ARTICLES:
Gareth Evans. “Burma/Myanmar: ‘Facing Up to Our Responsibilities’”
Moki Kokoris, “Water Wrestling”
Stephen M. Sachs, “Developing a Legitimate Carbon Trading Program To Appropriately
Abate Global Warming”
Alon Ben-Meir, “Mediating the nuclear Impasse”
Alon Ben-Meir, “Israel’s Peace Offensive“
Daniel Levy, “Civil War in Gaza Isn’t in Israel’s Interest”
Alon Ben-Meir, “Toward Israeli-Syrian Peace”
Hasan Abu Nimah, “What Syrian-Israeli talks mean”
Thomas L. Friedman, “Little engery for peace”
Ron Kraybill, “Peace Does Not Trickle Down from the Top”
Mara Rudman , “Taking Steps Forward: Economic and Political Fronts”
Lawrence Pintak, Jeremy Ginges and Nicholas Felton, “Misreading the Messenger”
Rene Wadlow, “Banning Cluster Bombs: Light in the Darkness of Conflicts”
ARTICLES
BURMA/MYANMAR: “FACING UP TO OUR RESPONSIBILITIES”
Gareth Evans*
First published in The Guardian, May 12, 2008, and carried by the International Crisis Group, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5430&l=1.
If the intransigence of the Burmese generals continues, it is a very real issue whether in the name of humanity some international action should be taken against their will – like military air drops, or supplies being landed from ships offshore – to get aid to the huge numbers who desperately need it right now, in the inaccessible coastal area in particular.
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner opened up a hornet’s nest when he argued last Thursday, as others are now doing, that this is a proper case for coercive intervention under the “responsibility to protect” principle unanimously endorsed by 150 heads of state and government at the 2005 UN World Summit. His proposal that the Security Council pass a resolution which “authorizes the delivery and imposes this on the Burmese government” met with immediate rejection not only from China and Russia, who are always sensitive about external intervention into internal affairs, but from many other quarters as well.
It generated concern from the UK and others, including senior UN officials, that such an “incendiary” approach would be wholly counterproductive in winning any still-possible cooperation from the generals. It also provoked the argument from humanitarian relief agencies – who know what they are talking about – that simply as a practical matter any effort to drop supplies without an effective supporting relief on the ground would be hopelessly inefficient, and maybe even dangerous with the prospect of misuse of medical supplies.
These are strong arguments, and they weigh heavily in the policy balance. But as the days go by, with relief efforts impossibly hindered, only a trickle of the government’s own aid getting through, and the prospect of an enormously greater death toll looming acutely within just a few more days, they are sounding less compelling, and at least need revisiting.
My own initial concern, and it remains a serious one, with Bernard Kouchner’s invocation of the “responsibility to protect” was that, while wholly understandable as a political rallying cry – and God knows the world needs them in these situations – it had the potential to dramatically undercut international support for another great cause, to which he among others is also passionately committed, that of ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all.
The point about “the responsibility to protect” as it was originally conceived, and eventually embraced at the World Summit – as I well know, as one of the original architects of the doctrine, having co-chaired the international commission that gave it birth – is that it is not about human security generally, or protecting people from the impact of natural disasters, or the ravages of HIV-AIDS or anything of that kind.
Rather, “R2P” is about protecting vulnerable populations from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” in ways that we have all too miserably often failed to do in the past, That is the language of the 2005 UN General Assembly resolution, and Security Council resolutions that have followed it, and it is only in that context that the question should even arise of coercively intervening in a country against the express will of its government. And even then, the responsibility to protect norm allows the use of military force only with Security Council endorsement, and only as a last resort, after prevention has failed, when it is clear that no less extreme form of reaction could possibly halt or avert the harm in question, that the response is proportional to that harm, and that on balance more good than damage will be done by the intervention.
If it comes to be thought that “R2P”, and in particular the sharp military end of the doctrine, is capable of being invoked in anything other than a context of mass atrocity crimes, then such consensus as there is in favour of the new norm will simply evaporate in the global South. And that means that when the next case of genocide or ethnic cleansing comes along we will be back to the same old depressing arguments about the primacy of sovereignty that led us into the horrors of inaction in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s.
But here’s the rub. If what the generals are now doing, in effectively denying relief to hundreds of thousands of people at real and immediate risk of death, can itself be characterised as a crime against humanity, then the responsibility to protect principle does indeed cut in. The Canadian-sponsored commission report that initiated the R2P concept in fact anticipated just this situation, in identifying one possible case for the application of military force as “overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened”.
The UN resolution does not pick up this specific language, but it does refer to “crimes against humanity”, and the definition of such crimes (in the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, as well as in customary international law) embraces, along with widespread or systematic murder, torture, persecution and the like, “Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health”.
There is, as always, lots for the lawyers to argue about in all of this, not least on the question of intent. And there will be lots for the Security Council to quarrel about as to whether air drops and the like are justified, legally, morally and practically. But when a government default is as grave as the course on which the Burmese generals now seem to be set, there is at least a prima facie case to answer for their intransigence being a crime against humanity – of a kind which would attract the responsibility to protect principle. And that bears thinking about, fast, both by the Security Council, and the generals.
*Gareth Evans is President, International Crisis Group; Co-Chair, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; Member, UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Genocide.
VVVVV
WATER WRESTLING
Moki Kokoris*”
As members of the American Polar Society, none of us is indifferent to the matters currently unfolding in both the Arctic and Antarctic, and although we may be disappointed by the events themselves, we cannot deny the fact that the polar regions and their wealth are now moving ever further into the political arena. The potential for exploitation is very real.
What could very well turn into a cold war-like conflict began rather quietly, when on August 2, 2007, a manned miniature submarine named “Mir 1″ planted a titanium capsule containing the Russian flag into the seabed at the North Pole. Organized by Artur Chilingarov, deputy speaker of the parliament’s lower house, this was a symbolic act representing Russia’s controversial claim of the vast resources believed to be stored beneath it.
For the Russians and other countries surrounding the North Pole, global warming may yet prove to be a financial blessing. Studies claim that up to a quarter of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas resources lie buried beneath the rapidly thawing ice, as well as uranium, titanium and gold. United Nations experts estimate the shelf reserves at 140-180 billion metric tons of hydrocarbons. In other words, there is a lot at stake, especially now that the peak of an energy crisis, perhaps the most serious in history, is approaching.
Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, countries have the right to economically exploit zones in the Arctic within 200 miles of their own respective shores. All countries have ratified this treaty – with the exception of the United States, which is now preparing to do so, with Senate approval pending.
Understandably, adding the land mass and the waters above demarcated continental shelves would markedly increase the exploitable area of resource prospects, from oil to fishing, and also give nations rights for military control over the defined regions. Such actions clearly threaten to transform the oceans into another arena for conflict and instability.
According to the Houston World Oil Conference data, approximately 70% of the polar region’s undiscovered gas deposits are in the Russian Arctic zone. Russia will have to defend its rights to a considerable part of this territory, which is why it undertook its initial Arctic campaign without waiting for the UN commission’s verdict on the limits of the continental shelf. After completing the research mission, Russia argued that the underwater Lomonosov and Mendeleyev Ridges lie on a continental shelf connected to Russia’s land mass. Moscow plans to file an application to claim the shelf with the United Nations next year.
It should therefore be no surprise that the Russian claim of the North Pole and the entire region extending to it has alarmed the Pole’s neighboring states.
Finland’s Defense Minister stated that there were three threats to his country’s security: “Russia, Russia and Russia.”
Unfortunately, those concerns aren’t baseless. Russia has greatly expanded its naval and aerial military activities near the Norwegian border as well. Over the past five months Norway’s air force had to launch fighter jets on 18 occasions to identify Russian long-range bombers that flew dangerously close to Norwegian airspace.
However, Russia and Norway aren’t the only players demanding ownership of the Arctic assets. Denmark, Canada and the United States have also entered the race, each of them sending their own research missions into the ice to prove their claims righteous.
Denmark joined hands with Sweden to send the Swedish Arctic-class icebreaker Oden to the area north of Greenland on an expedition named LOMROG (Lomonosov Ridge off Greenland), aiming to prove that the Lomonosov Ridge belongs to Greenland.
Canada has vowed to update its icebreaker fleet and add two new military installations in the Arctic to assert its sovereignty over the region, inferring that it has full rights over the portions of the Northwest Passage linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans that pass through its territory, and that it can bar transit there despite the fact that the United States believes the passage must remain free to all ships.
Harper’s Magazine reported in August that the U.S. had been secretly measuring the Arctic seabed since 2003, intending to apply for an expansion of its Alaskan continental shelf to include the seabed’s oil and gas reserves once the Senate ratifies the sea law convention.
The U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Healy led Germany’s Polarstern and French Tara schooner to the northern latitudes for scientific studies as well.
Denmark called on all competing countries to join a meeting next year to find “a common civilized manner in which to behave”, but observers view the current muscle-flexing in the Arctic as a harbinger of future struggles over its resources in an era of increased globalization.
