Arabia, where the most conservative Muslim outlook prevails.

At the opening event, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud emphasised his conviction that authentic religion is expressed in a spirit of moderation and tolerance, that concord must be elevated above conflict. In order to address the global challenges of our time, he called for cooperation and collaboration between the different religions.

This green light for interfaith dialogue and collaboration opened the gates for the curious but cautious. As a member of the Jewish delegation ˆ composed of some 15 rabbis and scholars ˆ we seemed most affected by his “permission.”

The Arab media interviewed us incessantly, and prominent Arab figures approached us, many of whom had never before met a Jew – let alone a rabbi. The encounter ignited a humanising flame that began to burn away the demonised image of the other. For this alone it was worthwhile.

As is often the case at conferences, conversations outside the formal proceedings offered far greater opportunity for meaningful exchange˜especially at meal times. (I should point out that the Muslim organisers had specially ordered kosher food for the Jewish participants, a testament to the consideration and respect shown by our hosts).

At one meal, our Saudi interlocutors were at pains to emphasise the 85-year-old king’s courage. King Abdullah’s desire, said one of them, was not only for Saudi Arabia to play a more engaged role in the world and with the world’s religions, but also to open Saudi Arabia itself to the world.

The World Muslim League (WML), which reflects a very conservative religious ideology, was given responsibility for organising the conference so that the initiative had significant religious “cover.” At the same time, it was patently clear that for the WML, these were uncharted waters. The preparations, list of invitees, invitations, the programme itself˜all betrayed a lack of familiarity with the interfaith territory, and with specific religious communities in particular. But that too highlighted the remarkable novelty, and thus significance, of King Abdullah’s decision to sponsor this event.

While I had been invited not as an Israeli, but as a Jewish leader in the inter-religious field, the fact that I am an Israeli citizen had been excitedly reported in the media. In the highly choreographed proceedings, there was a moment of some passion and heat. It came in the wake of an almost inevitable mantra expressed by a panellist in the penultimate session: while dialogue with Jews was permissible (and perhaps even desirable), he said, dialogue with Israel was not. The panellist called on me to respond to his comment.

I replied that an authentic dialogue is not one in which one side defines the character of the other, but rather it seeks genuinely to understand others as they see themselves. Judaism has always been inextricably connected to the land of Israel. While this must not be used to justify actions or policies that conflict with Judaism’s ethical foundation, to deny or try to separate this bond is to fail to acknowledge, let alone respect, the way most Jews define themselves. Moreover, because of the centrality of the land of Israel to Jewish life, without Israeli religious representation, no claim to full and genuine dialogue can ever be credible.

While a few reacted negatively, alleging that the irenic discussion had now been politicised, there were also constructive Muslim responses emphasising that by extension of this principle, Jews need to appreciate what Jerusalem means for Muslims, as well as Muslim solidarity with their Palestinian brothers and sisters.

Perhaps most notable of all was the respectful spirit in which the discussion took place. Many noted that it had actually served as something of a release. The absence of any mention of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had created the feeling that there was an elephant in the room. The opportunity to refer to it in the context of respectful debate actually helped clear the air.

While the concluding statement was an anticipated pious declaration of all things good, it does reflect the expressed Saudi intention to continue this newly embarked upon process. This should not be underestimated: the highest authority in the very heartland of Islam has taken a lead in interfaith outreach with the declared intention of addressing contemporary challenges and resolving conflict. I believe we will look back on the gathering convened on 16 July 2008 in Madrid as a very significant development, both for the Middle East and for the world at large.

*Rabbi David Rosen is international director of inter-religious affairs for the American Jewish Committee and interfaith advisor to the Chief Rabbinate of Israel.

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WATER WRESTLING

Moki Kokoris*”

As members of the American Polar Society, none of us is indifferent to the matters currently unfolding in both the Arctic and Antarctic, and although we may be disappointed by the events themselves, we cannot deny the fact that the polar regions and their wealth are now moving ever further into the political arena. The potential for exploitation is very real.

What could very well turn into a cold war-like conflict began rather quietly, when on August 2, 2007, a manned miniature submarine named “Mir 1″ planted a titanium capsule containing the Russian flag into the seabed at the North Pole. Organized by Artur Chilingarov, deputy speaker of the parliament’s lower house, this was a symbolic act representing Russia’s controversial claim of the vast resources believed to be stored beneath it.

For the Russians and other countries surrounding the North Pole, global warming may yet prove to be a financial blessing. Studies claim that up to a quarter of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas resources lie buried beneath the rapidly thawing ice, as well as uranium, titanium and gold. United Nations experts estimate the shelf reserves at 140-180 billion metric tons of hydrocarbons. In other words, there is a lot at stake, especially now that the peak of an energy crisis, perhaps the most serious in history, is approaching.

Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, countries have the right to economically exploit zones in the Arctic within 200 miles of their own respective shores. All countries have ratified this treaty – with the exception of the United States, which is now preparing to do so, with Senate approval pending.

Understandably, adding the land mass and the waters above demarcated continental shelves would markedly increase the exploitable area of resource prospects, from oil to fishing, and also give nations rights for military control over the defined regions. Such actions clearly threaten to transform the oceans into another arena for conflict and instability.

According to the Houston World Oil Conference data, approximately 70% of the polar region’s undiscovered gas deposits are in the Russian Arctic zone. Russia will have to defend its rights to a considerable part of this territory, which is why it undertook its initial Arctic campaign without waiting for the UN commission’s verdict on the limits of the continental shelf. After completing the research mission, Russia argued that the underwater Lomonosov and Mendeleyev Ridges lie on a continental shelf connected to Russia’s land mass. Moscow plans to file an application to claim the shelf with the United Nations next year.

It should therefore be no surprise that the Russian claim of the North Pole and the entire region extending to it has alarmed the Pole’s neighboring states.

Finland’s Defense Minister stated that there were three threats to his country’s security: “Russia, Russia and Russia.”