However, the British surprised everyone. Unable to lay claim to any region in the Arctic, the United Kingdom decided to assert its sovereignty over its segment of Antarctica in spite of the fact that the entire continent has been under international jurisdiction for more than four decades. On October 17, The Guardian wrote that Britain “is planning to claim sovereign rights over a vast area of the remote seabed off Antarctica, more than 386,000 sq miles of it” in “a quickening of the race for territory around the South Pole in the world’s least explored continent.” There are vast oil, gas and other mineral resources there, although their extraction “is not yet technically feasible.”
Argentina immediately responded by reclaiming its part of the southern continent to uphold its “sovereign rights” to the oceanic areas around several islands, including the Falklands.
Expectations are that Chile, Australia, New Zealand and other countries that believe they, too, have entitlement to the potentially valuable Antarctic territory will speak up soon.
So far, these players have been acting within the framework of international law, but some of them now seem ready to rewrite it. The 1959 Antarctic treaty, to which they are signatory, froze all territorial claims, and the 1991 protocol to it prohibited the production of mineral resources in the region.
The immediate task is for all countries involved in these conflicts to prepare for the next meeting of the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, but ultimately, it was Russia that threw the first stone that provoked the avalanche of claims, debates and accusations. The planting of its flag under the North Pole brought with it a new importance and urgency to the debate over the treaty. It is, however, quite possible that Chilingarov’s expedition may prove to have been a disservice to Russia because it encouraged powerful rivals to lay their own claims to the Arctic and beyond.
With so much money and mineral wealth at stake, there is sadly little hope that today’s world leaders will show much restraint. Nevertheless, they should at least have the grace to blush a little as they begin to divide up the spoils of climate change.
*Moki Kokoris Director of 90 North, moki@cloud9.net; Cocoordinator of the UNGO Climate Caucus Indigenous Working Group, http://www.climatecaucus.net/chapteronindigenous.htm; UN/DPI; representative for the World Federation of Ukrainian Women’s Organizations; 14th woman to reach the North Pole – first Ukrainian. Founder of “90-north”, an environmental educational program, the objective of which is to teach young students about the polar biospheres and how climate change affects them – with a specific focus on the indigenous peoples of the Arctic. Contributing Arctic Editor to “The Polar Times”, the journal of the American Polar Society. Partial affiliations list: American Himalayan Foundation, Children of Chornobyl Relief Fund, North American Association for Environmental Education, Will Steger Institute for Climate Change Education, Polar Bears International, Byrd Polar Research Center.
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DEVELOPING A LEGITIMATE CARBON TRADING PROGRAM
TO APPROPRIATELY ABATE GLOBAL WARMING
Stephen M. Sachs, IUPUI, “Developing a Legitimate Carbon Trading Program To Appropriately Abate Global Warming”
Carbon Trading, as an approach to global warming, is a controversial issue. It involves setting permissible levels of carbon emissions and requiring those who wish to emit carbon to have permits to do so, which can be traded – or sold – so that an entity wishing to emit carbon into the atmosphere can purchase permits to do so from other carbon emitters, or obtain them, as offsets, in return for acting to take carbon dioxide out of the air, such as by planting trees or other plants that transform CO2 into oxygen and carbon, or protecting existing forests or other carbon reducing plants, or by supporting other means for taking carbon out of the air.
In my view, there are two aspects to of Carbon Trading and offsetting that need to be considered in making policy about them. Supporters argue that this can be an effective method for reducing carbon pollution. By providing incentives for compliance, which in cases of offsetting, may have additional positive benefits, such as protecting rain forests (including providing incentives for protecting them – which in some cases may be necessary for insuring their preservation). Objectors point out, that carbon trading and offsetting do not directly reduce carbon emissions, as they allow those who purchase carbon credits to continue their pollution. Moreover, they correctly point out that some of the organizations, such as the World Bank, who run and favor such programs, have very bad records of promoting the increase of carbon pollution, and have fostered development in forests which both reduces their carbon absorbing capacity and often is destructive of the rights and lives of Indigenous people.1
Both views need to be taken into account in deciding what to do about carbon trading and offsetting. As Osborne and Gaebler have pointed out,2 there are limits to how much regulation can be achieved by simply ordering compliance. Providing incentives, such as in pollution credit trading, can increase compliance, while reducing the costs of regulation, as has been illustrated with controlling pollution a in a number of cases, particularly in limiting acid rain causing pollution in U.S. power plants in the 1970s.3 Moreover, offsetting can produce desirable results, in itself, such as preserving rainforests and encouraging development of appropriate carbon absorbing technologies. Similarly, carbon trading can result in reduction of C02 in the atmosphere if it operates so that for you to continue operating you carbon polluting power plant at its current level, you have to pay me to close my coal powered plant, and replace it with a wind farm. The key is to operate such programs, legitimately and appropriately, by people who are trustworthy (and many would not consider the World Bank to be so), so that carbon pollution is actually sufficiently reduced, with the achievement of other desired benefits at a sufficient level, while keeping negative side effects (any action has at least some negative and some positive effects) within acceptable parameters, an indeed, enhancing, rather than destroying the rights and well being if Indigenous peoples.
An appropriate carbon trading and offsetting program, as part of a broader carbon emissions reduction policy, would require a number of elements, including the following: 1) The regulating/administering body or bodies must function to assure they are trustworthy, have adequate information – and ability to collect information – (both for determining regulation and enforcement/application of policy) to operate effectively, and to have the power (with a fair adjudication-appeals process) to enforce/carry out policy.
2) The levels of total carbon pollution permitted – and the amount of carbon pollution credits given each and any entity – would have to be appropriate. Since time will be required to make the carbon reduction without undo cost, the allowable levels will need to be reduced over time. In calculating the appropriate levels, it must be realized that the need for reduction is so high that appropriate reductions cannot be achieved without significant cost – and there must be a willingness to pay them, as investments, to avoid later catastrophic costs.
3) It must be insured that the trading – offsetting is real, and only continues in the program so long as the actual trade or offset actually functions in practice. For example, if a tribe and nation are paid to preserve or expand a forest, the offset remains in effect only so long as the forest continues to exist (or expand) at the transaction level. If that forest is reduced below that level (or fails to grow at the transaction rate), for whatever reason, the offset credit must simultaneously be reduced at the same rate (and similarly the measuring involved must be accurate, with no double counting – for example a new tree grown as an offset can only count once, and not used in another offset as well). This should create a pressure for leaving forests undeveloped, and help stop mining, lumbering, farming and other activities within them, which would reduce their carbon absorbing capacity.
4) There must be fairness in who receives the benefits of carbon trading and offsetting. For example, if a forest in a carbon trade is in the territory of an Indigenous people, they should receive the benefit of the offset, which if it were in monetary terms, would have a secondary benefit for the country their territory is in. If in the Indigenous people concerned’s view, the nation’s action is needed to assist in protecting or expanding the forest – or if some incentive is needed to insure the national (or sub-national) government’s appropriate action – a reasonable and small portion of the benefit received might go to the state.
5) As in any trading arrangement, nothing should be done without the consent of the parties involved. For example, if the trade or offset involves Indigenous territory, that Indigenous people must be a full partner in the negotiation. Moreover, where the forest concerned is in the land of an Indigenous people, the arrangements for management and control of the forest must rest with those people. If they need assistance, they can contract for it, if necessary using a portion of the payment they receive for the offset.
6) As in any other program – especially one involving the environment – since everything is connected (but each location is different), a carbon trading and offsetting program must be set up and operated on the basis of properly and carefully considering the full range of relations that are involved, and taking into account the full range of impacts of the functioning of the program, making appropriate adjustments for new developments and new information obtained, over time – especially as not all conditions and impacts can be foreseen). One set of those relationships involves the people concerned. Where Indigenous people are involved, the arrangements of such programs must enhance their rights and welfare, and not diminish them.
7) Carbon trading and offsetting can only be one part of a much larger greenhouse gas reduction effort. To begin with, there simply are not enough available offsets to meet the need. Much more has to be done, and rapidly accomplished, to meet the great need for lowering the levels of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere, while minimizing negative side effects. Public regulation, and public and private investment are needed in reducing emissions with existing technology (e.g. higher efficiency standards, substituting green technology for polluting technology, expanding efficient public transportation, and encouraging less energy using and polluting life styles and actions), and in developing and applying new appropriate technologies.
It is important to note that, in its three years of operation, the European Union carbon trading system has experienced major difficulties because it has not met all of these standards, resulting in a rise in the levels of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere, instead of a reduction.4 Reports indicate that this occurred because two many carbon trading permits were allocated (violating the second requirement for a valid system) at the beginning, and then further increased, as a result of national governments – who had the responsibility for issuing permits within their jurisdiction – succumbing to lobbying by industries (violating the first requirement). EU regulators are now attempting to overhaul the dysfunctional aspects of the market, reducing the number of permits and charging more for polluting. The EU is considering moving permit issuing from national governments to the EU, which it is hoped will be less susceptible to lobbying pressure from industry. Energy intensive industries are resisting the changes, as are some of the poorer EU nations who are concerned that reducing carbon emissions will undercut their economic development.
The EU carbon trading program is also under attack from environmentalists who object to EU – and other – atmospheric carbon emitters from using large numbers of permits from the UN offsetting program, which sends funds to developing countries, supposedly to reduce their airborne carbon output. Serious questions have been raised about the effectiveness of that program. Clearly, the UN offsetting system needs to be fixed, or shut down.
All perspectives in the debate over carbon trading and offsetting have important contributions to make in developing an appropriate trading-offset program that can play a positive role in a comprehensive climate change policy, if all the concerns and factors are properly taken into account, both at the beginning and as the policy unfolds. This includes wealthier nations and regions assisting poorer ones in fighting climate change and other environmental degradation. For Indigenous forest people, a proper carbon trading and offsetting program can increase their rights, assist in preventing imposed development in their territory, and enhance their welfare. It all depends how the program is established and operated, Clearly no trading and/or offsetting program should be allowed to operate that does not function properly, in terms of adequately reducing carbon emissions, avoiding creating other environmental degradation, fairly distributing costs and benefits, and respecting the rights and welfare of the people involved, including Native people.
FOOTNOTES
1. RED Declaration (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation) FYI, REDD means (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation), “Protecting the World’s Forests Needs More Than Just Money,” Indigenous Policy, Vol. XIX, No. 1, Spring 2008). See also the statements of Indigenous and Environmental groups on the proposed World Bank Carbon program in the same issue of IPJ in “Ongoing Activities: International Activities.”
2. David Osbourne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1992), Ch. 10.
3. For early examples see, Citizens Power, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1992, published by Citizens Action Coalition, 3951 N. Meridian St., Suite 300 Indianapolis, IN 46208, which contains several articles on this topic. Osborne and Gaebler Reinventing Government, pp. 299-395 touches on this issue in environmental regulation and discusses some other incentive based approaches to environmental regulation.
4. James Kanter, “The Trouble with Markets for Carbon,” The New York Times, June 20, 2008, pp. C1 and C5. From 2005 to 2006, factories engaged in carbon trading in the EU increased their carbon emissions by .04%, and from 2006 t0 2007 by .07%. In Brittan, the energy intensive iron and steel sector over the three years increased CO2 pollution by more then 10%, while the cement industry raised carbon output by over 50%.
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MEDIATING THE NUCLEAR IMPASSE
Alon Ben-Meir,* July 17, 2008
Iran’s insistence on enriching uranium in defiance of three UN Security Council resolutions, combined with a bevy of antagonistic threats aimed at Israel’s existence has created an explosive recipe that may well precipitate a horrifying regional conflagration. For Iran’s own best interests, its contentious leaders would be well advised to tone down their anti-Israeli threats, which have not been taken lightly thus far, and find a diplomatic solution to Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program. The recent Israeli air force exercises and American naval maneuvers in the Persian Gulf, which were countered by Iran’s test-firing of a variety of missiles, have only heightened an already tense atmosphere.
It is now critical to look at who might be in a position to defuse the tension and restore some stability to a volatile region already battered by a devastating war in Iraq. At this point, Turkey has made itself well positioned geopolitically to play such a significant role. The fact that the Bush administration has shifted policy after nearly three decades and agreed to participate in the international talks with Iran’s nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili in Geneva may well open the door for future direct talks to be facilitated by the Turks.
Israeli concerns over Iran’s nuclear program are real and escalating rapidly, regardless of the fact that the US and the International Energy and Atomic Agency (IEAE) show different estimates of how close Iran is to obtaining the needed materials and technology. Israelis know well that while the United States and Europe are weary of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, they do not share Israel’s
sense of urgency about Iran’s nuclear potential. The Jews’ history in Europe does not offer Israel the luxury of taking matters of national survival lightly. Thus Israel tends to limit the scope of risks it can take with any one of its neighbors. Israel’s Defense Minister Ehud Barak noted recently that “Israel is the strongest country in the region and has proved in the past it is not afraid to take action when its vital security interests are at stake.” Indeed, when survival is at stake, an Israeli official told me during my recent visit to the region, the Israelis will not worry about public relations.
That being said, Israel wants to avoid escalation of the conflict with Iran fearing that such an extremely sensitive issue could result in a terrible miscalculation. Syrian President Bashar Assad also spoke on the issue last week stating that “The problem is that when one starts such action in the Middle East, one cannot manage the reactions that can spread out over years or even decades.” For this reason, Israel will continue to seek and push for a diplomatic solution and welcomes the American participation in the upcoming talks with Iran. However, should there not be a breakthrough in these and future talks, Israel will not wait until Iran reaches the point of no return-the point
in which Iran musters the technology to produce a nuclear weapon.
With the best of intentions Britain, France and Germany, representing the EU in the negotiations with Iran have thus far failed to persuade Iran to cease its enrichment of uranium. Swimming with oil money, Iran continues to defy three sets of UN sanctions almost with impunity while making considerable progress in its nuclear program. From the Iranian vantage point, the American preoccupation in Iraq and increasingly in Afghanistan substantially reduces the risks of an American attack on Iran. It is doubtful that under the present circumstances the next round of talks even with US participation will produce different results. Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei plainly stated on July 16th that “In relations to the negotiations–we have clearly defined red lines”–a reference to Iran’s insistence that it has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful
purposes.
Whether the next round of talks with Iran will help alleviate the tension between the US and Iran remains to be seen. What is needed at this critical time is a dramatic shift in the dynamic of the conflict, and this is where Turkey might be better suited to mediate Iran’s nuclear issue. In the five days of meetings I had in Ankara just recently, whenever the subject of Iran’s nuclear rogram was mentioned Turkish officials and academics expressed grave concerns about the growing danger of yet another avoidable and potentially devastatingwar in the Middle East. For the Turks, finding a diplomatic solution is not one of many options but the only sane option to prevent a horrific outcome.
Apart from Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s recent claims that “Maybe the mediator role regarding Iran’s nuclear issue will soon be given to Turkey” due to its recent diplomatic achievements between Israel and Syria, there are many reasons why Turkey may succeed in mediating a peaceful solution to the nuclear impasse. Other than being directly affected by regional events, Turkey generall enjoys good relations with all states in the region, it has not been tainted with the war in Iraq; it is a predominantly Muslim State, Middle Eastern as wellas European. Turkey shares the longest-standing border with Iran, and has mai tained good neighborly relations with Tehran for centuries with expanding trade relations. Moreover, Turkey and Iran share a similar sentiment and have collaborated recently on the Kurdish issue, and both have a shared interest in this regard for the emergence of a stable Iraq.
hereas Turkey, at this juncture, may not be able to mediate between Israel an Iran, Ankara certainly stands a much better chance to mediate between Washington and Tehran. Moreover, the Iranian government is mostly concerned with the Bush administration’s attitude toward regime change in Tehran. Iran is terrified of the prospect of an American attack on its nuclear facilities, but its leadership wants assurances from the US that Washington will no longer pursue regime change and will treat it with dignity and respect in dealing with the nuclear issue. Because of Turkey’s standing in the region and as a credible bridge to the West, Turkey might succeed where others have failed. Turkey is a close ally and a reliable friend of the United States; it is an important member of NATO, it has worked fervently to maintain the democratic nature of the state, and has received due praise for its recent diplomatic mediating efforts.
urkey can better understand the nature of Iran’s threats, specifically in connection with the United States who has made no secret of its efforts to support Ahmadinejad’s opponents. Arzu Celalifer, a Turkish expert on Iran from the ISRO Center for Middle Eastern Studies in Ankara suggested that “Turkey may also be in a better position than the EU representatives to bypass Ahmadinejad and reach out directly to Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei.” In addition, she said, “Turkey may offer a sort of plan B whereby Iran can be persuaded to enrich uranium on Turkish soil under strict IAEA monitoring.” Turkey, in short, can change the dynamics by offering a new venue for Americans and Iranians to meet and by generating a new momentum for serious dialogue. Finally, Turkey can provide Iran with a dignified disengagement plan, because if Iran is to make any concessions it will more likely make them to a fellow Muslim-majority state with which it has long and friendly relations.
The decision by the Bush administration to participate in the upcoming round of negotiations, however belated, is a wise one. It offers an opportunity to end the nuclear conflict with Iran. Turkey and the US should build on this development and prevent once and for all the prospect of another potentially
devastating war.
Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies: 212-600-4267, alon@alonben-meir.com, www.alonben-meir.com.
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ISRAEL’S PEACE OFFENSIVE
Alon Ben-Meir*, June 20, 2008
Israel’s recent peace offensive may have been motivated in part by personal or domestic politics, but the driving force to negotiate is part and parcel of a much larger plan. As the dynamics in the Middle East shift in response to Iraq war backlash, and as Iran develops its nuclear programme, Israel has finally conceded that peace with Syria is the key to rapprochement with the rest of the Arab world, including the Palestinians. If comprehensive peace with Syria can be reached, Israel will be better poised to successfully negotiate with Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority, and will be better equipped to deal with Hezbollah and Hamas˜all which will become extremely important as Israel gears up to face Iran.