Unfortunately, those concerns aren’t baseless. Russia has greatly expanded its naval and aerial military activities near the Norwegian border as well. Over the past five months Norway’s air force had to launch fighter jets on 18 occasions to identify Russian long-range bombers that flew dangerously close to Norwegian airspace.

However, Russia and Norway aren’t the only players demanding ownership of the Arctic assets. Denmark, Canada and the United States have also entered the race, each of them sending their own research missions into the ice to prove their claims righteous.

Denmark joined hands with Sweden to send the Swedish Arctic-class icebreaker Oden to the area north of Greenland on an expedition named LOMROG (Lomonosov Ridge off Greenland), aiming to prove that the Lomonosov Ridge belongs to Greenland.

Canada has vowed to update its icebreaker fleet and add two new military installations in the Arctic to assert its sovereignty over the region, inferring that it has full rights over the portions of the Northwest Passage linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans that pass through its territory, and that it can bar transit there despite the fact that the United States believes the passage must remain free to all ships.

Harper’s Magazine reported in August that the U.S. had been secretly measuring the Arctic seabed since 2003, intending to apply for an expansion of its Alaskan continental shelf to include the seabed’s oil and gas reserves once the Senate ratifies the sea law convention.

The U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Healy led Germany’s Polarstern and French Tara schooner to the northern latitudes for scientific studies as well.

Denmark called on all competing countries to join a meeting next year to find “a common civilized manner in which to behave”, but observers view the current muscle-flexing in the Arctic as a harbinger of future struggles over its resources in an era of increased globalization.

However, the British surprised everyone. Unable to lay claim to any region in the Arctic, the United Kingdom decided to assert its sovereignty over its segment of Antarctica in spite of the fact that the entire continent has been under international jurisdiction for more than four decades. On October 17, The Guardian wrote that Britain “is planning to claim sovereign rights over a vast area of the remote seabed off Antarctica, more than 386,000 sq miles of it” in “a quickening of the race for territory around the South Pole in the world’s least explored continent.” There are vast oil, gas and other mineral resources there, although their extraction “is not yet technically feasible.”

Argentina immediately responded by reclaiming its part of the southern continent to uphold its “sovereign rights” to the oceanic areas around several islands, including the Falklands.

Expectations are that Chile, Australia, New Zealand and other countries that believe they, too, have entitlement to the potentially valuable Antarctic territory will speak up soon.

So far, these players have been acting within the framework of international law, but some of them now seem ready to rewrite it. The 1959 Antarctic treaty, to which they are signatory, froze all territorial claims, and the 1991 protocol to it prohibited the production of mineral resources in the region.

The immediate task is for all countries involved in these conflicts to prepare for the next meeting of the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, but ultimately, it was Russia that threw the first stone that provoked the avalanche of claims, debates and accusations. The planting of its flag under the North Pole brought with it a new importance and urgency to the debate over the treaty. It is, however, quite possible that Chilingarov’s expedition may prove to have been a disservice to Russia because it encouraged powerful rivals to lay their own claims to the Arctic and beyond.

With so much money and mineral wealth at stake, there is sadly little hope that today’s world leaders will show much restraint. Nevertheless, they should at least have the grace to blush a little as they begin to divide up the spoils of climate change.

*Moki Kokoris Director of 90 North, moki@cloud9.net; Cocoordinator of the UNGO Climate Caucus Indigenous Working Group, http://www.climatecaucus.net/chapteronindigenous.htm; UN/DPI; representative for the World Federation of Ukrainian Women’s Organizations; 14th woman to reach the North Pole – first Ukrainian. Founder of “90-north”, an environmental educational program, the objective of which is to teach young students about the polar biospheres and how climate change affects them – with a specific focus on the indigenous peoples of the Arctic. Contributing Arctic Editor to “The Polar Times”, the journal of the American Polar Society. Partial affiliations list: American Himalayan Foundation, Children of Chornobyl Relief Fund, North American Association for Environmental Education, Will Steger Institute for Climate Change Education, Polar Bears International, Byrd Polar Research Center.

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DEVELOPING A LEGITIMATE CARBON TRADING PROGRAM

DEVELOPING A LEGITIMATE CARBON TRADING PROGRAM

TO APPROPRIATELY ABATE GLOBAL WARMING

Stephen M. Sachs, IUPUI, “Developing a Legitimate Carbon Trading Program To Appropriately Abate Global Warming”

Carbon Trading, as an approach to global warming, is a controversial issue. It involves setting permissible levels of carbon emissions and requiring those who wish to emit carbon to have permits to do so, which can be traded – or sold – so that an entity wishing to emit carbon into the atmosphere can purchase permits to do so from other carbon emitters, or obtain them, as offsets, in return for acting to take carbon dioxide out of the air, such as by planting trees or other plants that transform CO₂ into oxygen and carbon, or protecting existing forests or other carbon reducing plants, or by supporting other means for taking carbon out of the air.

In my view, there are two aspects to of Carbon Trading and offsetting that need to be considered in making policy about them. Supporters argue that this can be an effective method for reducing carbon pollution. By providing incentives for compliance, which in cases of offsetting, may have additional positive benefits, such as protecting rain forests (including providing incentives for protecting them – which in some cases may be necessary for insuring their preservation). Objectors point out, that carbon trading and offsetting do not directly reduce carbon emissions, as they allow those who purchase carbon credits to continue their pollution. Moreover, they correctly point out that some of the organizations, such as the World Bank, who run and favor such programs, have very bad records of promoting the increase of carbon pollution, and have fostered development in forests which both reduces their carbon absorbing capacity and often is destructive of the rights and lives of Indigenous people.¹

Both views need to be taken into account in deciding what to do about carbon trading and offsetting. As Osborne and Gaebler have pointed out,² there are limits to how much regulation can be achieved by simply ordering compliance. Providing incentives, such as in pollution credit trading, can increase compliance, while reducing the costs of regulation, as has been illustrated with controlling pollution a in a number of cases, particularly in limiting acid rain causing pollution in U.S. power plants in the 1970s.³ Moreover, offsetting can produce desirable results, in itself, such as preserving rainforests and encouraging development of appropriate carbon absorbing technologies. Similarly, carbon trading can result in reduction of C0₂ in the atmosphere if it operates so that for you to continue operating you carbon polluting power plant at its current level, you have to pay me to close my coal powered plant, and replace it with a wind farm. The key is to operate such programs, legitimately and appropriately, by people who are trustworthy (and many would not consider the World Bank to be so), so that carbon pollution is actually sufficiently reduced, with the achievement of other desired benefits at a sufficient level, while keeping negative side effects (any action has at least some negative and some positive effects) within acceptable parameters, an indeed, enhancing, rather than destroying the rights and well being if Indigenous peoples.