Israel has planed to engage Syria in peace talks for more than a year. I have been privy to some of the indirect talks between the two sides, and know first-hand that Israel would have commenced these talks much earlier had it not been for objections from the Bush administration.
Both countries fully understand the requirements for a peace agreement: The entire Golan Heights in exchange for comprehensive peace with normal relations. Without establishing these requirements in advance, it is doubtful that the two nations would have entered into any negotiations˜directly or indirectly.
Peace with Syria can also pave the way to an Israeli-Lebanese normalcy, specifically because Syria is imbedded in Lebanon’s social, economic, and political makeup, and continues to exert tremendous influence over Hezbollah. Moreover, Syria can wield significant influence on the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating front: More than any other Arab state, Syria provides sanctuary for Palestinian radical leaders and has influence over the political and financial support of Palestinian extremist groups. Syrian influence transcends the Arab-Israeli conflict because, as a predominantly Sunni state, it can shift the dynamic of the Shiite-Sunni conflict away from a dangerous escalation threatening to engulf the entire region.
Reports from Ankara about the Turkish peace mediation between Israel and Syria suggest that the two nations have made considerable progress, and that they will soon meet face-to-face. Seeing it in this light explains Israel’s various peace overtures towards Lebanon, as well as its willingness to negotiate a prisoners exchange with Hezbollah and accept a ceasefire agreement with Hamas.
The negotiations between Hezbollah and Israel ˆ in connection with the exchange of prisoners and Israel’s willingness to relinquish Shebaa Farms to the UN or to Lebanon ˆ were mutually pursued for different reasons. Hezbollah’s leaders fully understand that the closer the understanding between Israel and Syria, the less leverage Hezbollah will have in any future negotiations. Striking a deal with Israel now will allow them to take credit for recovering Lebanese territory, and hail their resistance of Israel as the key to their success. On the Israeli side, removing the reasons behind Hezbollah’s resistance will give Syria an even greater leverage over Hezbollah to bring about its disarmament in due course. Making a move at this time will, in particular, blunt any prospect of needing to deal with another hostile front should an attack on Iran becomes inevitable.
Accepting a ceasefire with Hamas has also its own calculus: Without peace with Syria, Israel would have most certainly opted for a major operation against Hamas’ forces in Gaza to put an end to the reign of terror. But since the negotiations with Syria are going well, a massive incursion into Gaza which would have claimed huge number of casualties on both sides has ˆ for the time being ˆ become unnecessary. Israel fully expects that Iran’s support of Hamas through Syria will eventually come to an end. This could alleviate much of Israel’s concern over the likelihood that Hamas will take advantage of the ceasefire to rearm, regroup, and be better prepared for the next round.
Meanwhile, a period of calm will allow peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to advance more rapidly, thereby strengthening the Palestinian moderate forces led by Mahmoud Abbas. This will also give Israel an opportunity to reduce some of its stringent security measures, remove many road blocks, release more Palestinian prisoners, and allow more Palestinian workers to seek employment in Israel. While this will certainly not solve the complex dispute between Israelis and Palestinians, it will show a concrete effort on Israel’s behalf to make concessions in the name of peace. Israel will then be in a better position to assist Mr. Abbas, directly and indirectly, in building his security forces without being accused of pitting one Palestinian faction against another.
As was demonstrated by Israel’s major air exercise earlier this month, Iran’s overt threats on Israel’s existence are being taken at face value. And should Iran’s uranium enrichment programme get to a point of immanent danger, Israel will need all the alliances it can get. Thus, in any peacemaking efforts in the region, Syria has proven to be the most strategic key in preventing all out war. Historically, Syria has demonstrated that once it commits itself to any agreement or understanding it usually fulfils its obligations. Should the current peace negotiations succeed, the Middle East geopolitical dynamic will experience an historical transformation, while preventing a major conflagration between Israel and Iran. Both Syria and Israel fully grasp the huge potential gain or loss should they succeed or fail.
*Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU, and is the Middle East project director at the World Policy Institute,
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CIVIL WAR IN GAZA ISN’T IN ISRAEL’S INTEREST
Daniel Levy*t
Source: Prospects for Peace (www.prospectsforpeace.com), August 8. 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for publication
When a bomb exploded in the Shaja’iyyah district of Gaza last month, killing four Hamas operatives and a 5-year-old girl, Hamas blamed Fatah, and moved violently against its remaining Gazan enclaves. Fatah forces then pursued retribution against Hamas in the West Bank. Another round of intra-Palestinian conflict and bloodletting ensued, with the leading pro-Fatah family in Gaza, the Hilles clan, fleeing to Israel in the hopes of making it to the West Bank.
Think that Palestinians nearing civil war and the ongoing collapse of a central Palestinian governing entity serves Israel’s security interests? Think again. Those who are taking comfort in the televised images of Palestinian-on-Palestinian violence, or in the “propaganda coup” of Human Rights Watch condemning both the Hamas government in Gaza and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (P.A.), are dangerously misguided. These events neither exonerate Israel for its own violations of human rights and international law in the territories, nor improve Israel’s own strategic environment.
Nearly 50 days ago, a cease-fire took hold in Gaza between Israel and Hamas. Under the terms of the deal, which was mediated by Egypt, both Israel and Hamas would cease attacks against the other side’s territory, Hamas would prevent other Palestinian factions from firing rockets at Sderot and its environs, and Israel would gradually ease the closure that was devastating the economy and daily life of the Gazan population. The cease-fire is fragile, but largely effective—and the reality on both sides of the line is incomparably better, if far from normal. When Democratic presidential hopeful Barack Obama visited Sderot on July 23 and held an open-air press conference with the world’s media, he was flanked by an impressive display of rocket fragments. What went uncommented upon was that absent the cease-fire, such a press conference would have been unimaginable.
One by-product of the ongoing Fatah-Hamas violence is the endangering of that cease-fire. Any Palestinian faction seeking a distraction from its domestic misdeeds and courting its own public opinion is likely to turn, sooner or later, to targeting Israel. Renewed violence would not only return the residents of Sderot to their shelters, but would also undermine any prospect of a prisoner exchange deal for the release of Gilad Shalit. The events of recent weeks have clearly deepened Palestinian political divisions. Again, one is tempted to conclude that this might be a good thing for Israel—divide and rule, weaken the enemy. Again, one would be wrong. Or rather, let me nuance that: wrong if one considers a two-state solution and permanent, recognised and secure borders between Israel and its neighbours to be a vital Israeli interest
For supporters of a one-state solution or anyone keen on entrenching a regime of segregation and discrimination in the territories, this might indeed be a reason to celebrate. That is because a two-state solution, at least as things are currently configured in the negotiations, requires a Palestinian national movement that is sufficiently unified and legitimate in the eyes of its own public to be capable of agreeing and implementing a deal. Palestinian geographical and political splintering makes that more, not less, challenging. Israel providing shelter to Fatah fighters, as it did recently with the Hilles clan, and constantly referring to the P.A. leaders as partners does those Palestinians little credit in the eyes of their own public. A Palestinian leadership that is perceived by its own people to be a security sub-contractor for Israel is unlikely to be in a position to reach an historic deal replete with historic compromises. The last thing we need is another South Lebanese Army. Despite the warm words showered on Prime Minister Salam Fayyad and his security efforts in Jenin, Nablus and elsewhere, the sad reality is that Israeli policy is consistently undermining him.
But perhaps most worrying of all is that as Palestinians lose hope in the peace process, and look despairingly at both the Fatah and Hamas leaderships, there is a danger of extremist Al Qaeda-style alternatives emerging. Such activity may already be taking place today, as politics breaks down into clan structures and groups like the Army of Islam appear. Hamas is not Al Qaeda, but the alternative to it might be.
Most of the possible Arab mediators are reticent about expending political capital on Palestinian reconciliation. Saudi Arabia tried last year by brokering a Hamas-Fatah unity deal in Mecca. That has since collapsed, and the Saudis have withdrawn from the arena. Egypt, and now Jordan, maintain contacts with both Hamas and the P.A. Neither Egypt nor Jordan, however, is rushing to fill the mediation vacuum, as both inevitably accord primacy to domestic political considerations. Of course, Israel has contributed, and not insignificantly, to the hollowing-out of the Palestinian national movement — by failing to deliver an end to occupation assassinating leaders, embracing unilateralism and more. But at the end of the day this is primarily a Palestinian story, and ultimate responsibility for ending the violence and pursuing an internal dialogue is with the Palestinians themselves. In the meantime, though, Israel should be doing three things — if for no other reason, than out of self-interest.
First, take a hands-off approach to Palestinian domestic politics. Don’t veto internal dialogue. The more we break it, the more we own. Israel obviously has an interest in pragmatists carrying the day, but the reality is that Israelis and Palestinians are in a conflict. For a Palestinian leader, being Israel’s “favourite” is a decidedly mixed blessing — especially when favouritism translates into unsophisticated declarations (about “our partners”) and indifference to actual Palestinian needs (like lifting the closure or freezing settlements)
Second, create practical working arrangements where possible—with whoever can deliver on their commitments, and with whoever is willing to cut a deal, even indirectly. That means maintaining and solidifying the cease-fire with Gaza and extending it to the West Bank, and closing the understanding with Hamas for Shalit’s release. It also means working with the P.A. government in the West Bank to improve daily conditions in real and meaningful ways.
Finally and crucially, ensure that Israel itself avoids descending into chaos and maintains its own democracy and government by a central authority. Israel is facing its own wild West Bank. Video footage, available for all to see on YouTube, offers a shocking window into unchecked settler violence against Palestinian civilians and property and close-range shootings by the military of unarmed demonstrators and onlookers. Supreme Court rulings are ignored as the separation barrier cuts deeper into the West Bank, while settlements and outposts expand without respite. Attending to this chronic erosion of the rule of law in Israeli society is long overdue—and it is one challenge Israel can meet unilaterally.
*Daniel Levy was an advisor in the Prime Minister’s Office, a member of the official Israeli negotiating team at the Oslo B and Taba talks, and the lead Israeli drafter of the Geneva Initiative.
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TOWARD ISRAELI-SYRIAN PEACE
Alon Ben-Meir*, May 27, 2008
Recent reports indicating that Israel and Syria are indirectly engaged in Turkish brokered peace talks suggest a major (albeit overdue) development in the Mid-East peace-making process. Since the collapse of the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations in May 2000, I have consistently been advocating the need for Israeli-Syrian reconciliation specifically because there is not a single dispute in the region that is not affected in one form or another by this conflict. Should Israel and Syria successfully achieve a working peace agreement, the positions of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran would be substantially weakened. Any assuagement of these three actors, who regularly threaten Israel’s existence, should give the Israelis all the more reason to corroborate in any Syrian peace efforts.
Both Israel and Syria know the high risks and returns such a peace treaty can bring about. On top of the Syrian agenda is regaining the Golan Heights, as well as normalizing relations with the US (which peace with Israel could secure) and recognition of Damascus’ special interest in Lebanon. While the Bush administration has denounced Syria’s heavy hand in Lebanese affairs, this must be a loss taken for the greater good. Syria’s military, economic, and historical ties with Lebanon are far too intertwined at this point to be realistically separated for the sake of wider regional peace. Against these gains Damascus must recognize its role in weakening logistical and political support to Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as limiting influence from Tehran.
Returning the Golan will no doubt be quite difficult for the Israelis, but what a peace agreement ensures is a potentially secure border with Syria and Lebanon. In dealing with Iranian and radical Palestinian threats, this will allow Israel a strategic leverage of paramount importance. By removing Syria from Iran’s grips, Israel could weaken Iran’s meddling and influence in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories and thereby erode the position of Israel’s most implacable threat, Iran. The goal in this situation is not only to make an Israeli-Syrian agreement, but to inherently shift the power structure away from an Iran-centric hegemony.
After years of direct and indirect involvement, I can attest that this turn of events has not come about without considerable posturing between Israel and Syria over the past 24 months. For years, Israel has insisted that it could handle only one track at a time-the Palestinians-but worsening security conditions and mounting difficulties in Palestinian negotiations has given a new priority to talks with Syria. Israel sought to commence tacit negotiations with Syria, but was rebuffed as a leak could be detrimental for relations with Syria’s Muslim allies. This is where Turkey’s good offices and relations with both Israel and Syria came to play. Syria sought public peace talks as long as each party knew where the other stood and there was a general understanding about both sides’ expectations from these peace negotiations.
In an October 2007 conversation with Syria’s Foreign Minister Walid Al Mualem, was told that once the peace talks with Israel become public, Damascus’ relations with its friends will be irreparably strained, which is why Syria wants to ensure a successful outcome. Syria, he said, has long since made peace with Israel a strategic option, and its friends in the region know that only too well. In retrospect, he was referring to Iran and Hezbollah’s growing influence over Syria, knowing that Israeli-Syrian peace talks would have to be worth the
risk of upsetting both of these powerful forces. For 12 years-from the time he was Syria’s ambassador to the US-Al Mualem has been adamant about his country’s desires and the conditions it requires for peace, which suggests that Damascus now is quite committed to the success of these peace talks.
As expected, there remain several difficult issues that could stymie an agreement such as final borders, security, water, and the nature of the relationship between the two nations. Syria will undoubtedly continue to insist on the final borders to be the June 4, 1967 ceasefire line which will give Damascus “a leg in the water,” that is, a commanding position over the eastern shores of the Sea of Galilee. Israel will still insist on pushing the Syrians eastward to the 1923 international border. Although the difference in land mass is not significant (less than seven square miles), for the Syrians returning back to the June 4 line represents a source of considerable national pride. It should be noted that the Israeli-Syrian negotiation in 2000 broke down over this border dispute. I suspect that the territorial discord will be resolved by Israel agreeing that while officially the border will be the June 4 ceasefire line, Syria will be forbidden from advancing beyond the 1923 international border. This will no doubt be an outcome of constructive ambiguity, though for the snake-like plot of land that at times is no more than 10-feet wide, any complete ownership will only be of symbolic importance.
With regard to national security, Israel will continue to demand that the Golan is demilitarized and only internal Syrian security personnel with light arms will be allowed-as was the condition for returning Sinai in the 1979 Egypt-Israeli peace treaty. There is a security issue that could complicate the negotiations, which relates to the nature of combat ready military units and installations Syria may station outside the Golan within striking distance from Israel. Israel will also insist that Syria stops the flow of weapons to Hezbollah and commits itself to help in disarming the organization. Other issues of great concern to Israel, including water supplies and normalization of relations, may prove to be easier to resolve because the Syrians appear to be determined not to allow these issues to prevent them from reaching an agreement. Ideally, both sides will be committed to finding solutions to mutually alleviate the security concern of each other, as this goes hand-in-hand with the risk of open negotiations. As was put to me by another Syrian official who asked to remain anonymous, “Once Israel concedes on the border dispute, we will surprise the Israelis with how flexible we can be on all other issues.”
One last complication that may drag the negotiations out is the number of phases it will take to complete the Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Ultimately, Damascus will want a binding and secure agreement to be reached under one Israeli government, to prevent any backtracking that could potentially occur under a new government. Moreover, the Syrians see the withdrawal from a logistical perspective and feel that Israel could pull out from the Golan within a few months. For the Israelis, the withdrawal of nearly 30,000 settlers and all that will entail to resettle them is somewhat of a national nightmare, not to speak of the intense opposition by the settlers’ movement. I believe that the two sides will eventually agree to a phased withdrawal over a period of about three years, which will progress at a rate dependent on regional security. In return, Israel will insist that Syria undertake measures to demonstrate its commitment to normal relations, such as promoting trade and academic delegates as well as officials to travel between states. As each phase progresses, until the very last settler is prepared to leave, both sides must show a commitment to peace between peoples and not just governments.
Unlike previous Israeli-Syrian peace talks, the chances of success in this round of negotiations are far greater than at any other time. Both Israel and Syria fully understand the gravity of the deteriorating security situation throughout the Middle East and how high the stakes are for both nations if radical forces are not contained. Israel also understands the inevitability of returning the Golan if it wishes to live in peace and security, and Syria is fully cognizant that its relations with Iran have inherent limitations. Syria’s future economic prosperity and ultimate security depends on peace with Israel and normal relations with the United States.
These are the factors on the ground that drive Israel and Syria towards peace. The American involvement in these negotiations will become critical sooner than later. Tragically, the Bush administration failed to see the need for an Israeli-Syrian peace and how far the ripple effect could have been on the entire region. Instead, it has made a bad situation worse by refusing to engage Syria and preventing Israel from pursuing the only logical course of action. It is incumbent upon the Presidential candidates to voice their unequivocal support of the Israeli-Syrian talks, and whoever is elected president should lend substantial support to bring these historic peace talks to a successful conclusion
*Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies: alon@alonben-meir.com, Web: www.alonben-meir.com.
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WHAT SYRIAN-ISRAELI TALKS MEAN
Hasan Abu Nimah*
Source: Jordan Times (http://www.jordantimes.com), May 28, 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for republication. mmm
There was a surprise announcement last week that Syrians and Israelis started indirect peace negotiations under Turkish patronage in Istanbul. That was confirmed in both countries’ capitals soon afterwards. Almost simultaneously, the Israeli daily Ha’aretz reported that the two sides had already reached understanding as a result of secret talks in Europe two years earlier, between September 2004 and July 2006, and that the two sides would sign an agreement of principles, and once they had fulfilled their commitments, a peace agreement would be signed.