An appropriate carbon trading and offsetting program, as part of a broader carbon emissions reduction policy, would require a number of elements, including the following: 1) The regulating/administering body or bodies must function to assure they are trustworthy, have adequate information – and ability to collect information – (both for determining regulation and enforcement/application of policy) to operate effectively, and to have the power (with a fair adjudication-appeals process) to enforce/carry out policy.

2) The levels of total carbon pollution permitted – and the amount of carbon pollution credits given each and any entity – would have to be appropriate. Since time will be required to make the carbon reduction without undo cost, the allowable levels will need to be reduced over time. In calculating the appropriate levels, it must be realized that the need for reduction is so high that appropriate reductions cannot be achieved without significant cost – and there must be a willingness to pay them, as investments, to avoid later catastrophic costs.

3) It must be insured that the trading – offsetting is real, and only continues in the program so long as the actual trade or offset actually functions in practice. For example, if a tribe and nation are paid to preserve or expand a forest, the offset remains in effect only so long as the forest continues to exist (or expand) at the transaction level. If that forest is reduced below that level (or fails to grow at the transaction rate), for whatever reason, the offset credit must simultaneously be reduced at the same rate (and similarly the measuring involved must be accurate, with no double counting – for example a new tree grown as an offset can only count once, and not used in another offset as well). This should create a pressure for leaving forests undeveloped, and help stop mining, lumbering, farming and other activities within them, which would reduce their carbon absorbing capacity.

4) There must be fairness in who receives the benefits of carbon trading and offsetting. For example, if a forest in a carbon trade is in the territory of an Indigenous people, they should receive the benefit of the offset, which if it were in monetary terms, would have a secondary benefit for the country their territory is in. If in the Indigenous people concerned’s view, the nation’s action is needed to assist in protecting or expanding the forest – or if some incentive is needed to insure the national (or sub-national) government’s appropriate action – a reasonable and small portion of the benefit received might go to the state.

5) As in any trading arrangement, nothing should be done without the consent of the parties involved. For example, if the trade or offset involves Indigenous territory, that Indigenous people must be a full partner in the negotiation. Moreover, where the forest concerned is in the land of an Indigenous people, the arrangements for management and control of the forest must rest with those people. If they need assistance, they can contract for it, if necessary using a portion of the payment they receive for the offset.

6) As in any other program – especially one involving the environment – since everything is connected (but each location is different), a carbon trading and offsetting program must be set up and operated on the basis of properly and carefully considering the full range of relations that are involved, and taking into account the full range of impacts of the functioning of the program, making appropriate adjustments for new developments and new information obtained, over time – especially as not all conditions and impacts can be foreseen). One set of those relationships involves the people concerned. Where Indigenous people are involved, the arrangements of such programs must enhance their rights and welfare, and not diminish them.

7) Carbon trading and offsetting can only be one part of a much larger greenhouse gas reduction effort. To begin with, there simply are not enough available offsets to meet the need. Much more has to be done, and rapidly accomplished, to meet the great need for lowering the levels of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere, while minimizing negative side effects. Public regulation, and public and private investment are needed in reducing emissions with existing technology (e.g. higher efficiency standards, substituting green technology for polluting technology, expanding efficient public transportation, and encouraging less energy using and polluting life styles and actions), and in developing and applying new appropriate technologies.

It is important to note that, in its three years of operation, the European Union carbon trading system has experienced major difficulties because it has not met all of these standards, resulting in a rise in the levels of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere, instead of a reduction.⁴ Reports indicate that this occurred because two many carbon trading permits were allocated (violating the second requirement for a valid system) at the beginning, and then further increased, as a result of national governments – who had the responsibility for issuing permits within their jurisdiction – succumbing to lobbying by industries (violating the first requirement). EU regulators are now attempting to overhaul the dysfunctional aspects of the market, reducing the number of permits and charging more for polluting. The EU is considering moving permit issuing from national governments to the EU, which it is hoped will be less susceptible to lobbying pressure from industry. Energy intensive industries are resisting the changes, as are some of the poorer EU nations who are concerned that reducing carbon emissions will undercut their economic development.

The EU carbon trading program is also under attack from environmentalists who object to EU – and other – atmospheric carbon emitters from using large numbers of permits from the UN offsetting program, which sends funds to developing countries, supposedly to reduce their airborne carbon output. Serious questions have been raised about the effectiveness of that program. Clearly, the UN offsetting system needs to be fixed, or shut down.

All perspectives in the debate over carbon trading and offsetting have important contributions to make in developing an appropriate trading-offset program that can play a positive role in a comprehensive climate change policy, if all the concerns and factors are properly taken into account, both at the beginning and as the policy unfolds. This includes wealthier nations and regions assisting poorer ones in fighting climate change and other environmental degradation. For Indigenous forest people, a proper carbon trading and offsetting program can increase their rights, assist in preventing imposed development in their territory, and enhance their welfare. It all depends how the program is established and operated, Clearly no trading and/or offsetting program should be allowed to operate that does not function properly, in terms of adequately reducing carbon emissions, avoiding creating other environmental degradation, fairly distributing costs and benefits, and respecting the rights and welfare of the people involved, including Native people.

FOOTNOTES

1. RED Declaration (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation) FYI, REDD means (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation), “Protecting the World’s Forests Needs More Than Just Money,” Indigenous Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 1, Spring 2008). See also the statements of Indigenous and Environmental groups on the proposed World Bank Carbon program in the same issue of IPJ in “Ongoing Activities: International Activities.”

2. David Osbourne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1992), Ch. 10.

3. For early examples see, Citizens Power, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1992, published by Citizens Action Coalition, 3951 N. Meridian St., Suite 300 Indianapolis, IN 46208, which contains several articles on this topic. Osborne and Gaebler Reinventing Government, pp. 299-395 touches on this issue in environmental regulation and discusses some other incentive based approaches to environmental regulation.

4. James Kanter, “The Trouble with Markets for Carbon,” The New York Times, June 20, 2008, pp. C1 and C5. From 2005 to 2006, factories engaged in carbon trading in the EU increased their carbon emissions by .04%, and from 2006 t0 2007 by .07%. In Brittan, the energy intensive iron and steel sector over the three years increased CO₂ pollution by more then 10%, while the cement industry raised carbon output by over 50%.

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MEDIATING THE NUCLEAR IMPASSE

MEDIATING THE NUCLEAR IMPASSE

Alon Ben-Meir,* July 17, 2008

Iran’s insistence on enriching uranium in defiance of three UN Security Council resolutions, combined with a bevy of antagonistic threats aimed at Israel’s existence has created an explosive recipe that may well precipitate a horrifying regional conflagration. For Iran’s own best interests, its contentious leaders would be well advised to tone down their anti-Israeli threats, which have not been taken lightly thus far, and find a diplomatic solution to Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program. The recent Israeli air force exercises and American naval maneuvers in the Persian Gulf, which were countered by Iran’s test-firing of a variety of missiles, have only heightened an already tense atmosphere.

It is now critical to look at who might be in a position to defuse the tension and restore some stability to a volatile region already battered by a devastating war in Iraq. At this point, Turkey has made itself well positioned geopolitically to play such a significant role. The fact that the Bush administration has shifted policy after nearly three decades and agreed to participate in the international talks with Iran’s nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili in Geneva may well open the door for future direct talks to be facilitated by the Turks.

Israeli concerns over Iran’s nuclear program are real and escalating rapidly, regardless of the fact that the US and the International Energy and Atomic Agency (IEAE) show different estimates of how close Iran is to obtaining the needed materials and technology. Israelis know well that while the United States and Europe are weary of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, they do not share Israel’s

sense of urgency about Iran’s nuclear potential. The Jews’ history in Europe does not offer Israel the luxury of taking matters of national survival lightly. Thus Israel tends to limit the scope of risks it can take with any one of its neighbors. Israel’s Defense Minister Ehud Barak noted recently that “Israel is the strongest country in the region and has proved in the past it is not afraid to take action when its vital security interests are at stake.” Indeed, when survival is at stake, an Israeli official told me during my recent visit to the region, the Israelis will not worry about public relations.

That being said, Israel wants to avoid escalation of the conflict with Iran fearing that such an extremely sensitive issue could result in a terrible miscalculation. Syrian President Bashar Assad also spoke on the issue last week stating that “The problem is that when one starts such action in the Middle East, one cannot manage the reactions that can spread out over years or even decades.” For this reason, Israel will continue to seek and push for a diplomatic solution and welcomes the American participation in the upcoming talks with Iran. However, should there not be a breakthrough in these and future talks, Israel will not wait until Iran reaches the point of no return-the point

in which Iran musters the technology to produce a nuclear weapon.

With the best of intentions Britain, France and Germany, representing the EU in the negotiations with Iran have thus far failed to persuade Iran to cease its enrichment of uranium. Swimming with oil money, Iran continues to defy three sets of UN sanctions almost with impunity while making considerable progress in its nuclear program. From the Iranian vantage point, the American preoccupation in Iraq and increasingly in Afghanistan substantially reduces the risks of an American attack on Iran. It is doubtful that under the present circumstances the next round of talks even with US participation will produce different results. Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei plainly stated on July 16th that “In relations to the negotiations–we have clearly defined red lines”–a reference to Iran’s insistence that it has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful

purposes.

Whether the next round of talks with Iran will help alleviate the tension between the US and Iran remains to be seen. What is needed at this critical time is a dramatic shift in the dynamic of the conflict, and this is where Turkey might be better suited to mediate Iran’s nuclear issue. In the five days of meetings I had in Ankara just recently, whenever the subject of Iran’s nuclear rogram was mentioned Turkish officials and academics expressed grave concerns about the growing danger of yet another avoidable and potentially devastatingwar in the Middle East. For the Turks, finding a diplomatic solution is not one of many options but the only sane option to prevent a horrific outcome.

Apart from Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s recent claims that “Maybe the mediator role regarding Iran’s nuclear issue will soon be given to Turkey” due to its recent diplomatic achievements between Israel and Syria, there are many reasons why Turkey may succeed in mediating a peaceful solution to the nuclear impasse. Other than being directly affected by regional events, Turkey generall enjoys good relations with all states in the region, it has not been tainted with the war in Iraq; it is a predominantly Muslim State, Middle Eastern as wellas European. Turkey shares the longest-standing border with Iran, and has mai tained good neighborly relations with Tehran for centuries with expanding trade relations. Moreover, Turkey and Iran share a similar sentiment and have collaborated recently on the Kurdish issue, and both have a shared interest in this regard for the emergence of a stable Iraq.

hereas Turkey, at this juncture, may not be able to mediate between Israel an Iran, Ankara certainly stands a much better chance to mediate between Washington and Tehran. Moreover, the Iranian government is mostly concerned with the Bush administration’s attitude toward regime change in Tehran. Iran is terrified of the prospect of an American attack on its nuclear facilities, but its leadership wants assurances from the US that Washington will no longer pursue regime change and will treat it with dignity and respect in dealing with the nuclear issue. Because of Turkey’s standing in the region and as a credible bridge to the West, Turkey might succeed where others have failed. Turkey is a close ally and a reliable friend of the United States; it is an important member of NATO, it has worked fervently to maintain the democratic nature of the state, and has received due praise for its recent diplomatic mediating efforts.

urkey can better understand the nature of Iran’s threats, specifically in connection with the United States who has made no secret of its efforts to support Ahmadinejad’s opponents. Arzu Celalifer, a Turkish expert on Iran from the ISRO Center for Middle Eastern Studies in Ankara suggested that “Turkey may also be in a better position than the EU representatives to bypass Ahmadinejad and reach out directly to Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei.” In addition, she said, “Turkey may offer a sort of plan B whereby Iran can be persuaded to enrich uranium on Turkish soil under strict IAEA monitoring.” Turkey, in short, can change the dynamics by offering a new venue for Americans and Iranians to meet and by generating a new momentum for serious dialogue. Finally, Turkey can provide Iran with a dignified disengagement plan, because if Iran is to make any concessions it will more likely make them to a fellow Muslim-majority state with which it has long and friendly relations.