The terms include Israeli commitment to withdraw from the Golan Heights to the lines of 4 June 1967, without agreement on a timetable for the withdrawal. Syria demanded five years while Israel demanded 15. Although Syrian sovereignty would be acknowledged on the evacuated land, the agreement includes the establishment of a public park on a “significant area of the Golan “for joint Syrian-Israeli use, but the Israeli presence there ‘will not be dependent on Syrian approval.’” The agreement, described as an unsigned ‘non-paper’ also speaks of a demilitarised zone on the Golan; a buffer zone in between the two sides on the basis of a ratio of 1:4 (in terms of territory) in Israel’s favour; and Israeli control over the use of the waters of the Jordan River and the Lake Kinneret. Ha’aretz published on May 21st a summary of the agreement in an article by Akiva Eldar, with a link to the full text.
If this is what Israel means by withdrawal from all the Golan Heights, then one should understand the leaks, towards the end of last month via the Turkish prime minister, in that light. The Syrian Arabic daily, Al Watan, revealed on April 23rd that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had informed the Syrian president that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was prepared to evacuate the entire Golan Heights in exchange for a peace agreement. Conditions on Syria, such as ending support for Hezbollah and Hamas, and scaling down relations with Iran had always been linked to such offers.
Knowing Israeli negotiating style, it was hard to take the offer at face value. Israel would never expose its negotiating cards in advance; they never did that before. Quite the opposite, the Israelis negotiate hardest on matters they would normally be willing to concede, in order to help their position with respect to more difficult issues. But if the recent Olmert offer was based on the so-called non-paper, and if the Istanbul talks are meant to proceed on that basis, the matter should be different, although it is hard to believe that Syria would consider such an arrangement as basis for a final settlement. Replacing the occupation with a shared public park, with no Syrian control on access, renders any claim of sovereignty worthless.
Olmert was criticised at home for the Syrian talks surprise. Some political leaders accused him of trying to divert attention from the criminal investigation of his controversial financial deals, which casts doubt on his ability as well as his authority to make such big decisions at such a crucial turn˜when the investigation might push him out of office. One may add to that the possibility that the Syrian opening could also be intended to serve as a cover for the apparent failure of the Palestinian track, despite much American promise and „mild‰ persuasion on Israel to make any kind of face-saving gesture.
Israel did not offer anything at all. Olmert, since Annapolis and before, was under severe pressure to not even talk about final status issues with anyone. Defiant settlement activity has also continued full-scale. It is likely, therefore, that opening a new track with the Syrians, with talks that could drag on endlessly and without much commitment on the part of the Israelis, may offer a convenient, though temporary distraction.
The response from Washington has already been lukewarm, with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice affirming that the Palestinian-Israeli is „the most mature track,‰ but without expressing explicit discouragement. The question is whether Washington is really prepared to allow Syria, through engagement with Israel in a renewed role in the stalled peace process, to place itself in a better position internationally. Probably the Syrians see the renewed talks ˆ even if they hold little or no promise ˆ as an exit for them as well.
The Doha agreement amongst the conflicting Lebanese factions was another development in Syria‚s favour, with its allies in Lebanon gaining good ground as a result. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, supposed to be on the opposing side, included in a statement at the brief ceremony announcing the agreement a specific but a noteworthy call for improving the „brotherly relations‰ with Syria. Both developments could lead to a substantial reduction of the diplomatic pressure on Syria, but one needs to know if that is acceptable to Washington at this stage. Some analysts, according to Reuters, doubt that any results would emerge from the current talks before President Bush has left office.
Although leaks about secret Syrian-Israeli talks have been circulating for few years, the truth is that official negotiations have been held on and off between the two sides since Madrid in 1991, but no progress was ever made. Renewed talks always had to start right from the beginning, as probably they will do this time. There is no doubt that serious talks between the two sides with the objective of reaching a settlement would be a major breakthrough. It is an important step that will contribute substantially to peace and stability in the region, and will have positive effect on the other tracks. But, and most unfortunately, the new enterprise is surrounded by dubious signs and uncertain circumstances. Maybe the time has finally come for a miracle, which will be very warmly welcome.
*Hasan Abu Nimah is Jordan’s former ambassador to the United Nations.
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LITTLE ENERGY FOR PEACE
Thomas L. Friedman*
Source: International Herald Tribune (http://www.iht.com), June4, 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for republication.
West Bank˜When I reported from Israel in the mid-1980s, the big debate here was whether Israel’s settlement-building in the West Bank had passed a point of no return˜a point where any serious withdrawal became virtually impossible to imagine. The question was often framed as: “Is it five minutes to midnight or five minutes after midnight?” Well, having taken a little drive through part of the West Bank, as I always do when I visit, it strikes me more than ever that it’s not only five after midnight, it’s five after midnight and a whole week later.
The West Bank today is an ugly quilt of high walls, Israeli checkpoints, “legal” and “illegal” Jewish settlements, Arab villages, Jewish roads that only Israeli settlers use, Arab roads and roadblocks. This hard and heavy reality on the ground is not going to be reversed by any conventional peace process. “The two-state solution is disappearing,” said Mansour Tahboub, senior editor, at the West Bank newspaper Al-Ayyam. Indeed, we are at a point now where the only thing that might work is what I would call “radical pragmatism”˜a pragmatism that is as radical and energetic as the extremism that it hopes to nullify. Without that, I fear, Israel will remain permanently pregnant with a stillborn Palestinian state in its belly.
Why we need a radical departure is obvious: The business-as-usual course that Israelis and Palestinians are on right now does not have enough energy or authority to produce a solution. With the encouragement of the Bush administration, Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank are negotiating a draft peace treaty that supposedly will be put on the shelf, until the Palestinians have enough capability to implement it. I seriously doubt that the parties will reach an agreement, let alone have the energy to implement it.
The Israeli-Palestinian energy shortage today is on three levels: First is the level of hope and trust. Ever since the breakdown of the Oslo agreement, the romance has gone out of the peace process. Israelis and Palestinians remind me of a couple who, after a stormy courtship, finally get married and one year after they tie the knot they each cheat on the other: Israelis kept on building settlements and the Palestinians kept on building hate. When you cheat and have war after peace, trust vanishes for a long time.
The trust deficit is exacerbated by the fact that after Israel quit the Gaza Strip in 2005, Palestinians, instead of building Singapore there, built Somalia and focused not on how to make microchips, but on how to make rockets to hit Israel. The second energy shortage comes from the fact that Israel, with the wall that it has erected around the West Bank, has so effectively shut down Palestinian suicide bombers that the Israeli public right now feels no sense of urgency, especially with the Israeli economy booming. The West Bank behind the wall might as well be in Afghanistan. “Today, you have neither the romanticism of the peace process before Oslo fell apart nor a visible disaster knocking at the gates of Israel’s consciousness,” noted the Ha‚aretz columnist Ari Shavit. The third energy shortage is the fact that the political system in both Israel and among the Palestinians is so internally divided that neither one can generate the authority to take a big decision.
Only the US can overcome this diplomatic brownout by offering some radical pragmatism, and the logic would be this: If Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas does not get control over at least part of the West Bank soon, he will have no authority to sign any draft peace treaty with Israel. He will be totally discredited. But Israel cannot cede control over any part of the West Bank without being assured that someone credible is in charge. Rockets from Gaza land on the remote Israeli town of Sderot. Rockets from the West Bank could hit, and close, Israel’s international airport. That is an intolerable risk. Israel has got to start ceding control over at least part of the West Bank but in a way that doesn’t expose the Jewish state to closure of its airport.
Radical pragmatism would say that the only way to balance the Palestinians’ need for sovereignty now with Israel’s need for a withdrawal now, but without creating a security vacuum, is to enlist a trusted third party ˆ Jordan ˆ to help the Palestinians control whatever West Bank land is ceded to them. Jordan does not want to rule the Palestinians, but it, too, has a vital interest in not seeing the West Bank fall under Hamas rule. Without a radically pragmatic new approach ˆ one that gets Israel moving out of the West Bank, gets the Palestinian Authority real control and sovereignty, but one which also addresses the deep mistrust by bringing in Jordan as a Palestinian partner ˆ any draft treaty will be dead on arrival.
*Thomas L. Friedman won the 2002 Pulitzer Prize for commentary, his third Pulitzer for The New York Times. He became the paper’s foreign-affairs columnist in 1995. Previously, he served as the chief White House correspondent.
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PEACE DOES NOT TRICKLE DOWN FROM THE TOP
Ron Kraybill, “Peace Does Not Trickle Down from the Top”*
Source: Ma’an News (http://www.maannews.net/en), 11 June 11, 2008. This abridged article is distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for publication.
Common wisdom says that getting a settlement among high-level negotiators at a bargaining table is the major difficulty in achieving peace. In reality, the biggest problem is often not across the table, but behind it. Peace does not „trickle down‰ from above. It has to be seeded broadly and actively cultivated throughout a society from near the beginning of the transition.
One reason for the success of the South Africa talks is that the politicians who designed them were quicker than most to learn this. A bitter season of killings threatened the entire process less than a year after talks had started in 1990. After several months of fumbling, South African leaders in the major parties responded by establishing structures and strategies at local, regional, and national levels to address the threats to peace that faced every level of the bitterly divided country. They did this while the outcome of top-level talks still hung in a dicey balance, well before agreements were reached about the key issues driving the conflict.