The decision by the Bush administration to participate in the upcoming round of negotiations, however belated, is a wise one. It offers an opportunity to end the nuclear conflict with Iran. Turkey and the US should build on this development and prevent once and for all the prospect of another potentially

devastating war.

Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies: 212-600-4267, alon@alonben-meir.com, www.alonben-meir.com.

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ISRAEL’S PEACE OFFENSIVE

ISRAEL’S PEACE OFFENSIVE

Alon Ben-Meir*, June 20, 2008

Israel’s recent peace offensive may have been motivated in part by personal or domestic politics, but the driving force to negotiate is part and parcel of a much larger plan. As the dynamics in the Middle East shift in response to Iraq war backlash, and as Iran develops its nuclear programme, Israel has finally conceded that peace with Syria is the key to rapprochement with the rest of the Arab world, including the Palestinians. If comprehensive peace with Syria can be reached, Israel will be better poised to successfully negotiate with Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority, and will be better equipped to deal with Hezbollah and Hamas˜all which will become extremely important as Israel gears up to face Iran.

Israel has planed to engage Syria in peace talks for more than a year. I have been privy to some of the indirect talks between the two sides, and know first-hand that Israel would have commenced these talks much earlier had it not been for objections from the Bush administration.

Both countries fully understand the requirements for a peace agreement: The entire Golan Heights in exchange for comprehensive peace with normal relations. Without establishing these requirements in advance, it is doubtful that the two nations would have entered into any negotiations˜directly or indirectly.

Peace with Syria can also pave the way to an Israeli-Lebanese normalcy, specifically because Syria is imbedded in Lebanon’s social, economic, and political makeup, and continues to exert tremendous influence over Hezbollah. Moreover, Syria can wield significant influence on the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating front: More than any other Arab state, Syria provides sanctuary for Palestinian radical leaders and has influence over the political and financial support of Palestinian extremist groups. Syrian influence transcends the Arab-Israeli conflict because, as a predominantly Sunni state, it can shift the dynamic of the Shiite-Sunni conflict away from a dangerous escalation threatening to engulf the entire region.

Reports from Ankara about the Turkish peace mediation between Israel and Syria suggest that the two nations have made considerable progress, and that they will soon meet face-to-face. Seeing it in this light explains Israel’s various peace overtures towards Lebanon, as well as its willingness to negotiate a prisoners exchange with Hezbollah and accept a ceasefire agreement with Hamas.

The negotiations between Hezbollah and Israel ˆ in connection with the exchange of prisoners and Israel’s willingness to relinquish Shebaa Farms to the UN or to Lebanon ˆ were mutually pursued for different reasons. Hezbollah’s leaders fully understand that the closer the understanding between Israel and Syria, the less leverage Hezbollah will have in any future negotiations. Striking a deal with Israel now will allow them to take credit for recovering Lebanese territory, and hail their resistance of Israel as the key to their success. On the Israeli side, removing the reasons behind Hezbollah’s resistance will give Syria an even greater leverage over Hezbollah to bring about its disarmament in due course. Making a move at this time will, in particular, blunt any prospect of needing to deal with another hostile front should an attack on Iran becomes inevitable.

Accepting a ceasefire with Hamas has also its own calculus: Without peace with Syria, Israel would have most certainly opted for a major operation against Hamas’ forces in Gaza to put an end to the reign of terror. But since the negotiations with Syria are going well, a massive incursion into Gaza which would have claimed huge number of casualties on both sides has ˆ for the time being ˆ become unnecessary. Israel fully expects that Iran’s support of Hamas through Syria will eventually come to an end. This could alleviate much of Israel’s concern over the likelihood that Hamas will take advantage of the ceasefire to rearm, regroup, and be better prepared for the next round.

Meanwhile, a period of calm will allow peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to advance more rapidly, thereby strengthening the Palestinian moderate forces led by Mahmoud Abbas. This will also give Israel an opportunity to reduce some of its stringent security measures, remove many road blocks, release more Palestinian prisoners, and allow more Palestinian workers to seek employment in Israel. While this will certainly not solve the complex dispute between Israelis and Palestinians, it will show a concrete effort on Israel’s behalf to make concessions in the name of peace. Israel will then be in a better position to assist Mr. Abbas, directly and indirectly, in building his security forces without being accused of pitting one Palestinian faction against another.

As was demonstrated by Israel’s major air exercise earlier this month, Iran’s overt threats on Israel’s existence are being taken at face value. And should Iran’s uranium enrichment programme get to a point of immanent danger, Israel will need all the alliances it can get. Thus, in any peacemaking efforts in the region, Syria has proven to be the most strategic key in preventing all out war. Historically, Syria has demonstrated that once it commits itself to any agreement or understanding it usually fulfils its obligations. Should the current peace negotiations succeed, the Middle East geopolitical dynamic will experience an historical transformation, while preventing a major conflagration between Israel and Iran. Both Syria and Israel fully grasp the huge potential gain or loss should they succeed or fail.

*Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU, and is the Middle East project director at the World Policy Institute,

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CIVIL WAR IN GAZA ISN’T IN ISRAEL’S INTEREST

CIVIL WAR IN GAZA ISN’T IN ISRAEL’S INTEREST

Daniel Levy*t

Source: Prospects for Peace (www.prospectsforpeace.com), August 8. 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for publication

When a bomb exploded in the Shaja’iyyah district of Gaza last month, killing four Hamas operatives and a 5-year-old girl, Hamas blamed Fatah, and moved violently against its remaining Gazan enclaves. Fatah forces then pursued retribution against Hamas in the West Bank. Another round of intra-Palestinian conflict and bloodletting ensued, with the leading pro-Fatah family in Gaza, the Hilles clan, fleeing to Israel in the hopes of making it to the West Bank.

Think that Palestinians nearing civil war and the ongoing collapse of a central Palestinian governing entity serves Israel’s security interests? Think again. Those who are taking comfort in the televised images of Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence, or in the “propaganda coup” of Human Rights Watch condemning both the Hamas government in Gaza and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (P.A.), are dangerously misguided. These events neither exonerate Israel for its own violations of human rights and international law in the territories, nor improve Israel’s own strategic environment.

Nearly 50 days ago, a cease-fire took hold in Gaza between Israel and Hamas. Under the terms of the deal, which was mediated by Egypt, both Israel and Hamas would cease attacks against the other side’s territory, Hamas would prevent other Palestinian factions from firing rockets at Sderot and its environs, and Israel would gradually ease the closure that was devastating the economy and daily life of the Gazan population. The cease-fire is fragile, but largely effective—and the reality on both sides of the line is incomparably better, if far from normal. When Democratic presidential hopeful Barack Obama visited Sderot on July 23 and held an open-air press conference with the world’s media, he was flanked by an impressive display of rocket fragments. What went uncommented upon was that absent the cease-fire, such a press conference would have been unimaginable.

One by-product of the ongoing Fatah-Hamas violence is the endangering of that cease-fire. Any Palestinian faction seeking a distraction from its domestic misdeeds and courting its own public opinion is likely to turn, sooner or later, to targeting Israel. Renewed violence would not only return the residents of Sderot to their shelters, but would also undermine any prospect of a prisoner exchange deal for the release of Gilad Shalit. The events of recent weeks have clearly deepened Palestinian political divisions. Again, one is tempted to conclude that this might be a good thing for Israel—divide and rule, weaken the enemy. Again, one would be wrong. Or rather, let me nuance that: wrong if one considers a two-state solution and permanent, recognised and secure borders between Israel and its neighbours to be a vital Israeli interest

For supporters of a one-state solution or anyone keen on entrenching a regime of segregation and discrimination in the territories, this might indeed be a reason to celebrate. That is because a two-state solution, at least as things are currently configured in the negotiations, requires a Palestinian national movement that is sufficiently unified and legitimate in the eyes of its own public to be capable of agreeing and implementing a deal. Palestinian geographical and political splintering makes that more, not less, challenging. Israel providing shelter to Fatah fighters, as it did recently with the Hilles clan, and constantly referring to the P.A. leaders as partners does those Palestinians little credit in the eyes of their own public. A Palestinian leadership that is perceived by its own people to be a security sub-contractor for Israel is unlikely to be in a position to reach an historic deal replete with historic compromises. The last thing we need is another South Lebanese Army. Despite the warm words showered on Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and his security efforts in Jenin, Nablus and elsewhere, the sad reality is that Israeli policy is consistently undermining him.

But perhaps most worrying of all is that as Palestinians lose hope in the peace process, and look despairingly at both the Fatah and Hamas leaderships, there is a danger of extremist Al Qaeda-style alternatives emerging. Such activity may already be taking place today, as politics breaks down into clan structures and groups like the Army of Islam appear. Hamas is not Al Qaeda, but the alternative to it might be.

Most of the possible Arab mediators are reticent about expending political capital on Palestinian reconciliation. Saudi Arabia tried last year by brokering a Hamas-Fatah unity deal in Mecca. That has since collapsed, and the Saudis have withdrawn from the arena. Egypt, and now Jordan, maintain contacts with both Hamas and the P.A. Neither Egypt nor Jordan, however, is rushing to fill the mediation vacuum, as both inevitably accord primacy to domestic political considerations. Of course, Israel has contributed, and not insignificantly, to the hollowing-out of the Palestinian national movement — by failing to deliver an end to occupation assassinating leaders, embracing unilateralism and more. But at the end of the day this is primarily a Palestinian story, and ultimate responsibility for ending the violence and pursuing an internal dialogue is with the Palestinians themselves. In the meantime, though, Israel should be doing three things — if for no other reason, than out of self-interest.

First, take a hands-off approach to Palestinian domestic politics. Don’t veto internal dialogue. The more we break it, the more we own. Israel obviously has an interest in pragmatists carrying the day, but the reality is that Israelis and Palestinians are in a conflict. For a Palestinian leader, being Israel’s “favourite” is a decidedly mixed blessing — especially when favouritism translates into unsophisticated declarations (about “our partners”) and indifference to actual Palestinian needs (like lifting the closure or freezing settlements)

Second, create practical working arrangements where possible—with whoever can deliver on their commitments, and with whoever is willing to cut a deal, even indirectly. That means maintaining and solidifying the cease-fire with Gaza and extending it to the West Bank, and closing the understanding with Hamas for Shalit’s release. It also means working with the P.A. government in the West Bank to improve daily conditions in real and meaningful ways.

Finally and crucially, ensure that Israel itself avoids descending into chaos and maintains its own democracy and government by a central authority. Israel is facing its own wild West Bank. Video footage, available for all to see on YouTube, offers a shocking window into unchecked settler violence against Palestinian civilians and property and close-range shootings by the military of unarmed demonstrators and onlookers. Supreme Court rulings are ignored as the separation barrier cuts deeper into the West Bank, while settlements and outposts expand without respite. Attending to this chronic erosion of the rule of law in Israeli society is long overdue—and it is one challenge Israel can meet unilaterally.