The prospect of major change unleashes vast pent-up energies in a society. Human emotions, good and bad, are escalated. People desperate for change press hopefully forward with their dreams. Those who fear change or a repeat of past traumas raise shrill voices of warning. Those hungry for power grab what they can.
Political groups of every stripe raised their rhetoric in an effort to win support for their favoured formulas. Radicals stepped up their activities. Incidences of threats, intimidation and violence increased. By early 1991, South Africans picked up newspapers at the end of many weekends to frightening news: multiple deaths in faction fighting in Cape Town, dozens killed in raids by local level mobs run by political goons in Natal province, white farmers killed in rural areas by intruders unknown; scores killed and wounded throughout the country in violence of unclear origins; police moving in armoured vehicles against stone throwers, hundreds of demonstrators tear-gassed, attacked by dogs, and targeted with rubber bullets by police. It seemed the entire country could go up in flames while politicians sat in endless talks. I was shocked one Friday evening to realise that every bridge I passed en route to a friend‚s house was guarded by heavily armed troops. ‘It‚s war!’ I thought.
In this time a handful of black and white business and religious leaders got together and agreed on a strategy: They would convene a conference on the violence on their own joint auspices and invite the politicians to attend. The group was well-balanced, black and white. They knew and trusted each other. They had good connections to key political leaders. No one group would gain power or credibility by having the conference convened in their name. Politicians of all backgrounds accepted their invitation to a second conference held in June, 1991.
The National Peace Accord that resulted established the largest structure ever created in support of a peace process. A dozen Regional Committees were formed, made up of respected black and white leaders. A National Peace Committee made up of senior national politicians oversaw the Regional Committees. Dozens of Local Peace Committees were set up in hot areas. More than two thousand training workshops were held, most several days in length, to train people in skills for monitoring violence, negotiation, conflict analysis, and mediation. Hundreds of salaried staff and a far larger number of volunteers served as monitors for marches and demonstrations, as advocates on behalf of local community needs, as mediators to defuse local tension points, and as motivators for peace within their own communities. A media section conducted a media campaign advocating peace. Programmes in schools told stories of peace and trained youngsters in conflict resolution.
Key to the success of the National Peace Accord was that it immediately and directly addressed daily grievances that were outrageous to South African blacks. The conduct of South African security forces had for years been brutal. Even while peace talks were going on, white police were beating up and often killing black demonstrators. The Peace Accord included a first for the country: a Code of Conduct for the police and a process and structure jointly controlled by both sides to deal with alleged abuses. Community development funds also began to flow through the National Peace Accord to needy black communities.
As director of training of a conflict resolution organisation, I sat with a number of civil society advisors on the training committee of that National Peace Accord structure. Half the committee were high-level politicians also deeply involved as negotiators in the national talks. I often wondered how they found time to meet several times a month over details of training conferences on negotiation and violence monitoring. But there they were. Key political leaders on both sides saw that they could not single-handedly drive the country to peace. They made constant effort to root the process downwards and immediately address things that drove people to hopelessness. Though the politicians did the high-level talking, they took measures to bring certain practical results to all levels of the nation. Not next year, this month. This allowed hope and momentum for change to grow and grow.
What worked in South Africa will not all work elsewhere. But as we behold a rapidly sinking Israeli-Palestinian peace process, I wonder: – Whether political leaders on both sides now see the limits of their present „trickle down peace‰ approach and recognise that keeping a peace process alive requires providing immediate results to the people of both sides in at least a few carefully selected ways? – Whether politicians on both sides would be open to rooting the peace process more deeply in the societies with additional layers of civil society leaders mandated to help address immediate needs on an urgent basis? – Whether civil society leaders here would be willing to make the commitments that South Africans did to actively support the faltering peace process – Whether leaders on both sides recognise how the bitter divisions in the other side damage the prospects for peace for everyone, and might be open to conversations about ways to reduce these internal divisions? This is a task which a mutual understanding would greatly assist. – Whether the international community, which generously funded South Africa‚s National Peace Accord after the South Africans created it, might step forward once again to support such a structure if one were created here?
*Ron Kraybill was Training Advisor to the South African National Peace Accord 1993-95. Presently he is based in Jerusalem and Amman as Senior Advisor on Peacebuilding and Diplomacy for the American Friends Service Committee (Quakers).
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TAKING STEPS FORWARD: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FRONTS
Mara Rudman*
Source: Middle East Progress (http://www.middleeastprogress.org), May 27, 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for republication.
For those who have long advocated for improvement on movement and access issues, the Palestine Investment Conference experience illustrates Israeli capabilities on the positive side of the ledger. The Palestine Investment Conference in Bethlehem, held May 21st-23rd, turned out to be the milestone its sponsors had promised. For those who recognise the mutual Palestinian, Israeli, US and regional interests served by the establishment of a sustainable, functioning Palestinian state alongside Israel as soon as possible, it was a glass half full. The conference brought together local, regional and international investors, and demonstrated the potential for economic development and security cooperation necessary for political progress.
I attended last week’s conference with low expectations. Palestinian and Israeli friends and colleagues had warned me for months in advance: Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad was doing this only because the Americans had pushed him, and the conference would be an embarrassment; it could never come together in time. He was being set up for failure, said some Palestinian colleagues. Others cautioned that those who did want to come from Arab countries would have too difficult a time with Israeli travel restrictions at Ben-Gurion Airport or the Allenby Bridge, a main border crossing from Jordan˜difficulties that would be compounded by the hassles from Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers at checkpoints that would await them if they were admitted.
One thing evident from this pre-conference pessimism is that Israelis and Palestinians share far more than they like to acknowledge, including a need to insulate themselves from too many harsh realities with protective layers of cynicism.
It first occurred to me that the gloomy picture painted by many in advance of the conference would not come to pass when I arrived at Ben Gurion: greeters with „PIC-Bethlehem‰ signs met me, politely expedited my entry, took care of my passport and escorted me all the way to my taxi. Never before when acknowledging that I would be visiting the Palestinian territories had I been so well received at the Tel Aviv airport.
Next I learned that the conference was dramatically oversubscribed; hundreds more had registered than were originally anticipated. I observed this directly as I sat in the crowd spilling over into the overflow room for the opening plenary, a plenary that included more than a hundred businesspeople from Gaza and representatives from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, among other countries.
Panels were devoted in large part to mainstay investment topics ˆ discussion of financing, information technology, manufacturing, infrastructure, and construction sectors – but the conference did not shy away from tough issues unique to the area. A session devoted to ‘revitalising Gaza’ included Prime Minister Fayyad along with Planning Minister Samir Abdullah. Another session was focused on ‘East Jerusalem: Untapped Potential.’
At the margins of the panels and plenary sessions, leaders from both the private and public sector made investment announcements and commitments. Several stood out for their aim, scope and potential impact if their implementation goes forward as intended. For example, a leading Qatari firm, Qatari Diar Real Estate Investment Company, and Palestinian developer Bashar Masri signed an agreement to finance Rawabi, a major new affordable housing community near Ramallah. The project is expected to cost nearly $350 million and house more than 25,000, and it will create significant construction jobs. Affordable mortgage financing facilities also are being developed in parallel to meet market needs.
On a smaller scale, but to fill a critically important market demand, the Palestinian Political Risk Insurance Project (PPRI), a project on which I work, agreed to provide affordable political risk insurance covering trade disruption and asset damage resulting from political violence to small businesses. PPRI will establish a facility funded by public and private capital that will include the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a US government agency, and the Middle East Investment Initiative (MEII), an independent non-profit organisation formed to help revitalise economies in the region. Initially, OPIC will partner with MEII, to reinsure the National Insurance Company (NIC), a local Palestinian insurance company, for $5 million in political risk insurance that the NIC is providing to small businesses. Ultimately, the PPRI‚s capacity is expected to grow to $20 million.
Laced throughout the conference panels, discussions and side conversations were expected references to burdens, political and economic, imposed by Israeli occupation, starting with movement and access of goods and people and the connections between those issues, settlements and security. Yet for once these words were coming from people who had made it to the conference with dignity intact and far greater ease than is the norm in these parts.
The conference closed with an opportunity to attend Friday prayers in Jerusalem and tour the Old City. For many who cannot otherwise easily access Jerusalem this in itself was no small incentive to attend.
The Israeli cooperation required to make this conference proceed as it did, without incident, with the flow of this number of participants from this range of countries was outstanding. Top leaders in Israel had clearly given directions to make things run so smoothly, and extraordinary efforts were made throughout the chain of command. The IDF soldiers manning checkpoints entering and leaving Bethlehem, for example, were all officers, all spoke English (not just Hebrew), were easy-going in manner and were clearly instructed to speak courteously and treat as guests all those going to and from the conference. For many people who had frequented checkpoints in the past, this was not a typical experience. At the same time, the Palestinian security forces showed skill, commitment and professionalism as they managed crowds in and around Bethlehem. From the varied uniforms, it appeared that multiple security services were deployed and coordinating their efforts, another mark of improved training.