*Daniel Levy was an advisor in the Prime Minister’s Office, a member of the official Israeli negotiating team at the Oslo B and Taba talks, and the lead Israeli drafter of the Geneva Initiative.

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TOWARD ISRAELI-SYRIAN PEACE

TOWARD ISRAELI-SYRIAN PEACE

Alon Ben-Meir*, May 27, 2008

Recent reports indicating that Israel and Syria are indirectly engaged in Turkish brokered peace talks suggest a major (albeit overdue) development in the Mid-East peace-making process. Since the collapse of the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations in May 2000, I have consistently been advocating the need for Israeli-Syrian reconciliation specifically because there is not a single dispute in the region that is not affected in one form or another by this conflict. Should Israel and Syria successfully achieve a working peace agreement, the positions of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran would be substantially weakened. Any assuagement of these three actors, who regularly threaten Israel’s existence, should give the Israelis all the more reason to corroborate in any Syrian peace efforts.

Both Israel and Syria know the high risks and returns such a peace treaty can bring about. On top of the Syrian agenda is regaining the Golan Heights, as well as normalizing relations with the US (which peace with Israel could secure) and recognition of Damascus’ special interest in Lebanon. While the Bush administration has denounced Syria’s heavy hand in Lebanese affairs, this must be a loss taken for the greater good. Syria’s military, economic, and historical ties with Lebanon are far too intertwined at this point to be realistically separated for the sake of wider regional peace. Against these gains Damascus must recognize its role in weakening logistical and political support to Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as limiting influence from Tehran.

Returning the Golan will no doubt be quite difficult for the Israelis, but what a peace agreement ensures is a potentially secure border with Syria and Lebanon. In dealing with Iranian and radical Palestinian threats, this will allow Israel a strategic leverage of paramount importance. By removing Syria from Iran’s grips, Israel could weaken Iran’s meddling and influence in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories and thereby erode the position of Israel’s most implacable threat, Iran. The goal in this situation is not only to make an Israeli-Syrian agreement, but to inherently shift the power structure away from an Iran-centric hegemony.

After years of direct and indirect involvement, I can attest that this turn of events has not come about without considerable posturing between Israel and Syria over the past 24 months. For years, Israel has insisted that it could handle only one track at a time-the Palestinians-but worsening security conditions and mounting difficulties in Palestinian negotiations has given a new priority to talks with Syria. Israel sought to commence tacit negotiations with Syria, but was rebuffed as a leak could be detrimental for relations with Syria’s Muslim allies. This is where Turkey’s good offices and relations with both Israel and Syria came to play. Syria sought public peace talks as long as each party knew where the other stood and there was a general understanding about both sides’ expectations from these peace negotiations.

In an October 2007 conversation with Syria’s Foreign Minister Walid Al Mualem, was told that once the peace talks with Israel become public, Damascus’ relations with its friends will be irreparably strained, which is why Syria wants to ensure a successful outcome. Syria, he said, has long since made peace with Israel a strategic option, and its friends in the region know that only too well. In retrospect, he was referring to Iran and Hezbollah’s growing influence over Syria, knowing that Israeli-Syrian peace talks would have to be worth the

risk of upsetting both of these powerful forces. For 12 years-from the time he was Syria’s ambassador to the US-Al Mualem has been adamant about his country’s desires and the conditions it requires for peace, which suggests that Damascus now is quite committed to the success of these peace talks.

As expected, there remain several difficult issues that could stymie an agreement such as final borders, security, water, and the nature of the relationship between the two nations. Syria will undoubtedly continue to insist on the final borders to be the June 4, 1967 ceasefire line which will give Damascus “a leg in the water,” that is, a commanding position over the eastern shores of the Sea of Galilee. Israel will still insist on pushing the Syrians eastward to the 1923 international border. Although the difference in land mass is not significant (less than seven square miles), for the Syrians returning back to the June 4 line represents a source of considerable national pride. It should be noted that the Israeli-Syrian negotiation in 2000 broke down over this border dispute. I suspect that the territorial discord will be resolved by Israel agreeing that while officially the border will be the June 4 ceasefire line, Syria will be forbidden from advancing beyond the 1923 international border. This will no doubt be an outcome of constructive ambiguity, though for the snake-like plot of land that at times is no more than 10-feet wide, any complete ownership will only be of symbolic importance.

With regard to national security, Israel will continue to demand that the Golan is demilitarized and only internal Syrian security personnel with light arms will be allowed-as was the condition for returning Sinai in the 1979 Egypt-Israeli peace treaty. There is a security issue that could complicate the negotiations, which relates to the nature of combat ready military units and installations Syria may station outside the Golan within striking distance from Israel. Israel will also insist that Syria stops the flow of weapons to Hezbollah and commits itself to help in disarming the organization. Other issues of great concern to Israel, including water supplies and normalization of relations, may prove to be easier to resolve because the Syrians appear to be determined not to allow these issues to prevent them from reaching an agreement. Ideally, both sides will be committed to finding solutions to mutually alleviate the security concern of each other, as this goes hand-in-hand with the risk of open negotiations. As was put to me by another Syrian official who asked to remain anonymous, “Once Israel concedes on the border dispute, we will surprise the Israelis with how flexible we can be on all other issues.”

One last complication that may drag the negotiations out is the number of phases it will take to complete the Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Ultimately, Damascus will want a binding and secure agreement to be reached under one Israeli government, to prevent any backtracking that could potentially occur under a new government. Moreover, the Syrians see the withdrawal from a logistical perspective and feel that Israel could pull out from the Golan within a few months. For the Israelis, the withdrawal of nearly 30,000 settlers and all that will entail to resettle them is somewhat of a national nightmare, not to speak of the intense opposition by the settlers’ movement. I believe that the two sides will eventually agree to a phased withdrawal over a period of about three years, which will progress at a rate dependent on regional security. In return, Israel will insist that Syria undertake measures to demonstrate its commitment to normal relations, such as promoting trade and academic delegates as well as officials to travel between states. As each phase progresses, until the very last settler is prepared to leave, both sides must show a commitment to peace between peoples and not just governments.

Unlike previous Israeli-Syrian peace talks, the chances of success in this round of negotiations are far greater than at any other time. Both Israel and Syria fully understand the gravity of the deteriorating security situation throughout the Middle East and how high the stakes are for both nations if radical forces are not contained. Israel also understands the inevitability of returning the Golan if it wishes to live in peace and security, and Syria is fully cognizant that its relations with Iran have inherent limitations. Syria’s future economic prosperity and ultimate security depends on peace with Israel and normal relations with the United States.

These are the factors on the ground that drive Israel and Syria towards peace. The American involvement in these negotiations will become critical sooner than later. Tragically, the Bush administration failed to see the need for an Israeli-Syrian peace and how far the ripple effect could have been on the entire region. Instead, it has made a bad situation worse by refusing to engage Syria and preventing Israel from pursuing the only logical course of action. It is incumbent upon the Presidential candidates to voice their unequivocal support of the Israeli-Syrian talks, and whoever is elected president should lend substantial support to bring these historic peace talks to a successful conclusion

*Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies: alon@alonben-meir.com, Web: www.alonben-meir.com.

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WHAT SYRIAN-ISRAELI TALKS MEAN

WHAT SYRIAN-ISRAELI TALKS MEAN

Hasan Abu Nimah*

Source: Jordan Times (http://www.jordantimes.com), May 28, 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for republication. mmm

There was a surprise announcement last week that Syrians and Israelis started indirect peace negotiations under Turkish patronage in Istanbul. That was confirmed in both countries’ capitals soon afterwards. Almost simultaneously, the Israeli daily Ha’aretz reported that the two sides had already reached understanding as a result of secret talks in Europe two years earlier, between September 2004 and July 2006, and that the two sides would sign an agreement of principles, and once they had fulfilled their commitments, a peace agreement would be signed.

The terms include Israeli commitment to withdraw from the Golan Heights to the lines of 4 June 1967, without agreement on a timetable for the withdrawal. Syria demanded five years while Israel demanded 15. Although Syrian sovereignty would be acknowledged on the evacuated land, the agreement includes the establishment of a public park on a “significant area of the Golan “for joint Syrian-Israeli use, but the Israeli presence there ‘will not be dependent on Syrian approval.’” The agreement, described as an unsigned ‘non-paper’ also speaks of a demilitarised zone on the Golan; a buffer zone in between the two sides on the basis of a ratio of 1:4 (in terms of territory) in Israel’s favour; and Israeli control over the use of the waters of the Jordan River and the Lake Kinneret. Ha’aretz published on May 21st a summary of the agreement in an article by Akiva Eldar, with a link to the full text.

If this is what Israel means by withdrawal from all the Golan Heights, then one should understand the leaks, towards the end of last month via the Turkish prime minister, in that light. The Syrian Arabic daily, Al Watan, revealed on April 23rd that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had informed the Syrian president that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was prepared to evacuate the entire Golan Heights in exchange for a peace agreement. Conditions on Syria, such as ending support for Hezbollah and Hamas, and scaling down relations with Iran had always been linked to such offers.

Knowing Israeli negotiating style, it was hard to take the offer at face value. Israel would never expose its negotiating cards in advance; they never did that before. Quite the opposite, the Israelis negotiate hardest on matters they would normally be willing to concede, in order to help their position with respect to more difficult issues. But if the recent Olmert offer was based on the so-called non-paper, and if the Istanbul talks are meant to proceed on that basis, the matter should be different, although it is hard to believe that Syria would consider such an arrangement as basis for a final settlement. Replacing the occupation with a shared public park, with no Syrian control on access, renders any claim of sovereignty worthless.

Olmert was criticised at home for the Syrian talks surprise. Some political leaders accused him of trying to divert attention from the criminal investigation of his controversial financial deals, which casts doubt on his ability as well as his authority to make such big decisions at such a crucial turn˜when the investigation might push him out of office. One may add to that the possibility that the Syrian opening could also be intended to serve as a cover for the apparent failure of the Palestinian track, despite much American promise and „mild‰ persuasion on Israel to make any kind of face-saving gesture.

Israel did not offer anything at all. Olmert, since Annapolis and before, was under severe pressure to not even talk about final status issues with anyone. Defiant settlement activity has also continued full-scale. It is likely, therefore, that opening a new track with the Syrians, with talks that could drag on endlessly and without much commitment on the part of the Israelis, may offer a convenient, though temporary distraction.

The response from Washington has already been lukewarm, with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice affirming that the Palestinian-Israeli is „the most mature track,‰ but without expressing explicit discouragement. The question is whether Washington is really prepared to allow Syria, through engagement with Israel in a renewed role in the stalled peace process, to place itself in a better position internationally. Probably the Syrians see the renewed talks ˆ even if they hold little or no promise ˆ as an exit for them as well.

The Doha agreement amongst the conflicting Lebanese factions was another development in Syria‚s favour, with its allies in Lebanon gaining good ground as a result. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, supposed to be on the opposing side, included in a statement at the brief ceremony announcing the agreement a specific but a noteworthy call for improving the „brotherly relations‰ with Syria. Both developments could lead to a substantial reduction of the diplomatic pressure on Syria, but one needs to know if that is acceptable to Washington at this stage. Some analysts, according to Reuters, doubt that any results would emerge from the current talks before President Bush has left office.

Although leaks about secret Syrian-Israeli talks have been circulating for few years, the truth is that official negotiations have been held on and off between the two sides since Madrid in 1991, but no progress was ever made. Renewed talks always had to start right from the beginning, as probably they will do this time. There is no doubt that serious talks between the two sides with the objective of reaching a settlement would be a major breakthrough. It is an important step that will contribute substantially to peace and stability in the region, and will have positive effect on the other tracks. But, and most unfortunately, the new enterprise is surrounded by dubious signs and uncertain circumstances. Maybe the time has finally come for a miracle, which will be very warmly welcome.

*Hasan Abu Nimah is Jordan’s former ambassador to the United Nations.

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