For those who have long advocated for improvement on movement and access issues, the Palestine Investment Conference experience illustrates Israeli capabilities on the positive side of the ledger. It also showed hopeful signs of what Palestinian security forces might be able to accomplish. Carrying out this kind of effort on a sustained basis and throughout the territories is exponentially more challenging. But when leaders make it a priority, it is a challenge that can be met.
Although the Bethlehem conference exceeded the expectations of many, the reality check of setbacks and negative incidents intruded at key moments, as is often the case in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On the second day of the conference, an Islamic Jihad suicide bomber on the Gaza side of the Erez checkpoint killed himself and, fortunately, no one else, but closed off passage home to the 100 plus Gazans attending, who must await the reopening of Erez before they receive permission from Israel to return home. This incident served as a reminder that extremist groups often work to play the spoilers at key moments like this conference˜and it also served to illustrate what is at stake and why it is so important to press forward for tangible economic and political progress at the same time.
Last week‚s Palestine Investment Conference, with its key announcements of deals and commitments, represents important steps forward in the process of building a sustainable Palestinian economy that will provide a strong foundation for a state. As important was the commitment illustrated by coordinated efforts on the ground by Israelis and Palestinians, likely with some US support, that were required to get participants to the conference, and to allow it to proceed, so that these announcements could occur. Now, this mutual commitment and coordination must continue so that agreements can be implemented and Israelis and Palestinians alike can see that progress ˆ economic, political and on the day-to-day issues ˆ is possible, desired and necessary for all involved.
*Mara Rudman is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and an adviser to the Middle East Progress.
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MISREADING THE MESENGER
Lawrence Pintak*
Source: International Herald Tribune (http://www.iht.com), May 25, 2008. Distributed by the Common Ground News Service with permission for republication.
Arabic TV does not do our country justice,” President George W. Bush complained in early 2006, calling it a purveyor of “propaganda” that “just isn’t right, it isn’t fair, and it doesn’t give people the impression of what we’re about.” The president’s statement, along with the decision by the New York Stock Exchange to ban Al-Jazeera’s reporters in 2003, is a prime example of how the Arab news media have been demonised since the September 11th attacks. As a result, America has failed to make use of what is potentially one of its most powerful weapons in the war of ideas against terrorism.
For proof, in the last year we surveyed 601 journalists in 13 Arab countries in North Africa, the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula. The results, to be published in The International Journal of Press/Politics in July, shatter many of the myths upon which American public diplomacy strategy has been based. Rather than being the enemy, most Arab journalists are potential allies, whose agenda broadly track the stated goals of US Middle East policy and who can be a valuable conduit for explaining American policy to their audiences. Many see themselves as agents of political and social change who believe it is their mission to reform the anti-democratic regimes they live under. When asked to name the top 10 missions of Arab journalism, they cited political reform, human rights, poverty and education as the most important issues facing the region, trumping Palestinian statehood and the war in Iraq.
Overwhelmingly, they wanted the clergy to stay out of politics. And, aside from the ever-present issue of Israel, they ranked “lack of political change” alongside American policy as the greatest threats to the Arab world. Though many Arab journalists dislike the US government, more than 60 percent say they have a favourable view of the American people. They just don’t believe the United States is sincere when it calls for Arab democratic reform or a Palestinian state, as Bush did again this month in Egypt.
Make no mistake, the Arab press has many flaws, including being subject to state control; only 26 percent of our respondents said they felt their fellow Arab journalists “act professionally” and only 11 percent said they were truly independent in their work. Nevertheless, Arab news outlets are more powerful and free today than at any time in history. If the next administration is going to try to reach out to the Arab people, it won’t get far by blaming the messenger.
*Lawrence Pintak is the director of the Kamal Adham Center for Journalism Training and Research at the American University in Cairo and the author of “Reflections in a Bloodshot Lens: America, Islam and the War of Ideas.” Jeremy Ginges is an assistant professor of psychology at the New School for Social Research. Nicholas Felton is a graphic designer.
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BANNING CLUSTER BOMBS: LIGHT IN THE DARKNESS OF CONFLICTS
Rene Wadlow,* June 5, 2008
This article is available at: http://www.newropeans-magazine.org/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=8025&Itemid=85&pop=1&page=0#
In a remarkable combination of civil society pressure and leadership from a small number of progressive States, a strong ban on the use, manufacture, stocking cluster bombs was agreed to by 111 countries in Dublin, Ireland, on 30 May. All bright sunlight casts a dark shadow, and in this case the shadow is the fact that the major makers and users of cluster munitions were deliberately absent from the agreement: Brazil, China, India, Israel, Russia, Pakistan and the USA.
Yet as arms negotiations go, the cluster bomb ban has been swift. They began in Oslo, Norway in February 2007 and were thus often called the “Oslo Process.” The negotiations were a justified reaction to their wide use by Israel in Lebanon during the July-August 2006 conflict. The UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) working in southern Lebanon reported that their density there is higher than in Kosovo and Iraq, especially in built up areas, posing a constant threat to hundreds of thousands of people, as well as to UN peacemakers. It is estimated that one million cluster bombs were fired on south Lebanon during the 34 days of war, many during the last two days of war when a ceasefire was a real possibility. The Hezbollah militia also shot off rockets with cluster bombs into northern Israel.
Cluster munitions are warheads that scatter scores of smaller bombs. Many of these sub-munitions fail to detonate on impact, leaving them scattered on the ground, ready to kill and maim when disturbed or handled. Reports from humanitarian organizations and mine-clearing groups have shown that civilians make up the vast majority of the victims of cluster bombs, especially children attracted by their small size and often bright colors.
The failure rate of cluster munitions is high, ranging from 30 to 80 per cent. But “failure” may be the wrong word. They may, in fact, be designed to kill later. The large number of unexploded cluster bombs means that farm lands and forests cannot be used or used with great danger. Most people killed and wounded by cluster bombs in the 21 conflicts where they have been used are civilians, often young. Such persons often suffer severe injuries such as loss of limbs and loss of sight. It is difficult to resume work or schooling.
Discussions of a ban on cluster weapons had begun in 1979 during the negotiations in Geneva leading to the Convention on Prohibition on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects — the “1980 Inhumane Weapons Convention” to its friends.
The indiscriminate impact of cluster bombs was raised by the representative of the Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva and me with the support of the Swedish government. My NGO text of August 1979 for the citizens of the world on “Anti-Personnel Fragmentation Weapons” called for a ban based on the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration and recommended that “permanent verification and dispute-settlement procedures be established which may investigated all charges of the use of prohibited weapons whether in inter-State or internal conflicts, and that such a permanent body include a consultative committee of experts who could begin their work without a prior resolution of the UN Security Council.”
I was thanked for my efforts but left to understand that world citizens are not in the field of real politics and that I would do better to stick to pushing for a ban on napalm — photos of its use in Vietnam being still in the memory of many delegates. Governments always have difficulty focusing on more than one weapon at a time. Likewise for public pressure to build there needs to be some stark visual reminders to draw attention and to evoke compassion.
Although cluster munitions were widely used in the Vietnam-Indochina war, they never received the media and thus the public attention of napalm. (1) The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research recently published a study on the continued destructive impact of cluster bombs in Laos noting that “The Lao People’s Democratic Republic has the dubious distinction of being the most heavily bombed country in the world” (2). Cluster-bomb land clearance is still going on while the 1963-1973 war in Laos has largely faded from broader public memory.
The wide use by NATO forces in the Kosovo conflict again drew attention to the use of cluster bombs and unexploded ordnance. The ironic gap between the humanitarian aims given for the war and the continued killing by cluster bombs after the war was too wide not to notice. However, the difficulties of UN administration of Kosovo and of negotiating a “final status” soon overshadowed all other concerns. Likewise the use of cluster bombs in Iraq is overshadowed by the continuing conflict, sectarian violence, the role of the USA and Iran, and what shape Iraq will take after the withdrawal of US troops.
Thus, it was the indiscriminate use of cluster bombs against Lebanon in a particularly senseless and inconclusive war that has finally led to sustained efforts for a ban.The ban on cluster bombs follows closely the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction which came into force in March 1999 and has been now ratified by 152 States. Many of the same NGOs active on anti-personnel mines were also the motors of the efforts on cluster bombs — a combination of disarmament and humanitarian groups.
States plan to sign officially the treaty in December in Oslo where the negotiations began. If the momentum can be kept up, parliaments should ratify the treaty quickly, and it could come into force by mid-2009. It is important to contact members of parliament indicating approval of the ban and asking for swift ratification. A more difficult task will be to convince those States addicted to cluster bombs: USA, Russia, China, Israel, India and Pakistan. The ban may discourage their use by these States, but a signature by them would be an important sign of respect for international agreements and world law. Pressure must be kept up on those outside the law.
*René Wadlow is Representative to the United Nations, Geneva, Association of World Citizens and Editor of the online journal of world politics, http://www.transnational-perspectives.org
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1. See Eric Prokosch, who called attention to the range of weapons used in the Vietnam war in his Technology of Killing: A Military and Political History of Anti-personnel Weapons (London: Zed Books, 1995)
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